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Abstract 
Power grids, electrical systems and liberalized zonal electricity markets are in due for ma-
jor recasting as the ongoing energy transition impacts the electricity sector profoundly. 
This will mean new kinds of market behavior in liberalized and regulated electricity mar-
kets and increased challenges for TSOs to maintain power balance at system-level. Also, 
inadequacies in network capacity and flexible asset availability impact at local level. Con-
gestions, voltage deviations and grid outages impact both TSOs and DSOs locally and the 
mitigation of these situations requires new types of multilateral coordination. In addition 
to more transmission and distribution grid capacity, future electrical systems need resili-
ent flexible resources and intelligent control mechanisms. This thesis examines market-
based control by using flexibility products. The envisioned flexibility products are ex-
pected to be implementable in the Baltic Sea area electricity markets during the regulatory 
period of Finnish electricity network companies beginning in 2024.  
Thesis includes a literature review and a qualitative empirical research consisting of 
industry consultation. First, the literature study examines existing products traded on fu-
ture European electricity markets and other mechanisms that control networks and net-
work connected assets. Secondly, it examines emerging flexibility products that can pro-
vide local flexibility services which the existing product structure is not covering.  
Industry consultation includes Finnish expert views regarding different aspects of 
flexibility needs, flexibility markets and opinions on the emerging flexibility products. In-
terviewees found the concepts of flexibility markets and products new and complex. Most 
of the interviewees had not experienced serious technical flexibility issues at local level in 
Finnish electrical networks but agreed that local flexibility challenges would be a reality 
in Finland within next five years. Majority of interviewees saw new enabling technologies 
and market-based trading of local flexibility worth considering. They had different local 
needs for flexibility products, if trading could be done cost-efficiently and market design 
would be supportive for both flexibility buyers and sellers. Outage management and volt-
age support with flexibility were identified as the most urgent local needs and congestion 
management was seen less important.  
According to the findings, numerous although contradictory flexibility product al-
ternatives can solve different flexibility needs. It was concluded that market design should 
go forward with the development of three options: locational intraday products, locational 
balancing products and competitive bilateral flexibility contracts. The results show, that 
these recommended products are modifications of existing products. All three preferred 
options should be enabled due to different reasons and these options are not mutually 
exclusive. The compatibility of flexibility products with existing products and operational 
processes must be ensured, especially considering reconciliation of flexibility markets and 
a reactive balancing model of TSOs. Development of flexibility products should start im-
mediately with incremental experimentation with cooperation of all network users and 
operators. 
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voltage and reactive power control, outage management  
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Tiivistelmä 
Meneillään oleva energiamurros aiheuttaa merkittäviä muutoksia sähköverkkoihin ja-
markkinoihin. Tämä johtaa uudenlaiseen käyttäytymiseen vapautetuilla ja säännellyillä 
sähkömarkkinoilla sekä kantaverkkoyhtiöiden lisääntyviin haasteisiin ylläpitää järjestel-
mätason tehotasapainoa. Myös alueelliset haasteet lisääntyvät riittämättömän verkkoka-
pasiteetin tai joustavien resurssien puuttuessa. Paikalliset ylikuormitukset, jännite- ja 
loistehopoikkeamat sekä käyttökatkot voivat vaikuttaa useisiin siirto- ja jakeluverkkoyh-
tiöihin, jolloin ratkaisut vaativat monenkeskistä koordinointia. Tulevaisuuden sähköjär-
jestelmät vaativat lisää siirto- ja jakeluverkkokapasiteettia, joustavia resursseja ja älyk-
käitä ohjausmekanismeja. Tässä diplomityössä tutkitaan markkinaehtoisiin joustotuot-
teisiin perustuvia ohjausmekanismeja. Suunniteltujen joustotuotteiden on tarkoitus olla 
käytettävissä 2024 alkavalla suomalaisten sähköverkkoyhtiöiden sääntelykaudella Itäme-
ren alueen sähkömarkkinoilla. 
Tämä diplomityö sisältää kirjallisuuskatsauksen ja empiirisen tutkimuksen, joka 
koostuu sähköalan asiantuntijoiden laadullisesta konsultaatiosta. Työssä tarkastellaan 
nykyisten sähkömarkkinoiden tuotteita, joilla verkkoja ja verkkoon kytkettyjä resursseja 
hallitaan. Lisäksi työ tutkii kehittyviä joustotuotteita, jotka voivat tarjota paikallisia jous-
topalveluita, joita nykyiset tuotteet eivät kata. Konsultaatio sisällyttää alan näkemyksiä 
jouston tarpeista, joustomarkkinoista ja kehittyvistä joustotuotteista tutkimukseen. 
Haastateltavat kokivat joustomarkkinoiden ja -tuotteiden käsitteet uusiksi ja moni-
mutkaisiksi. Suurin osa haastatelluista ei ollut todennut suomalaisissa sähköverkoissa 
alueellisesti vakavia haasteita, mutta arvioivat paikallisten joustavuushaasteiden yleisty-
vän seuraavan viiden vuoden aikana. Merkittävä osa asiantuntijoista arvioi uudet tekno-
logiaratkaisut ja markkinalähtöisen joustokaupankäynnin harkinnan arvoiseksi, mikäli 
kaupankäynti on kustannustehokasta ja kannattavaa sekä joustavuuden ostajille että 
myyjille. Keskeyttämätön sähkönsyöttö ja loistehon hallinta tunnistettiin kiireellisiksi 
paikallisiksi tarpeiksi ja siirtojenhallintaa pidettiin vähemmän kiireellisenä tarpeena. 
Työn mukaan lukuisat ja keskenään ristiriitaiset joustotuotevaihtoehdot voivat rat-
kaista erilaisia joustotarpeita. Ensisijaisesti tulisi keskittyä kolmen kategorian tuotteiden 
kehittämiseen: sijainnilliset päivänsisäisen markkinan tuotteet, sijainnilliset säätösähkö-
markkinan tuotteet ja kilpailutetut kahdenväliset joustosopimukset. Tuloksista voidaan 
nähdä, että kaikki kolme vaihtoehtoa ovat olemassa olevien tuotteiden muunnoksia. 
Tuotteet ovat otettavissa käyttöön eri syistä, ja vaihtoehdot eivät ole toisiaan poissulkevia. 
Joustotuotteiden yhteensopivuus olemassa olevien tuotteiden ja toimintaprosessien 
kanssa on taattava, erityisesti yhteensovittaminen kantaverkkojen reaktiivisen säätöta-
van kanssa on varmistettava. Joustomarkkinoiden jatkokehittäminen tulisi aloittaa välit-
tämättömästi kokeiluilla ja verkonhaltijoiden ja -käyttäjien yhteistyöllä. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Power grids, electrical systems and liberalized electricity markets are in due for major recasting 
as the on-going energy transition impacts the electricity sector profoundly. Fundamental struc-
tural changes in the energy sector result from a combination of technical development, political 
goals and guidelines, capital movements and other phenomena (Smil 2016). Here energy tran-
sition refers to a global trend, the most rapidly emerging in the 21st century, of governments, 
companies and public implementing policies and practices in place to mitigate climate change. 
The mitigation is done mainly by reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions created from the 
use of fossil fuels. In Figure 1 is illustrated the trajectory of GHG reductions and GHG removal 
increases from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) based on European Commis-
sion vison to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. For the power sector this target is particularly 
ambitious, as it means reducing fossil fuel-based power generation without carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) close to zero before 2035.  
 
 
Figure 1: European emission trajectory in a 1.5°C scenario (European commission 2019). 
 
While electricity sector reduces emissions, the electricity consumption and peak loads can in-
crease if other energy sectors such as industries, transport and heating can reduce their envi-
ronmental impact trough electrification. For example, mobility electrification can decrease to-
tal energy consumption due to energy efficiency but increase electricity consumption and es-
pecially peak power utilization (Rautiainen 2015). According to Pinomaa (2019) the electrifi-
cation of Finnish chemical industry will increase tenfold the current electricity consumption of 
7 TWh (Pinomaa 2019). SSAB estimates, that cleaner steel manufacturing will require the 
equivalent of about 10 percent of Sweden’s current electricity consumption, which was 145 
TWh in 2018 (Dagens Nyheter 2019). In 2010 the EU28 building heat consumption was 13.1 
exajoules, of which natural gas was 47 percent of this market. Replacing natural gas with syn-
thetic natural gas (SNG) or other forms of electric heating, such as heat pumps, could reduce 
emissions of heating (Persson & Werner 2018). Previous examples put together require large 
amounts of affordable electricity production.  
 
6 
 
Reducing GHG emissions and increasing electricity consumption, implies that reductions in 
the emission content of electricity must be done. This can be achieved with increased non-
fossil fuel-based power generation, such as nuclear, hydro, wind, solar and biomass power, 
together with different kinds of energy storages. This will result in increased shares of decen-
tralized, variable and inflexible power production capacity in the electricity system. For exam-
ple, a high-growth scenario from Wind Europe (2017) foresees the Nordic wind capacity in-
creasing 2300 MW per year, exceeding 45 GW in 2030. This alone would significantly exceed 
the current minimum power demand of the area. Mid-term Adequacy Forecast 2018 of EN-
TSO-E sees the possibility of decommissioning or mothballing of tens of gigawatts of dispatch-
able capacity within the European area, such as nuclear and fossil-fuel thermal power plants, 
before the year 2025 (ENTSO-E 2018a).  
 
Alongside with capacity adequacy and balance management, also local grid constraints pose 
major challenges due the foreseen changes. For example, in major European areas 2016 market 
facilitation with ancillary services, such as different capacity mechanisms, witnessed a 21.4% 
year-on-year capacity increase and congestion management costs rose 25% between 2015 and 
2017 to 1.27 billion euros, although the distribution of these costs is highly concentrated in 
Germany and UK. The pressure on power grids described above is indicated by multi-billion 
grid infrastructure investment plants to all voltage levels. Changes in generation capacity to-
gether with the electrification of other energy sectors means that the current and future electri-
cal system requires more transmission and distribution grid capacity, resilient flexible re-
sources and intelligent control mechanisms. (ENTSO-E 2019a.) 
 
Extension towards a larger and more liberalized European power system and markets has his-
torically increased efficiency due to competition caused by the interconnectivity and market 
mechanisms (Elovaara & Haarla 2011). Existing market mechanisms must now be updated, so 
that market-based control can keep up with changes that physically impact networks. Current 
trends in the electricity sector mean that new types of distributed energy resources (DER) are 
connected and controlled by non-traditional parties in distribution and transmission systems.  
This happens sometimes in the grid segments with the lowest transmission capacity. System 
operators (SO) are responsible to continuously maintain both system level power balance and 
local level grid capacity adequacy to transfer electricity with reasonable cost. This also includes 
planning for future since infrastructure projects can take years to be completed, while new 
types of consumption and generation facilities can be completed at a much faster pace. A sizing 
approach of designing grids from centralized power plants down to low-voltage consumption 
to withstand almost all possible situations within a bidding-zone is also called a copper-plate-
assumption (Elovaara & Haarla 2011). It is evident that this assumption is not working anymore 
or at least not fast enough in the rapidly changing market and technology environment. To-
gether with insufficient existing network capacity this means that current zonal energy-only 
market models are not allocating resources according to spatial and temporal scarcity.  
 
Moving from an integrated power system with centralized controllable generation mainly in 
transmission networks to a situation where both generation and consumption are distributed to 
all-voltage levels and new types of resources are controllable by many market parties is a chal-
lenge for transmission system operators (TSO) and distribution system operators (DSO) (Big-
gar et al. 2014). Therefore, previously proven market mechanisms, infrastructure planning prin-
ciples and operational guidelines are not suitable for the type of multilateral coordination 
needed. For example, a common report from European industry: “An integrated approach to 
Active System Management”-report (ASM) encourages all market participants, market 
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operators, resource owners and especially system operators to enhance current coordination 
measures to utilize the full potential of the power system (CEDEC et al. 2019).   
 
Solely relying on grid reinforcements to handle every increase of load and connections of de-
centralized generation at the distribution grid level will be very expensive (Schittekatte & 
Meeus 2019). Similarly, solving all transmission grid congestions and balance management 
issues with grid investments or backup power plants will result in a power system that has 
oversized grids at all voltage levels, and has a socioeconomically non-optimal amount of gen-
eration capacity in the system. Thus, by over-investing, this hypothetical practice weakens the 
economic competitiveness of the entire electricity system in question, when compared to alter-
native energy sources or to electricity grids in other areas. The practice does not fully exploit 
new technology and advanced operating models and fails to utilize the full potential of the 
existing infrastructure. Moreover, in some cases the mentioned approach might not even be 
technically achievable, or its implementation may be too slow compared to the modern chal-
lenges. The provision of non-wire alternatives (NWAs) such as demand response, location spe-
cific generation, energy storage, and energy control devices can be an alternative for conven-
tional investments, such as network reinforcements or centralized power generation facilities. 
An investment into a NWA or other market-based flexibility procurement can in specific cases 
reduce the total system costs if the network asset or a backup power plant alternative would be 
otherwise built to facilitate very limited operational hours or minor overcapacities. Similarly, 
flexibility can be a desirable temporary alternative if the option would be to curtail load or 
generation during the completion of infrastructure projects. In vertically disintegrated power 
systems, the selection of flexibility over or in conjunction with grid investments requires mul-
tilateral coordination between regulated and market actors. In addition, enabling network mo-
nopolies to procure NWAs from markets requires sufficient cost-efficient supply locally and a 
supportive regulatory environment. After investments or procurement from existing resources 
the utilization of NWAs for balancing, congestion management (CM) or to other ancillary ser-
vices requires multilateral contracts and market-facilitated price signals. (Burger et al. 2019). 
 
In Europe utilization of flexibility for market-based balance and transmission management and 
transparent grid development has a clear ruling within Clean energy for all Europeans package 
(CEP), which among many things contains recasts to the previous Electricity Directive (EUR-
Lex. 2019b) and the Electricity Regulation (EUR-Lex. 2019b). CEP follows a series of Euro-
pean energy packages aiming to harmonize national markets to achieve an implementation of 
the internal energy market (IEM). The first package in 1996 started the deregulation process of 
the European electricity market. CEP continues this path to achieve a secure, competitive, cus-
tomer-centered, flexible and non-discriminatory EU electricity markets with market-based sup-
ply prices while meeting with the requirements of EU’s Paris Agreement for reducing green-
house gas emissions (Nouicer & Meeus 2019). For example, Electricity Regulation and Di-
rective will start to incentivize and oblige system operators, to systematically use market-based 
flexibility. The use of flexibility as a NWA has not happened on large scale either due to lack 
of need, complexity and uncertainties involved, technological costs, misaligned regulatory in-
centives or unfamiliarity related to the topic (Burger et al. 2019).  
 
Regardless of the chosen strategy for tackling flexibility issues, major challenges for both bal-
ancing and network management can be foreseen. As power grids are physically struggling to 
keep up with the energy transition, the value of both system level and local flexibility is in-
creasing. In future electricity demand and supply vary more and more temporally causing a 
need for new flexibility to balance system in different time windows. Flexibility is also required 
at multiple geographical locations to ease congestions and to solve power quality challenges at 
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system-level and locally at all voltage levels. To use such market-mechanisms market parties, 
TSOs and DSOs face new challenges that will require greater coordination than previously. At 
the core of a liberalized electricity market model design is the market architecture, operational 
philosophy and the definitions of tradable products (Lin et al. 2017). Successful product design 
for electricity markets is such that it enables secure, sustainable and affordable electricity where 
realized prices reflect the true value of the service, allocates costs fairly to correct parties and 
enforce system-beneficial behavior. Flexibility products can be a desirable alternative to exist-
ing products or to traditional grid reinforcements, if such solutions produce better results in 
terms of cost-effectiveness. As technology and concepts advance and the use of new flexibility 
sources is becoming more mainstream, they provide a good opportunity to re-evaluate, define 
and harmonize existing and emerging flexibility product definitions. The energy transition 
makes this need for definitions urgent. Figure 2 shows the current situation where many Euro-
pean initiatives and pilots are working with flexibility market concepts. 
 
 
Figure 2: Flexibility pilot projects in EU (Nouicer & Meeus 2019). 
1.2 Fingrid Oyj and EU INTERRFACE project 
This thesis is commissioned by Fingrid Oyj. The findings are to be utilized for power system 
operation and market development purposes and as a part of the INTERRFACE-project. Fin-
grid is a Finnish TSO responsible for the electricity transmission in the high-voltage intercon-
nectors and transmission system in mainland Finland. To enable continuous transmission in 
the power grid cost-efficiently, Fingrid utilizes flexibility procured from markets and from its 
own resources for balance management, non-frequency ancillary services and congestion man-
agement within the transmission system. Also, grid reinforcements and maintenance, market 
development and the sharing of electricity market information are necessary actions to increase 
efficiency of electricity markets together with stakeholders (Fingrid 2019a). Importance of in-
creased collaboration between TSOs, DSOs and market parties and the development needs for 
market-based flexibility utilization are emphasized in the final report of the Finnish Smart Grid 
Working Group-report, in which work Fingrid participated (Pahkala et al. 2018). 
 
This thesis is a part of an EU project, INTERRFACE, which has received funding from the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. INTERRFACE project 
(TSO-DSO-Consumer INTERFACE aRchitecture to provide innovative grid services for an 
efficient power system) is promoting cooperation and seeks to design, develop and test 
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multilateral flexibility services to increase efficiency in European power system. The project 
will last 4 years from 2019. Fingrid participates in the piloting of a single flexibility platform 
(SFP) for different models of aggregation and network bottleneck management, coordination 
between the transmission system operator and distribution system operator, and the develop-
ment of information exchange on distributed resources in the demonstration area of Finland, 
Estonia and Latvia. The use cases to be demonstrated in real-market conditions are: (a) con-
gestion management (from TSO and/or DSO side); (b) frequency/ balance management in TSO 
side, including mFRR, aFRR, FCR products and demonstration in cross-border usage; (c) flex-
ible grid connectors, where both contracts and technical feasibility will be demonstrated; (d) 
trading between interested market participants, like BRPs, prosumers. (INTERRFACE 2019).  
1.3 Objective and content of the thesis 
This thesis examines existing electricity market products, electricity market development and 
emerging flexibility product alternatives to complete gap-analysis of the foreseen future prod-
ucts and services. This is needed to define an optimal product structure for multilateral elec-
tricity markets. Examined products are to be used for balancing, congestion management and 
ancillary services in short-term electricity markets (Energinet et al. 2019). In this thesis, short-
term electrical markets indicate the timeframe of current intraday and balancing energy mar-
kets, but the thesis considers also longer duration capacity-based products where the possible 
service happens within the day of physical delivery of electricity. Longer term financial con-
tracts, day-ahead trading, electricity taxation and other structures that do not strictly enforce 
the utilization of flexibility within the delivery day are excluded from the scope, even though 
it is identified that these influence the attractiveness of flexibility markets, products and ser-
vices significantly. Scope includes also the possibility of utilizing network products, such as 
grid tariffs or network service agreements, to enforce system beneficial behavior near delivery.  
 
This thesis looks at all short-term products, both existing and emerging, to look for flexibility 
services that are not covered with the existing product structure. Focus is on short-term due to 
fact that longer-term markets have more commonly established products and procedures. An-
other reason to limit the scope to short-term products is the pressure of the energy transition 
pushing the system closer the operational timeframe and nearer the physical limits of equip-
ment as established above. This will mean, that the current short-term products will be modified 
before 2024 and to avoid the development of overlapping flexibility products, the foreseen 
updated versions of existing products must be known. Parallel examination of emerging and 
existing short-term products is needed because of two reasons. Firstly, to investigate product 
possible synergies in linking offers between products or product integrations. Secondly, to un-
derstand will networks and network users see flexibility products as an attractive option instead 
of using existing products and mechanisms.  
 
In this thesis multilaterality refers to utilization of flexibility for the needs of TSOs and DSOs 
as well both balance responsible parties (BRP) and third-party aggregators depending of the 
product or resource in question. It can be argued that historically all above-described parties 
have utilized flexibility, but not to full possibilities or in a coordinated manner as the term 
multilateral is here understood. In this thesis flexibility product definitions must be such that 
they are flexible, market-based whenever deemed societally beneficial, encouraging for new 
types of services and are compatible with existing products and other market mechanisms (Bis-
chof et al. 2008). Product definitions will be subjected to state-of-the-art technical, economic 
and regulatory constraints and to upcoming changes that have been decided to be implemented. 
The analysis focuses on the power system, electricity market and regulatory characteristics of 
Finland, but seeks Baltic sea area power system and EU compliant solutions for the 
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development of an internal electricity market. EU compliance is referred with the term Euro-
pean target model. Envisioned products are designed to be implementable in the Finnish regu-
latory period of electricity networks after 2023, if seen beneficial in further decisions.  
 
The main research question of the thesis is:  
• What kind of electricity market product structure would match the needs of the flexi-
bility buyers and capabilities of the flexibility seller’s best, while ensuring cost-efficient 
and secure delivery of electricity? 
The main research question can be further separated into sub-questions: 
• What changes are expected to existing electricity markets, products, rules and mecha-
nisms in five years?  
• What other changes could be done during next five years to existing tradable products 
on electricity markets or should completely new flexibility products be implemented? 
• Which of the emerging flexibility product alternatives are compatible with the foreseen 
electricity market architecture and foreseen updated versions of existing products? 
• Which of the emerging flexibility product alternatives are most promising for future 
development and testing? 
• What kind of flexibility supply different resource owners and operators have now and 
in five years? 
• What kind of flexibility needs different flexibility users have now and in five years? 
 
The study in this thesis will consist of a literature study and an empirical part. Two different 
empirical research methods were considered: a quantitative cost comparison of flexibility prod-
uct-based procurement against traditional alternatives, such as network reinforcements and ca-
pacity mechanisms or a qualitative industry consultation. The first method was not selected 
due to lack of suitable data and other reasons explained in more detail in Chapter 7. The later 
method was decided to be executed with half-structured expert interviews. The selection of a 
limited amount and discretionary expert sources for interviews is firstly due to time limitations 
and secondly since the concepts under research in this thesis are new or still non-existing and 
require comprehensive expertise from the field. Limited experience with flexibility products 
combined to current and foreseen flexibility challenges are the reason for real-life market-based 
demonstrations like the INTERRFACE-project, other industry wide collaboration and this the-
sis. The half-structured interviews will consult experts at Fingrid and with major stakeholders. 
Initial research hypothesis is that market participants, resource owners and network operators 
see barriers in further participation to markets or utilization of flexibility products for different 
services due to: 
• restricting network codes, regulation and market rules, 
• complexity of the operational demands of flexibility resources or networks, 
• market and product fragmentation and non-existing markets and products, 
• high transaction, availability and utilization costs of flexibility, 
• commitment of a resource to a specific market or service provider for a long time. 
 
The thesis starts by introducing the background of the research topic, Fingrid Oyj and IN-
TERRFACE project and the thesis objective in the first chapter. The second chapter introduces 
the relevant concepts and terminology related to liberalized power markets and the use of flex-
ibility for achieving stability in electrical grids. The premise for this is that the product design 
choices made in this thesis try to follow the market principles as closely as possible, while 
ensuring power system beneficial behavior physically. The third chapter elaborates the existing 
short-term market and product structures that will most likely be in place after 2023. The topics 
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to be examined are intraday markets, balancing markets and transmission and distribution net-
work management processes. The roles of day-ahead market, and system-level imbalance set-
tlement are explained together with intraday markets when deemed necessary, though they are 
not the focus of this thesis. Main principles of product design are explained in the correspond-
ing segments. Third chapter concludes with a gap-analysis of the foreseen updated versions of 
existing products. Fourth chapter introduces the currently emerging market-based concepts for 
flexibility management in future electrical markets. These concepts are categorized according 
to their capability to provide missing flexibility services for the power system. The fifth chapter 
summarizes industry consultation results from the interviews. Interviews contain topics regard-
ing system and market development in general and the possible flexibility product alternatives 
described in chapter four. Chapter six proposes the most promising flexibility products for fur-
ther development as a combination of results from chapters 3-5. Chapter 7 discusses the chal-
lenges related to proposed flexibility products and their implementation from the viewpoints 
of operational logic of electricity markets, network development planning and regulation. The 
last chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this thesis.  
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2 Flexibility in electrical power systems  
This chapter examines the key concepts and terminology related to liberalized power markets 
and the use of flexibility for achieving stability in electrical grids. The chapter is written from 
the viewpoint what most parties agree on a European level and is compliant to major legislative 
frameworks such as the CEP of an interconnected electricity grid with liberalized electricity 
markets in Europe. Electrical power systems need flexibility to continuously and in the long 
term to adapt to demands that different physical conditions and users require from the system. 
The concept of flexibility in electrical power systems has many alternative versions depending 
on the party responsible for the definition, geographical area and the time when the definition 
was done. For example, in the pan-European market framework there are still major transac-
tional differences in the existing market models, legal and contractual differences in responsi-
bilities of different roles and physical differences in the actions regarding system operations 
(Schittekatte et al. 2019). Flexibility in electrical power systems is here defined according to 
CEER (2018):  
 
“Flexibility could be defined as: the modification of generation injection and/or 
consumption patterns, in reaction to an external signal (price signal or activa-
tion) in order to provide a service within the energy system. The parameters used 
to characterize flexibility can include: the amount of power modulation, the du-
ration, the rate of change, the response time, and the location. The delivered ser-
vice should be reliable and contribute to the security of the system.” 
 
An electrical power system consisting of a complexity of physical resources, can be classified 
into to the following subsystems: generating stations, transmission system, distribution system 
and consuming loads. With the emergence of electrical energy storages (EES) and other DERs 
such as photovoltaics, some bidirectional nodes of a network can inject or withdraw energy 
depending on the situation. The quality of power delivery from generation to load must be 
controlled locally and on the system level respecting different technical limits. This is achieved 
with assets of network operators and network users. The main parameters related to these tech-
nical limits of power networks are stability, voltage and thermal limitations. These refer to the 
grids capability to transmit power within the operational security limits, which must consider 
physical characteristics of the interlinked network elements and possible sudden malfunctions. 
Stability can be further divided into rotor angle stability, frequency stability and voltage stabil-
ity. Frequency and voltage quality and the number and duration of interruptions are the main 
quality indicators for power delivery. Power quality is also measured and maintained based on 
voltage or frequency harmonics, phase asymmetry, transient voltages or frequencies and other 
metrics, which are not further examined in this thesis. (Kundur 1994).  
 
Real-time operational frequency stability in alternating current (AC) power systems is achieved 
by balancing the generation and consumption of power at the power system level. This is done 
with markets described in chapters 3.1-3.2. At local level SOs are responsible to control volt-
age, mitigate congestions and solve outages to ensure safe and continuous delivery of power. 
In AC system voltage is controlled locally with the balance of reactive power consumption and 
generation. Network elements in AC power systems load the grid with resistive and reactive 
attributes. Reactive attributes of components can be either inductive, capacitive or nonlinear 
where this characteristic depends on the loading situation. Reactive power is an abstraction 
which represents the imaginary vector derived from the phase difference of voltage and current. 
SOs need reactive power control to continuously maintain voltage, minimize real-power losses 
and congestions and ensure adequate voltage stability in case of contingencies. To achieve 
voltage stability SOs use their own resources and include obligations in connection agreements 
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and cost components in tariffs related to power angle control. This is currently challenged since 
many modern electrical devices are increasingly sensitive for voltage deviations and that many 
of the network connected devices have non-resistive characteristics. Also, the emergence of 
distributed and controllable resources and multilateral coordination required to use market-
based flexibility can be new to SOs. All power system control is achieved with flexibility from 
different kinds of flexibility sources, categorized in Figure 3. It is important to add that long-
term flexibility sources such as network reinforcements and network connected equipment are 
a mechanism which is a flexibility source with a lead-time in the investment. As the opposite 
of flexibility could be considered non-controlled demand and generation, but with evolving 
technology loads can be increasingly matched to generation or generation can be stored for 
later use. Utilization of flexibility needs preceding investments into the capability to do so. 
(Machowski et al. 1997).  
 
 
Figure 3: Categorization of network and network connected flexibility sources. 
  
This thesis does not investigate flexibility capability and costs of different technologies in Fig-
ure 3, but here is highlighted that not all flexibility demand and supply is equal nor of equal 
importance. For example, some flexibility sources, such as certain types of power plants, can 
sell system-level balancing and black-start capabilities and local-level congestion management 
for long durations while other resources are able provide fast responses for short durations. 
Also, when operating power plants inherently provide system-level physical inertial response 
and local-level voltage support. Some technologies, like certain older types of inverter-con-
nected photovoltaic and wind generators, have no or little inertial response or black-start capa-
bilities, but still these can provide some active and reactive power and congestion management 
services under certain weather-related limitations. Currently certain types of demand response 
equipment react only to fixed rules, wholesale prices or weather. Energy storage can have lim-
itations in the duration which the resource can deliver different kind of flexibility services. 
Some flexibility reacts instantaneously and for some resources an activation processes can take 
hours or days. All the differences above mean different capabilities and costs when different 
flexibility sources provide flexibility services. In cases of overlapping flexibility demands there 
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might be reasons to prioritize needs. For example, in scarcity situations the severity of the 
situation and socioeconomical costs of a system-level black out are higher than a local outage 
and imbalance cost, and therefore TSO balancing should be prioritized over market party port-
folio optimization or TSO-DSO congestion management (CEDEC et al. 2019). These system-
level emergency situations are not part of this thesis. On the other hand, in the case there are 
flexibility needs in different activation directions for a resource and a portfolio optimization or 
balancing can be procured from another location without causing issues this should be preferred 
and local network operator given priority.  
 
Equipment of power grids and network connected resources are controlled by complex set of 
directives, regulations, network codes, trading actions and various other measures that enforce 
system beneficial behavior to deliver electricity within the system. These can be categorized to 
rule, price and market-based signals and activations, explained in more detail in Chapter 3 
together with corresponding products and mechanisms. Signal components that influence in-
vestment, operations and trading can be divided into four categories (Burger et al. 2019): 
1. Energy price signal 
2. Network use of system price signal 
3. Ancillary services and capacity price signals 
4. Subsidies and other policy and regulatory costs 
 
Market signals and rules are a combination of these components. This thesis focuses on com-
ponents one, two and three. Electricity markets are distinguishable from many other markets 
by three unique physical characteristics: time, location and flexibility (Biggar et al. 2014). 
These differences all relate to the fact that produced electricity is almost completely non-stor-
able commodity and must continuously match system-level demand and local grid constraints. 
Previously market instruments have been mostly national or regional, but with the development 
of the internal electricity market international harmonization is taking place (Forsström et al. 
2016). From the viewpoint of this thesis the most important European wide legislation, network 
codes and guidelines are (Nouicer & Meeus 2019; Schittekatte et al. 2019): 
• Clean energy for all Europeans package (CEP), 
• Capacity allocation and congestion management guideline (CACM GL), 
• Electricity balancing guideline (EB GL), 
• Electricity transmission system operation guideline (SO GL), 
• Network Code on Demand Connection (DCC), 
• Network Code on Requirements for Grid Connection of Generators (NC RfG). 
 
Flexibility is a complex term which can be divided into technical, contractual and transactional 
aspects. Transactionally, flexibility means that there are sellers and buyers of flexibility in dif-
ferent types of markets or a party can acquire flexible assets to use them by itself. Physically 
users and buyers of flexibility are network operators which technically need flexibility for sys-
tem level balance management or more locally for example voltage support or congestion man-
agement. Both physical operations and financial trading relationships require contracts to be in 
place to define roles and responsibilities.  
 
In liberalized and deregulated power systems in Europe under the tasks of TSOs and DSOs 
include building, operating and maintaining transmission and distribution infrastructure for en-
suring the long-term ability of the system with reasonable costs and as an integrated electricity 
undertaking manage and measure electricity flows on the system, while considering exchanges 
with other interconnected systems (EUR-Lex. 2019a). TSOs and DSOs must do this in close 
cooperation with neighboring SOs after results from electricity markets are available near 
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delivery, but also in the longer term, ensuring the availability of all necessary ancillary services. 
IEM consists of different synchronous areas covered by synchronously interconnected TSO 
networks, which consist of one or more load-frequency control (LFC) areas operated by one or 
more TSOs fulfilling the obligations of balancing. LFC areas can be equal or consist of multiple 
scheduling areas. Scheduling areas link physical control areas to market based trading areas 
with bidding zones (BZ). To summarize each network component and network connected re-
source belongs to different kinds of system operation areas and a market area in which the 
trading of network use or allocation of network capacity takes place (Schittekatte et al. 2019). 
IEC 62325-451-3 standard distinguishes two alternatives for network capacity allocation: im-
plicit and explicit allocation (IEC 2014). In explicit allocation capacity is not included and in 
implicit auctioning the available transmission capacity is included in market clearing of power 
exchange energy trading. Terms are later used also in other contexts to describe either inte-
grated or separate processes in electrical markets. As a main rule in disintegrated electrical 
markets SOs do not participate to competitive markets, such as the production and sales of 
electricity. System operators utilizing generation or storage facilities as integrated network el-
ements is limited in the CEP, therefore in this thesis is assumed that the use of NWAs is pos-
sible only via service contracts from market parties (EUR-Lex 2019a). 
 
Market participant is a natural or legal person who buys, sells or generates electricity, who is 
engaged in aggregation or who is an operator of demand response or energy storage services 
(EUR-Lex 2019b). This is done through the placing of orders to trade, in one or more electricity 
markets. Balance responsible party (BRP) is a market participant or market participants chosen 
representative, responsible for its imbalances in the electricity market. Also, BRPs participate 
to the balance mechanism by utilizing and procuring flexibility to optimize their portfolios to 
minimize imbalance costs and by selling flexibility in different electricity markets. Such a mar-
ket participant who provides either balancing energy or balancing capacity to TSOs is defined 
as balancing service provider (BSP) (EUR-Lex 2019a). Independent aggregator refers to an 
operator that combines flexible resources outside the conventional electricity delivery chain, 
in other words, an operator that is not the electricity supplier or balance responsible party re-
lated to these flexible resources (Pahkala et al. 2018). In more general terms, BRPs, BSPs and 
third-party aggregators can be together referred as flexibility service providers (FSP), which 
can offer a variety of flexibility services to different needs and users.  
 
Among many other tasks national regulatory authorities (NRA) and Agency for the Coopera-
tion of Energy Regulators (ACER) are responsible for the regulation of the natural monopolies 
of TSOs and DSOs and the monitoring of wholesale and retail electricity markets. Market op-
erators or nominated electricity market operators (NEMO), certified by regulatory authority to 
organize cross-zonal electricity trade, provide a service whereby the offers to sell electricity 
are matched with offers to buy electricity. Market operators have a major role together with 
SOs, in the long-term and operational timeframe of power system management. Through the 
facilitation of competitive dispatching within and across bidding zone borders this service 
prices and balances generation and consumption, but also provides reference prices for finan-
cial and retail markets and price signals for example to install new generation or consumption 
assets. (EUR-Lex 2019b). 
 
For in order to market results to be realized and networks operators to maintain the electricity 
system operational, many parties must do different market and remedial actions to provide 
ancillary services. Therefore, flexibility provides services to grids, system and markets 
(CEDEC et al. 2019). A set of remedial actions can consist of proactive and reactive actions. 
Preventive remedial actions in general are preventive operational planning processes that 
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enable networks to cope with any possible single fault, so called N-1 criterion, based on fore-
casts or scheduled dispatches. Such actions can be topology changes, network capacity reallo-
cation and redispatching or countertrading before network issues occur. Reactive actions are 
activated immediately or relatively soon after operational security limits are violated. Electric-
ity Directive defines ancillary service as “a service necessary for the operation of a transmission 
or distribution system including balancing and non-frequency ancillary services but not con-
gestion management”. Electricity Directive defines non-frequency ancillary service as “a ser-
vice used by a transmission or distribution system operator for steady state voltage control, fast 
reactive current injections, inertia for local grid stability, short-circuit current, and black start 
capability and island operation capability. (EUR-Lex 2019a).  
 
This thesis does not examine balancing as it is an established mechanism with already func-
tional markets but examines balancing products and the balancing process to the extent it af-
fects the use of flexibility products for the currently missing services. EB GL defines balancing 
as: “All actions and processes, on all timelines, through which TSOs ensure, in a continuous 
way, to maintain the system frequency within a predefined stability range” (EUR-Lex 2017). 
Two balancing approaches can be identified in the EU: reactive and proactive balancing. 
Håberg and Dooman (2016) summarize the differences between the two balance philosophies: 
“Reactive designs aim at providing strong incentives for market participants to reduce imbal-
ances, thereby also reducing the need for balancing actions by the TSO. Proactive designs aim 
at efficiency through pooling of resources, early intervention, competition between products 
and centrally controlled price optimization through the TSO”. It can be said that reactive bal-
ancing attempts minimize balancing costs with lower balancing energy prices while reactive 
balancing attempts this by reducing the needed volume of balancing energy trades. Reactive 
balancing philosophy of TSOs relies strongly on the proactive participation of BRPs, BSPs and 
other FSPs to the maintenance of the system.  
 
To balance electricity supply and demand at system-level and locally system operators must be 
able to manage electricity flows within the grid. This is known as dispatching (Elovaara & 
Haarla 2011). Power system dispatching can be based on self (SDM) or central-dispatching 
model (CDM). In Europe SDM is more common and is defined in EB GL as: “a scheduling 
and dispatching model where the generation schedules and consumption schedules as well as 
dispatching of power generating facilities and demand facilities are determined by the sched-
uling agents of those facilities” (EUR-Lex 2017). SDM can be further divided into unit based 
or portfolio-based dispatching. In portfolio-based self-dispatching the planning and dispatch-
ing of the entire resource portfolio is determined by the scheduling agents of those facilities, 
while in unit-based individual generation or demand facilities follow their own schedules. EB 
GL defines CDM as: “the generation schedules and consumption schedules as well as dispatch-
ing of power generating facilities and demand facilities, in reference to dispatchable facilities, 
are determined by a TSO within the integrated scheduling process” (EUR-Lex 2017). An inte-
grated scheduling process means that balancing, reserve procurement and congestion manage-
ment are done concurrently. This thesis refers to SDM as it is more in line with the European 
target model, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Resulting trade-offs between CDM and SDM 
and proactive and reactive designs are explained in the corresponding following chapters, when 
network operators and market parties must optimize scarce resources for portfolio-manage-
ment, balancing, congestion management and non-frequency ancillary services. 
 
Congestion is defined in the Electricity Regulation as: “a situation in which all requests from 
market participants to trade between network areas cannot be accommodated because they 
would significantly affect the physical flows on network elements which cannot accommodate 
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those flows” (EUR-Lex 2019b). Congestions can exist on markets, physically or structurally 
(EUR-Lex 2019b). Market congestions are explained in Chapter 3.1. Physical congestions 
mean the breach thermal limits, voltage stability or the rotor angle stability as explained of 
network equipment as explained in Chapter 2. Physical congestions can happen due to market 
failures where there is insufficient capacity in relation to market nominations or due to outages 
and maintenance work. Because of the previous reasons and the in general due to the nature of 
electricity flows, physical congestions on grid elements can last only seconds or hours. In cases 
of continuous congestion situations, it can be discussed of structural congestions. Congestion 
management is tightly linked to energy markets, balance management and dispatching. In the 
short-term congestion management solves bottlenecks of scarce network capacity, which can 
be solved in the longer term with grid investments, bidding zone border reconfigurations or by 
other means (Fingrid 2019b).  
 
Comparison of flexibility services for congestion management against reinforcements is obli-
gated in CEP to DSOs serving more than 100 000 customers (EUR-Lex 2019a). In this thesis 
the management of congestion problems should provide correct economic signals to system 
operators and market participants and should be preferably based on open market mechanisms. 
Here congestion management is defined as any measure undertaken by system operators and 
regulatory authorities that aims at influencing power flows in accordance with operational se-
curity constraints within and across bidding zone borders in the operational and investment 
time scale. In this thesis countertrading (CT) is examined as a cross-zonal exchange where the 
locations of activated resources are not known within the bidding zone and redispatching (RD) 
as a cross-zonal exchange and all intra-zonal exchanges where the locations and parameters of 
the activated resources are known (EUR-Lex 2019b). In both countertrades and redispatching 
there should be another equally sized activation to the opposite direction within the bidding 
zone area, though this is assumed to be currently violated by many SOs. Figure 4 summarizes 
possible congestion management instruments. 
 
 
Figure 4: A structured list of congestion management instruments (Hirth & Glismann 2018). 
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3 Existing products in European electricity markets  
This chapter elaborates the existing short-term product structures that will most likely be in 
place after 2023 in European electricity markets and their links to flexibility products. Sub-
chapters 3.1-3.3 describe the existing short-term products and subchapter 3.4 summarizes the 
technical details related to these products and does a gap-analysis to identify missing products 
definitions. To limit the scope and provide concrete parameters, the examined products de-
scribed here are currently or foreseen to be used in Finland, but whenever possible the described 
products are referenced to the corresponding European target model parameters or to the fore-
seen trends in the European electricity market area for year 2024 (Nouicer & Meeus 2019). It 
is assumed that all products parameters are subjected to be possibly updated before 2024. 
 
There are thousands of different kinds of products and product-like concepts linked to Euro-
pean electricity markets. Definition of products and the differentiation of products, services, 
markets and other mechanisms related to liberalized power markets and electrical systems is 
complex. For example, Sys-Flex research identifies over 120 different kinds of products vari-
ations just in the current regulated electricity markets (Nolan et al. 2019). A product is an option 
that is purchased, delivered, settled and remunerated when called upon, and it is a central part 
of a specific market or mechanism (Nolan et al. 2019). Products are traded on markets to deliver 
services. Products are designed to incentivize regulated parties and market participants to in-
vest, trade and control assets or commodities linked to the electricity system (Biggar et al. 
2014). Here the entire electricity market and electricity system control is understood as the sum 
of different sub-markets and other non-market-based mechanisms, either related to the regu-
lated or competitive domain. In terms of financial transactions, power balancing and energy 
flows, the majority of control in power systems is achieved with different kinds of electricity 
market mechanisms. These can be divided into liberalized and regulated markets. Liberalized 
markets, such as financial and wholesale markets, are much larger and allocate most of physical 
capacity in terms of energy delivered. Fine-tuning and other remaining control is achieved with 
regulated markets and mechanisms. Figure 5 illustrates these scales from a Nordic perspective. 
 
 
Figure 5: Electricity marketplaces in the Nordics 2017 (Aalto University 2019). 
 
In liberalized markets market parties trade among selves whereas in regulated markets the 
counterparty is a regulated monopoly or monopolies. Other regulated control mechanisms can 
be further divided into price-based control, such as network tariffs, and to different rule-based 
mechanisms, such as network codes. Electrical system service is here defined as a physical 
action, which are needed to solve technical scarcities either at local or at system level as 
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described in Chapter 2. Market service is here defined as a service that enables the functioning 
of markets, such as offer matching, that in turn enable electrical system services. To achieve 
market-based control, the market rules and tradable products must be functional, fair and har-
monized. This compatibility applies to local and national markets, but due to international in-
terconnectivity of networks, also larger scale market harmonization must be achieved to main-
tain control cost-efficiently.  
 
Many existing products, such as products in day-ahead and intraday markets, have been exten-
sively harmonized in Europe to achieve an internal energy market. In near future European 
compatibility of capacity and balancing products is expected to increase as, many cooperation 
-projects will be completed (ENTSO-E 2018b). Sufficiently standardized products and cross-
process interoperability is addressed repeatedly in CEP and in many technical documents to 
avoid market-fragmentation, remove market entry-barriers and to increase competition in mar-
kets (CEDEC et al. 2019; Schittekatte et al. 2019). This must be remembered when defining 
flexibility products. Figure 6 illustrates the existing electricity market structures. This chapter 
focuses on products in short-term market groups 2-4 in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Electricity markets in EU (Nouicer & Meeus 2019). 
3.1 Day-ahead and intraday markets 
This subchapter explains the implications of the European target model regarding the wholesale 
electricity markets and the network capacity allocation process to flexibility markets. Day-
ahead market (DAM) and Intraday market (IDM) are energy-only electricity markets (EOM). 
In energy-only markets market participants trade energy products in portions of megawatt 
hours (MWh) for delivered energy. EOM power trading takes place either on the power ex-
changes or in over the counter (OTC) trades based on bilateral commercial agreements. Due to 
single day-ahead coupling (SDAC) day-ahead markets is an integrated market within Europe 
where trading across bidding zone borders is possible. In intraday markets market participants 
can adjust their market position regarding foreseen changes in generation or consumption 
schedules. Single intraday coupling (SIDC) is less harmonized than SDAC, though this 
changed significantly in year 2018 when a joint initiative cross-border intraday market (XBID) 
was established. In some areas IDMs are designed with multiple intraday auctions, continuous 
trading or a hybrid combination of both (ACER 2019). In wholesale markets the offer formats 
and temporal resolutions, differ as this is highly depended of the imbalance settlement period 
(ISP), balancing and imbalance settlement mechanisms in place. Especially merchant market 
operators have the incentive to cooperate and develop trading products in close cooperation 
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with the industry as they can recuperate costs from TSOs and because this increases trade vol-
umes, which is a major income source of these platform owners (Schittekatte et al. 2019). Re-
garding new flexibility products, the most essential offer concepts of existing wholesale mar-
kets are explained next. A non-exhaustive list of currently SDAC (Nemo Committee 2019) and 
SDIC (Nord Pool 2018) compatible products types are: 
• Day-ahead products (SDAC): 
o Aggregated Orders 
o Complex Orders 
▪ Minimum Income Condition (MIC) orders 
▪ Load Gradient orders 
o Block Orders 
▪ Linked Block Orders 
▪ Exclusive Groups of Block Orders 
▪ Flexible Hourly Orders 
o Merit Orders and PUN Orders. 
• Intraday products (SIDC): 
o Regular predefined 
o Regular user defined block 
o Iceberg 
o Basket Orders 
 
The simplest product type in auctions is aggregated orders where parties can offer to buy or to 
sell a certain amount of energy at a certain price. Different types of orders from market partic-
ipants belonging to the same bidding zone will be aggregated into a single curve referred to as 
aggregated demand or supply curve. This is defined for each market time unit of the day. De-
mand orders are sorted from the highest price to the lowest and supply orders from the lowest 
price to the highest. The intersection of these two curves defines the market clearing price. 
Supply offers lower and demand offers higher than the clearing price are defined as in-the-
money and are selected. Offers equal to the clearing price are defined as at-the-money and can 
be either rejected or accepted partially or fully. Remaining offers are defined as out-of-the-
money and are fully rejected. (Nemo Committee 2019).  
 
Block offers are more complex multiples of standard products. Block orders are defined by 
supply or demand sense, price limits, number of periods, volume that can be different for every 
period and with minimum acceptance ratio parameters. Acceptance ratio can be defined as how 
divisible each offer and the group of offers is. Market parties can create structures where, for 
instance, bid B is selectable if bid A is selected through linked block orders. With exclusive 
groups of block orders market parties can create bids where acceptance ratio limits of individ-
ual bids must be followed, and the sum of the selected offers accepted ratios will not exceed 
one (Nemo Committee 2019). This can mean that for example both bids A and B must be fully 
selected. Block bids can be used to create structures where non-convex costs of flexibility are 
included in the parent block and child blocks are then capable of bidding at marginal oppor-
tunity costs for a market time unit (MTU) or for the following MTUs. A buy offer (bid) and 
sell offer (ask) are cleared if another party is willing to trade for that price and quantity, either 
fully or partly. An ask is equivalent to the market party having a position where it would gen-
erate more electricity or consume less and a bid to an opposite position. The block and complex 
products described above must exist alongside simple sell and buy orders due to the different 
flexibility capabilities of different resources and technologies described in Chapter 2. These 
conditional parameters can include the different non-convex cost, such as start-up cost, ramp-
rates and minimum run levels, of physical resources to the market processes. These conditional 
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products must be in place in future electricity and flexibility markets to enable market-based 
dispatching of flexibility while respecting physical limitations of resources (Forsström et al. 
2016). 
 
In day-ahead and intraday markets market parties place bids according to pre-defined bidding 
zones and price convergence between areas is defined by the available transmission capacity 
between zones. From a market perspective, the physical network capacity within a bidding 
zone is considered as infinite, however this is not always the case, as discussed in Chapter 3.3. 
Due to these internal congestions and other historical reasons, both unit- and portfolio-based 
bidding and dispatch are in place in different European bidding zones, as seen in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7: Balancing processes in European electricity systems 2017 (ENTSO-E 2018c). 
 
Apart from to allow self-dispatch there is no clear European target model whether self-dispatch 
in the bidding process of wholesale markets or during dispatch should be unit- or portfolio-
based (Nouicer & Meeus 2019). Majority of the European area is part of SDAC with implicit 
capacity allocation. In IDMs cross-border capacity allocation has both implicit and explicit 
types. Due to the need for a single methodology for pricing of intraday cross-zonal capacity 
(IDCZCP) ACER (2019) decided to move towards a combination of continuous intraday trad-
ing and three intraday auctions. This will impact flexibility market trading. Intraday capacity 
allocation is done after remaining capacity from DAM auctions is available and the remedial 
actions of system operators caused by infeasible market nominations or other network con-
straints are known. There is possibility to limit a maximum of 30% cross-border transmission 
capacity either due to TSO or DSO intra-zonal needs for cross-zonal balancing, intra-zonal 
congestion management or for other network management purposes (EUR-Lex 2019b). Such 
capacity reduction is here considered favorable if it is necessary due to the security of trans-
mission or it can be shown to decrease the overall costs of balancing or congestion management 
more than the capacity limitation causes net societal costs from wholesale markets, here un-
derstood as an attempt to maximize social welfare based on European-wide market area 
(Korhonen 2018). If nominations in the zonal wholesale markets with implicit auctions cause 
market congestions, due to capacity limits, the two price zones split. This is different to con-
tinuous trading in IDM where the capacity is allocated explicitly or for free on first come first 
served basis (Schittekatte et al. 2019). The definition of price for each area is then based on the 
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local nominations plus the maximum amount the region is capable to import or export when 
taking congestions into account. The price difference of areas times the commercial flow is 
defined as congestion rent and is allocated to the parties responsible for the transmission over 
the congested border (Fingrid 2019b). Here described cross-zonal practices and economic prin-
ciples are applied in later described intra-zonal flexibility market areas, when network capacity 
allocation reductions and congestion management are discussed. 
 
DAM has a gate opening time (GOT) latest at 11:00 central European time (CET) day before 
delivery (D-1) and a gate closure time (GCT) at noon D-1. DAM is based on double-side blind 
implicit auction where hourly supply and demand offers are traded. Both in DAM and IDM 
auctions marginal pricing is in place, but in continuous IDMs pay-as-bid pricing is in place. In 
continuous intraday trading trades are realized if a placed order is matched. In Europe the in-
traday gate opening time (IDGOT) and intraday gate closure time (IDGCT) are LFC area spe-
cific. When trading cross-market areas the intraday cross-zonal gate opening time (IDCZGOT) 
is often later than IDGOT and intraday cross-zonal gate closure time (IDCZGCT) is often ear-
lier than IDGCT. To increase the possibility of wholesale trading, many areas will have IDGCT 
near the start of delivery. This can be later than foreseen balancing energy market gate closure 
time (BEGCT). Details above can be challenging for flexibility markets and mechanisms de-
pending on preventive actions, as explained in later chapters (ENTSO-E 2018d). 
 
To understand the implications of wholesale markets to flexibility markets also the European 
target model regarding balancing and imbalance settlement must be jointly examined. This is 
because near real-time markets described in chapters 3.2-3.3 affect the behavior of grid users 
in the wholesale and retail markets and vice versa. Also, behavior outside DAM and IDM trad-
ing can affect networks, if for example a market party decides to differ from the market position 
or unit schedule by reducing or increasing network use to minimize costs or gain revenue from 
imbalance settlement. This behavior is here defined as self-balancing, which is either explicit 
or implicit behavior of network users to intentionally change their consumption or generation 
regardless of market nominations and other plans (Håberg & Doorman 2016).  
 
Imbalance settlement allocates occurred balancing costs to the parties responsible for the im-
balance. Imbalances are calculated per imbalance settlement period in the imbalance area in 
question, as the difference between the final position and allocated volume of the balance re-
sponsible party. The position of BRPs is linked to nominations in financial markets, OTC 
trades, DAM and IDM as well possible imbalance adjustments from balancing markets. In the 
future also flexibility market trades must be considered as well. Allocated volume refers to the 
measured or estimated grid usage, which is delivered by system operators from each metering 
grid area (MGA) where the BRP is active. In the Nordic imbalance settlement model, this re-
porting window is 13 days after delivery day (eSett 2019). After intraday markets, market par-
ties cannot anymore correct their position, excluding possible balancing, bilateral and flexibil-
ity market trades, unless there are aftermarkets for imbalance trading after the start of delivery.  
 
Depending on operational agreement of the control area, BRPs can also be responsible to report 
either indicative or binding production and/or consumption plans per unit for the relevant sys-
tem operator. Other changes described in CEP and EB GL oblige electrical markets move to-
wards 15-minute wholesale products, 15-minute ISP, supports to abandon separate balances 
for generation and consumption and prefers to move to a single price model for imbalance 
settlement (Nouicer & Meeus 2019; EUR-Lex 2017). The above described changes are relevant 
to flexibility markets since these markets provide references and prices to monitor flexibility 
delivery in relation to some position. Also, to define a holistic product structure, the trading 
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window and products of flexibility markets must be compatible with wholesale and regulated 
markets and vice versa.  
3.2 Balancing mechanism 
This part examines the relation of balancing mechanism products to other flexibility needs. 
Balancing mechanism ensures power supply matches demand at system-level in real-time. Bal-
ancing mechanism consists of balancing markets and reserve markets, but also of other mech-
anisms described in chapters 3.1 and 3.3. Figure 8 illustrates the balancing process where dif-
ferent reserves are activated for different purposes as ancillary service for frequency control.  
 
 
Figure 8: Balancing mechanism for frequency control (ENTSO-E 2018e). 
 
3.2.1 Balancing markets 
Balancing markets consist of balancing capacity and balancing energy markets. Balancing 
mechanism of the responsible TSO corrects the occurred imbalances during the operational 
time unit with self-balancing from market parties and reserve and balancing energy market 
offers from FSPs. Imbalances occur due to behavioral and weather-related forecasting errors 
of BRPs and due to disturbances, both in networks and in network connected equipment 
(Håberg & Doorman 2016). 
 
Unlike the European common SDAC and SIDC, balancing markets are in most cases are na-
tionally or regionally defined. Due to the energy transition examined in Chapter 1 and increas-
ing interconnectivity of European electricity networks, also these markets are being harmo-
nized (ENTSO-E 2018b, d). SO GL enforces the further harmonization of reserve categories, 
the sizing guidelines of reserves and the activation strategy for balancing energy in real-time. 
EB GL focuses on the product design of balancing markets and imbalance pricing (Schittekatte 
et al. 2019). Here the future balancing mechanism of the Baltic Sea area is studied from the 
viewpoint of the foreseen Nordic synchronous area control and European balancing markets 
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after 2023. Future Nordic balancing model is referred here as modern area control error (ACE) 
control. ACE is derived by comparing measured flows on LFC area borders against planned 
flows corrected with activated primary reserves and balancing contracts. In modern ACE con-
trol balance is achieved for each LFC area, while allowing cross area balancing trading and 
imbalance netting. Bids to the balancing energy markets are first organized in local merit order 
list (LMOL) and then forwarded to combine the common merit order list (CMOL) (ENTSO-E 
2018d). Activations of each LFC area are based on local control loops that are at system-level 
controlled by a common activation optimization function (AOF). AOF function results are re-
alized with LFC controllers, which provide automatic setpoint or manual dispatch orders to 
activate resources accordingly. The setpoint or activation signal that the BSPs receive comes 
from TSOs, which results in activations corresponding to the need and the merit order of the 
usable bids. These balancing actions restore the system frequency and progressively return the 
activated primary reserves, while considering cross LFC area balancing and possible grid con-
straints. (ENTSO-E 2019b). 
 
The possibility to reserve shares of transmission capacity from wholesale markets for balanc-
ing, congestion management or other purposes is not examined here further, but simply re-
garded as a possible option if it would create socioeconomical net benefits. If an offer activation 
itself would cause issues to power networks or if there is a need to reserve capacity for N-1-
dimensioning, system operators have a chance to mark balancing bids unavailable during the 
formation of the MOL or during real-time. It is here assumed that in the future this unavaila-
bility marking is done by TSO as currently, but also by DSOs. The differences of TSO and 
DSO grid voltage levels, network connected resources and the capability of TSOs and DSOs 
to assess the need to red-flag bids differ between and within countries. Unnecessary unavaila-
bility marking and other discrimination is here assumed to be avoided at all costs, but the de-
scribed actions require national and international multilateral coordination that does not exist 
in Europe at the moment (Håberg et al. 2019). Also, as discussed in later chapters, it is here 
assumed that in the future, SOs can have the possibility to manually activate contradictory bids 
from balancing energy markets differing from the price order or the balancing direction (Ha-
dush & Meeus 2018). This can be done with the preconditions that firstly there is a local flex-
ibility need and secondly that the costs are separated from balancing and allocated to correct 
parties. (ENTSO-E 2018d). 
 
Responsible TSO organizes balancing markets and is the single buyer of the of services. Bal-
ancing energy market consists of three types of reserve products: automatic frequency restora-
tion reserve (aFRR), manual frequency restoration reserve (mFRR) and restoration reserve 
(RR) (EUR-Lex 2017). Especially, product parameters of RR or mFRR with special products, 
such as long or fast activations, are interesting for local flexibility needs, as discussed in later 
chapters. Still, RR is not further examined here, since it’s not foreseen to be implemented in 
the Nordic Balancing Model (NBM) and is interpreted here as an overlapping product with 
mFRR (ENTSO-E 2018f; ENTSO-E 2019b). The role of frequency restoration reserve (FRR) 
energy markets is to return the frequency to its normal range and to release activated frequency 
containment reserves (FCR). The role of balancing capacity markets is to be a premarket to 
ensure enough capacity in corresponding balancing energy markets. This thesis assumes that 
future balancing in the European area will be done with separate capacity and balancing energy 
markets consisting of aFRR and mFRR standard balancing products and possible other special 
products (ENTSO-E 2018g). Participation to regional balancing capacity markets or pan-Eu-
ropean balancing energy markets will be done with offer submissions to the regional TSO, 
which then transfers the bids to the common markets. Here FCR refers to primary, aFRR to 
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secondary and mFRR and RR to tertiary control of frequency. This order means that after aFRR 
has relieved activated FCR capacity, mFRR bids are used to release aFRR capacity.  
 
The development project of the common aFRR-platform, called PICASSO, will enable a Eu-
ropean platform for the exchange of aFRR balancing energy (ENTSO-E 2018b). The location 
of a aFRR bid resource or aggregated portfolio must be included in the bid in the level of the 
LFC area. Portfolio bidding per LFC area is allowed also in the foreseen aFRR and mFRR 
balancing capacity markets, meaning that local flexibility selections from capacity markets are 
challenging without modifications (ENTSO-E 2018g). This thesis assumes that due to the na-
ture of the aFRR activation, this product will not be used for ancillary services other than bal-
ancing and is not assessed further as a flexibility product. The development project of the com-
mon mFRR-platform, called MARI, will enable a European platform for the exchange of 
mFRR balancing energy (ENTSO-E 2018d). The activation of mFRR products can be either 
direct (mFRRda) or scheduled activated (mFRRsa). Firstly, mFRRsa or mFRRda can be used 
for preventive balancing when a distinct and foreseen need occurs before delivery. This proac-
tive balancing aims to keep the forecasted ACE within the limits that FCR and aFRR reserves 
are sized for. Secondly, when mFRR is used for reactive balancing the role of mFRR is here 
defined to provide tertiary frequency control. (ENTSO-E 2018e.) 
 
Due to the nature of the mFRR standard product and the non-convexities of resources partici-
pating in the market, the design of the mFRR AOF must avoid technically or economically 
unfeasible selections. This means that the algorithm must be able to avoid linked bid activations 
where the underlying asset is not physically capable to deliver due to the maximum power 
feasible or the ramp-rate required. Economical linking means considering financial limitations, 
similar to block and complex bids in wholesale markets, described in Chapter 3.1 It should be 
noted, that the mFRR AOF does not perform optimization over multiple market time units. 
Therefore, according to current knowledge, economic linking with block offers forward in time 
will not be allowed, but it remains to be seen that will economic linking backward in time be 
allowed. This will mean that there is no certainty that manual balancing energy activations will 
be longer than a single market time unit of fifteen minutes. (ENTSO-E 2018d.) 
 
Balancing energy markets result in product-specific marginal prices and thus the current im-
balance pricing in Nordics, dependent on existing mFRR products, must be revisited (ENTSO-
E 2018g). Also, the activation logic of FRR and some FCR resources can have a noticeable 
effect on the imbalance of the BRP in question. Currently in the Nordic system these reserve 
resources and aggregated bids are linked to a specific BRP and thus considered also in the 
imbalance settlement. Implementation of independent aggregator models where resources from 
different BRP balances are aggregated together to participate to reserve, balancing markets and 
or other flexibility markets, require rules, transactions, imbalance adjustment processing and 
information exchange between different parties that does not exist or are not harmonized 
(Pahkala et al. 2018). The relevance of aggregators, independent aggregators and other FSP 
roles is assumed to be increasing in future when smaller and smaller resources are participating 
to system level markets, such as balancing markets, and localized flexibility markets. 
 
3.2.2 Reserve markets  
In this subchapter reserve markets of TSOs are examined from the viewpoint of Finland. Pri-
mary frequency control is achieved at the synchronous area level with physical inertial response 
of network connected resources, such as rotating masses of power-plants, reserve markets and 
SO resources. Reserve markets are designed to balance power deviations and maintain fre-
quency to an acceptable limit. When the frequency of the synchronous area differs from 50Hz 
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more than the dead band, the procured FCR or Fast Frequency Reserve (FFR) reserves activate 
with self-dispatch (Fingrid 2019c; Modig et al. 2019). Activation of FCR or FFR is done by 
the prequalified and selected resources, with a local measurement of frequency. FCR for nor-
mal operation (FCR-N) is a symmetrical product which is activated with a delay of a couple of 
minutes if frequency deviates within the normal frequency range of 49.9 - 50.1 Hz. Currently 
FCR for disturbance (FCR-D) is procured only for upward regulation to contain frequency 
above 49.5 Hz when FCR-N is not enough to contain frequency above 49.9 Hz. For FFR and 
FCR-D product there are different activation rules for different types of resources and how 
much the frequency has deviated. This thesis assumes that regardless of 15-minute imbalance 
settlement period and other market changes, the FCR and FFR markets will have a market time 
unit of one hour in 2024, but other parameters can be changed.  
 
The maintenance of these reserves in the Nordic synchronous area is agreed together by Nordic 
TSOs. For example, the share of Fingrid of the Nordic FCR resources is procured in Finland 
from the domestic yearly and hourly markets, the Russian interconnector and Estonian High-
voltage direct current (HVDC) links and other Nordic countries. FCR yearly markets ensure 
capacity and increase market liquidity, which is complemented with FCR hourly market offers. 
FFR will be a new market hourly market from 2020 onwards. It is established to maintain 
sufficient inertia in the Nordic synchronous area in case of an N-1 condition of critical network 
elements (CNE), such as large power plants or major interconnectors disconnecting. FFR is 
planned to be jointly procurable with FCR-D (Modig et al. 2019). The sizing and trading of 
these reserve products is not examined in further detail, as these are already established system-
level products. Still, reserve products are relevant to be monitored in relation to flexibility 
products. Firstly, this is since FCR markets can provide an interesting market for flexible ca-
pacity and thus reduce the availability of these resources for local purposes on flexibility mar-
kets. Secondly, if in the future flexibility markets can or must be cross-process linked to reserve 
markets. Thirdly, if for example FCR capacity would not able to be activated due to a disturb-
ance, voltage deviation or a congestion. (Fingrid 2019b) 
3.3 Transmission and distribution network management 
This subchapter describes the concepts related to electricity markets and power system man-
agement that chapters 3.1-3.2 did not dealt with. Terminology and definitions are related to 
Finland but can be applicable and valuable for other environments as well. Subchapter 3.3.1 
defines the current service of congestion management and 3.3.2 explains non-frequency ancil-
lary and other services, such as and local transmission management, grid maintenance and re-
inforcement planning.  
 
3.3.1 Congestion management  
Here is described how congestion management is done currently in TSO networks. As de-
scribed in chapters 1 and 2, there are numerous alternatives how system operators manage 
congestions in the long and operational terms at the moment and that the need for commonly 
defined congestion management products and practices is growing due increasing technical 
difficulties and costs. As an example, currently many TSOs solve congestions by unit-based 
dispatching, redispatching or countertrading generation or loads with for example hourly bal-
ancing energy mFRR-bids or other bilateral trades (ENTSO-E 2018c). This practice must be 
revisited, as self-dispatching is promoted, and new common balancing energy markets are be-
ing established. Also, DSOs are not part of this process. For example, congestion management 
activations longer than fifteen minutes are challenging due to the short market time unit and 
bid linking details as described in Chapter 3.2.1. The possibility to do congestion management 
with other options are described in Chapter 4 as emerging solutions. Congestion management 
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activations solve cross-border and intra-zonal violations of network capacity constraints which 
cross-border capacity allocation failed to solve (USEF 2018a).  
 
Finland and TSO redispatching is now presented as an example of congestion management. In 
Finland BSPs currently indicate in their mFRR-bids the location of the underlying resources 
inside the “transmission area”, although Finland is a single regulation area. Currently this 
means a division into north and south transmission areas, which are divided by the latitude 64º. 
These balancing bids are then sometimes used to solve congestions either on borders of the 
bidding zone or within the regulation area with redispatching and countertrades. If a balancing 
bid is used for congestion management, it is not considered in the balance or imbalance pricing 
and the system operator requesting the activations bears these costs. This cost-reflective allo-
cation principle is the precondition of all congestion management and other flexibility solutions 
presented this thesis. Congestion management bids are settled at the balance price or as pay-
as-bid if the offer is more expensive. (Fingrid 2019b.) 
 
The process of congestion management mechanisms in general is described in Figure 9. As 
illustrated in the first phase, a product definition is needed for to network operators trade for 
congestion management services. Currently in the above described example model, the product 
definition and main motivation bid for congestion management is due to BSPs bidding for the 
balancing market instead of congestion management. The possibility of combining balancing 
and congestion management processes also combining DSO congestion management with TSO 
congestion management is being discussed among network operators (CEDEC et al. 2019). 
Historically DSO have solved congestions with bilateral contracts or there have been little con-
gestions in DSO networks. According to phenomena presented in Chapter 1 the energy transi-
tion will impact all grid levels and DSOs must also procure flexibility for congestion manage-
ment. Currently DSOs are not able to use TSO balancing energy market offers for congestion 
management and the foreseen 1 MW minimum bid size on the can be still too large for low-
voltage networks (ENTSO-E 2018d). The motivation to combine TSO-DSO congestion man-
agement and balancing comes from possibility to avoid unnecessary market fragmentation 
(CEDEC et al. 2019). These combinations are listed in detail in Appendix 1, which shows three 
alternatives for balancing and congestion management markets and processes of grid operators: 
• Option 1: Separated TSO and DSO congestion management. 
• Option 2: Combined TSO and DSO congestion management, with separated balancing. 
• Option 3: Combined balancing and congestion management, for all system operators. 
 
 
Figure 9: Congestion management processes (CEDEC et al. 2019). 
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Here preventive congestion management is defined as system operators activating congestion 
management bids based on a forecast, before the congestion has occurred. Reactive congestion 
management is here defined as system operators activating bids when the congestion is already 
active in a network element. Like preventive balancing with mFRRsa-product, preventive con-
gestion management forecasting and settlement can be based on generation or consumption 
plans from market parties and other information such as weather data. It is important to notice 
that the availability and accuracy of these plans from network users might be questionable in 
the future, due to volatile loads or generation, near real-time trading, self-balancing and lack 
of motivation. Complementary to portfolio-based bidding and the possibility to aggregate im-
balances over the portfolio, there can be an obligation for BRPs to deliver generation or con-
sumption plans at unit-level. The motivation for BRPs to deliver accurate plans is dependent 
of the bidding-, dispatch and imbalance settlement model of different markets. It is here argued 
that if system operators allow portfolio-based self-balancing in a single price and single posi-
tion imbalance model, the relevance and motivation to give accurate unit-based plans is re-
duced. This results from the situation, where BRPs are not financially responsible for the ac-
curacy, as the imbalance settlement mechanism will not require schedules. The motivation of 
SOs to additionally incentivize market parties to forecast and deliver true private schedules at 
unit-level is here left open, though there are needs to use these plans during congestion man-
agement and other operational planning processes, as explained in following chapters.  
 
SO GL considers that the operation of the mFRR energy market should avoid activations that 
itself cause congestions to DSO or TSO: “Each reserve-connecting DSO and each intermediate 
DSO, in cooperation with the TSO, shall have the right to set limits to or exclude the delivery 
of active power reserves located in the distribution system during the prequalification process. 
Each reserve-connecting DSO and each intermediate DSO can set temporary limits to the de-
livery of active power reserves before their activation. Procedures need to be agreed upon with 
the respective TSO” (EUR-Lex 2017). This right of TSOs and DSOs limiting certain offers 
partially or certain resources completely to participate, is here considered to be allowed when 
it is due to physical limitations in the network. Therefore, here described congestion manage-
ment products and balancing in general should include a TSO-DSO coordination mechanism 
for enabling the marking of bids unavailable in the LMOL-process or during real-time from 
the CMOL. These assumptions are compatible with mFRR explanatory document, where it is 
stated, that TSOs can request to have a bid resource location defined for a LFC area or a more 
detailed geographical location. This location data is needed for the unavailability process de-
scribed above (ENTSO-E 2018d). Here is also assumed, that if there is a SO need and it is 
societally beneficially to do redispatching or countertrades with location specific balancing 
offers this should be enabled. This is regardless of the fact, that this suitable offer might not be 
the cheapest in the MOL or in the wrong direction in relation to balancing need.  
 
Reasonability of historical congestion management costs and technical suitability of the above 
described congestion management model of Fingrid is here simply assumed to have been suf-
ficient, but not a precondition of future results. Congestion management activations from TSO 
balancing markets should be revisited because: 
• the current locational signals are not sufficiently detailed and are static,  
• standardization is lacking,  
• common European balancing energy markets will be launched, 
• DSOs are not able coordinate,  
• the transparency is limited, 
• the introduction of single price and single position imbalance model, 
• to account for other challenges in the future.  
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3.3.2 Non-frequency ancillary and other networks services 
This subchapter examines voltage and reactive power control, network maintenance and rein-
forcements that TSOs and DSOs are doing as a service to network users. Currently these ser-
vices are procured and implemented either by the SO investing, procurement from market par-
ties or via grid connection agreement and grid tariffs (Glismann & Nobel 2017). Remaining 
ancillary services and transmission management options such as grid topology reconfigura-
tions, harmonics filtering, scarcity reserves and black start are not examined (EUR-Lex 2019b). 
As the services considered here are related to designated task of regulated networks, all services 
here should follow the main principles of sustainability, economic efficiency, non-discrimina-
tion or fairness, additivity, and transparency (Similä et al. 2011). 
 
Cost related to grid connection contracts and utilization payments of TSOs and DSOs, vary 
significantly in Europe and within countries. Also, the definitions of cost components and cost 
allocation principles between parameters vary. Here is assumed that system operators have an 
obligation to connect all interested parties to a network, but they can impact on the conditions 
of the connection. When a new network user wants to connect to the network the corresponding 
system operator can define the timeline, location, costs and technical details of the connection 
while respecting the main principles. The cost components vary mainly due to the maximum 
size of the connection, voltage level in question and location in relation to the network. When 
a network operator takes care of the grid reinforcement costs related to the connection this is 
considered as a shallow connection cost. If on the other hand if the new network users must 
pay for the connection equipment and grid reinforcements this is considered as a deep connec-
tion cost. Due to the complexity of electrical networks and behavior of grid users it is impos-
sible to allocate all or none of the reinforcement costs to a network user. Therefore, all connec-
tions vary in between deep and shallow costs (Similä et al. 2011). As stated in Chapter 1, rein-
forcement planning must be predictive and long-term since the lifetime of network components 
is often multiple decades and infrastructure projects can be slow to complete.  
 
An important technical point related to connections and flexibility products, is the possibility 
of SOs limiting network use. Because of congestions and lack of supply due to high network 
use, maintenance work or outages, SOs can be interested to include the option of curtailment 
in connection contracts and network service agreements. This option can be obligatory or vol-
untary and paid or not remunerated by the SO in question. These practices vary significantly 
can vary even within a network area. For example, a successful connection agreement into 
weak network segment could have an option for the SO to curtail peak network usage until 
reinforcements are completed. The alternative of this is that connections are not completed, or 
delivery is curtailed anyway. Some customers can be more adjusted to be curtailed or com-
pletely cut out of supply than others. Reinforcing networks to account for all peak network use 
cases or to avoid outages in network areas with low consumption per line segment is expensive. 
NWAs, such as electrical storages, near the connection of the customer, can in specific cases 
deliver the necessary power during outages and peak use to reduce the need to invest or to 
curtail. These practices are either not in place or have not been harmonized. The motivation for 
network users is to be paid for these kinds of flexibility service directly or with reduced con-
nection contract and grid tariff fees. (Similä et al. 2011; Schittekatte et al. 2018). 
 
Reinforcement deferral is here defined as SOs purchasing a service from resource owner, rather 
than investing into grid reinforcements. The motivation is to avoid an investment into trans-
mission capacity upgrades altogether or defer an investment into a future. The motivation for 
the former can be cheaper total costs, insufficient capability to complete a reinforcement in 
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time or clarification of the need. For example, there might be significant uncertainty whether 
an area will have higher or lower network use in the future and therefore it might be best to 
wait for the forecasts to improve. If a SO could procure NWAs for to be available during peak 
hours, there might be reduced need to reinforce. The reference price for this service is lifetime 
costs related to the discounted investment costs, which can be calculated by the corresponding 
SO or the regulator. Figure 10 shows this graphically in years, but does not include physical 
and financial risks related to the decission to defer investments. 
 
 
Figure 10: Reinforcement deferral (Contreras-Ocaña et al. 2018). 
 
Grid tariffs are in place so that TSOs and DSOs can cover the operational expenses related to 
electricity transmission. Tariffs are often different for generation and consumption connec-
tions, but due to the emergence of energy storage and distributed generation this assumption is 
less valid anymore. Also, with the help of these new technologies, both energy and capacity 
measured network use can be changed and optimized by the network users. Grid tariffs can 
have cost components such as: volumetric energy (€/Wh), volumetric reactive energy (€/Varh), 
maximum size of the connection (€/W), power capacity (€/W), reactive capacity (€/kVAr) and 
other fixed fees (e.g. €/month) (Similä et al. 2011). These costs can vary periodically and are 
based on the network area of the connection. For similar connected users within a network area 
these costs parameters are equal, regardless of the location. Also, accuracy of SO invoicing 
varies significantly in Europe, since there is little European harmonization regarding metering 
and tariffs. Tariff design has a major impact on all other flexibility products and must be con-
sidered in the design process. By increasing cost-reflectiveness or price-responsiveness in tar-
iffs, SOs can also procure explicit grid services from network users. The remuneration of these 
activations, such as congestion management, can be netted in the grid service invoicing or paid 
separately. These emerging concepts for SO grid services with flexible grid service agreements 
and dynamic tariffs are examined further in chapters 4.3-4.4. 
 
Reactive power and voltage control is an important task of SOs as described in Chapter 2. 
Liberalization of energy markets and vertical disintegration of utilities means, that SOs must 
procure reactive power and voltage control from multiple resources. Firstly, SOs control the 
balance of reactive power and voltages with their own resources, such as reactors and capacitor 
banks and other controllable compensators. Secondly, they procure reactive power reserves 
from network users with rule and price-based mechanisms, such as network service agreements 
and reactive power tariffs. Network connected elements, can have an obligation in their grid 
connection agreement to do some degree of reactive power compensation according to the lo-
cally measured deviation from the needed terminal voltage or power factor or do this implicitly 
based on foreseen tariff cost. The quantity and quality of voltage support delivered is not equal 
among different types of resources. For example, some resources are procured to deliver 
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continuous fixed compensation to an area while for example power plants can deliver dynamic 
control based on the momentary power factor.  
 
In Finland there are reactive tariffs in place in TSO and DSO grids. With reactive power tariffs 
SOs pass on the costs of voltage and reactive power control to their customers. If a network 
user must partly pay for reactive power and energy transmitted through the network connection, 
there is an incentive to participate in the compensation of reactive power together with SOs. 
This kind of mandatory voltage is here defined as obligatory reactive power reserve (ORPR). 
The possibility to be remunerated for ORPR in the European area is shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11: Remuneration of voltage control in Europe (ENTSO-E 2018c). 
 
In addition to this SOs can procure voluntary enhanced reactive power reserve (ERPR) from 
network users that are either not obligated to deliver to ORPR or can provide voltage support 
services above the standards of ORPR and implicit control from grid tariffs. A method for this 
procurement is presented in Chapter 4.2. ERPR is not a commonly established product defini-
tion nor a harmonized market. This largely due to the locational and technical specificity re-
quired. Existing ERPR procurements are often based on bilateral contracts, for example in re-
lation to a location with a large connection. (Takala 2018; UKPN 2019). 
3.4 Technical details and gap-analysis of existing electricity market 
products 
This subchapter lists the technical details related to products described in chapters 3.1-3.3 and 
summarizes with a gap-analysis of the existing product structure, including agreed changes 
before 2024. Here it is assumed that this foreseen product structure is due to two reasons. 
Firstly, the parameters of products have been defined as they are because they serve the differ-
ent needs of buyers and sellers. Secondly, these match to the capabilities of the providers that 
operate these markets. Product structure should enable two main goals of electricity markets: 
trading of electrical energy and continuous and secure supply of power in electrical networks. 
The complex dependencies between markets, products and services is illustrated in Appendix 
2. It should be noted that some of these connections are not primary purposes of the market or 
contract and that some lines do not apply to all electrical systems and markets in Europe. Also, 
32 
 
some products and services, such as Guarantees of Origin (GO), are missing from Appendix 2. 
Interestingly many of the market mechanisms are designed for one service, but there is still 
significant overlap in some services, such as balancing and congestion management.  
 
Product parameters are defined in Appendix 5. Parameters like minimum duration between 
deactivation period and the following activation and recovery period are not listed as these are 
assumed to be handled with bid linking, which is a market attribute not a product parameter. 
For example, conventional power plants might be interested to use linking so that they can be 
activated only if the activation is slow and long enough or in case of electrical storages use bid 
linking to ensure that the activation does not result into violations caused by the limited energy 
supply. Only the underlying standard products are described, while more complicated products 
are additionally in place. Examples of such are block product trades in wholesale markets or 
technical and financial linking in balancing energy market bids. Tables 1-3 list the technical 
details of existing products or the updated versions of existing products foreseen to be in place 
in 2024. This is done by using Appendix 5 as a template. Products in Tables 1 and 2 are com-
mon European products and products in Table 3 are Nordic regional products. 
 
FRR capacity markets and FCR yearly markets are not listed due to similarities with FRR en-
ergy and FCR hourly markets. Both liberalized market and regulated market products are 
shown, but non-market-based products and mechanisms, such as existing grid tariffs and net-
work service agreements, are not listed. Also, congestion management products, flexible ser-
vice agreements, dynamic tariffs and enhanced reactive power reserve are not shown because 
these are listed in Chapter 4 as emerging products. Bilateral energy trading is not shown as a 
separate product, as it can be understood in the broader context of bilateral contracts which are 
used for many purposes.  
 
Table 1: Wholesale and bilateral products. 
Parameter Bilateral contracts Day-ahead market Intraday market 
Short description Use-case specific bi-
lateral contracts or 
trades for services 
that other products 
do not enable 
Auction-based wholesale 
market for implicit trading 
of electrical energy.  
Auction-based or contin-
uous trading of electrical 
energy to modify previ-
ous nominations closer to 
real-time. 
Market time unit/validity 
period 
Many/continuous 
trading 
15 min.  15 min.  
Market opening 
 Many/continuous 
trading 
D-1 10:00-12:00 (auction) 
Uncertainties: 
Auction: D-1 15:00 
Continuous: e.g. D-1 
~15:15 
Market closure                        
(Cross-zonal=CZ,                                   
Intra-zonal=IZ) 
Many/continuous 
trading 
D-1 12:00  
CZ: varies e.g. H-60 min             
IZ: varies e.g. H-0 min 
Minimum lead time 
Contract specific 12 hours.  
Varies depending on the 
closure time: e.g. 0 min 
Full activation time 
Contract specific 
Not applicable since non-physically binding trade for 
the MTU. Also, results are known in advance.  
Duration of delivery pe-
riod (minimum-maxi-
mum) 
Contract specific 
Equal to the validity pe-
riod, 15 min.  
Equal to the validity pe-
riod, 15 min. 
Minimum bid size [gran-
ularity] 
Contract specific 0.1 MW [0.1 MW] 
Divisibility Contract specific Can be, depends on the product.  
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Symmetric/asymmetric 
product 
Contract specific Asymmetric 
Mode of activation  Contract specific Portfolio-based self-dispatch  
Locational information                        
(order book, bid re-
sources) 
Contract specific 
Order books organized based on portfolios in bidding 
zones. Underlying resources are not indicated (unless 
schedules, unit-based bidding or central dispatch used). 
Aggregation rules Contract specific Aggregation of own resources allowed. 
Link to primary ser-
vice(s) 
Many (e.g. portfolio 
optimization of 
BRPs, capacity 
mechanisms of SOs) 
Wholesale market trading. 
Link to secondary or 
other services 
Balance mechanism, imbalance pricing, cross-zonal 
network capacity cost allocation, retail markets, finan-
cial markets and many others. 
Market or other procure-
ment channel 
Many  Power exchanges 
Buyer(s) Many:  
SO from FSP,    
BRP from FSP,       
BRP from BRP 
BRPs trade with other BRPs.  
Seller(s) 
Remuneration and com-
pliance monitoring Contract specific 
Remuneration is based on power exchange trades. 
Compliance monitoring and remuneration or sanctions 
for physical delivery via imbalance mechanism. 
Sources 
- (Nemo Committee 2019) 
(Energinet et al. 2019; 
ACER 2019; Nord Pool 
2018) 
 
Table 2: Balancing products. 
Parameter 
 
Replacement Reserve (RR) 
Manual Frequency 
Restoration Reserves 
(mFRR) 
Automatic Fre-
quency Restoration 
Reserves (aFRR) 
Short description 
Product to return frequency 
to its normal range and to re-
lease activated aFRR or 
mFRR back into use. 
Product to return fre-
quency to its normal 
range and to release ac-
tivated aFRR back into 
use. 
Product to return fre-
quency to its normal 
range and to release 
activated FCR back 
into use. 
Market time unit/validity 
period 30min   15 min.  15 min. 
Market opening Unknown D-1 12:00 
Market closure H-55 min H-25 min 
Minimum lead time 25 min 17.5 min 25 min  
Full activation time 30 min 12.5 min 5 min  
Duration of delivery pe-
riod (minimum-maxi-
mum) 
15-60 min 
5 min or longer (de-
fined in Defined in 
terms and conditions 
for BSPs) 
15 minutes (equal to 
the validity period) 
Minimum bid size [gran-
ularity] 
1 MW [0.1 MW] 
Divisibility Yes (indivisible bids also allowed).  
Symmetric/asymmetric 
product 
Asymmetric product 
Mode of activation  Manual SO signal Manual SO signal Automatic SO signal 
Locational information                        
(order book, bid re-
sources) 
Bids can include the detailed location of the underlying resources, but order 
books are organized according to LFC areas. This can be due to technical link-
ing or SO rules, e.g. to do bid filtering to avoid or to solve congestions. 
Aggregation rules Aggregation allowed. 
Link to primary ser-
vice(s) 
Balance mechanism. aFFR is for secondary and mFRR and RR are for tertiary 
frequency control. 
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Link to secondary or 
other services 
Can be used also for: N-1 fault dimensioning, conges-
tion management and for other purposes. 
- 
Market or other procure-
ment channel 
TSO operated balancing energy market. Also balancing capacity markets (with 
availability remuneration) are used to ensure liquidity in balancing energy mar-
kets. 
Buyer(s) TSOs (and DSOs in the future?) 
Seller(s) BSPs (also resources of SOs or bilateral contracts can 
be used in scarcity situations) 
BSP 
Remuneration and com-
pliance monitoring 
Energy remuneration based on utilization with marginal pricing. Compliance 
based on monitored delivery. 
Sources (ENTSO-E 2018f) (ENTSO-E 2018d) (ENTSO-E 2018b) 
 
Table 3: Reserve products. 
Parameter Frequency Containment 
Reserve for Normal Op-
eration (FCR-N) 
Frequency Containment 
Reserve for Disturbances 
(FCR-D) 
Fast Frequency 
Response (FFR) 
Short description 
Product to control fre-
quency in normal operat-
ing conditions. 
Product for frequency con-
tainment in the case of dis-
turbances. 
Product for fre-
quency contain-
ment during low 
inertia conditions. 
Market time unit/validity 
period 
1 h  
Market opening D-30 
Market closure D-1 17.30 
Minimum lead time 6,5 h  
Full activation time 
Depends on the frequency 
deviation, e.g. 3 min. 
Depends on the frequency 
deviation, e.g. 1-30s. 
Depends on the 
frequency devia-
tion, e.g. <1s. 
Duration of delivery pe-
riod (minimum-maxi-
mum) 
No minimum, maximum varies e.g. 30-60min. 
No minimum, 
maximum varies 
e.g. 5-30s. 
Minimum bid size [gran-
ularity] 
0.1 MW [0.1 MW]. 1 MW [0.1 MW]. 
Divisibility Yes (indivisible bids also allowed).  
Symmetric/asymmetric 
product 
Symmetric Asymmetric for upregulation only. 
Mode of activation  Automatic self-dispatch according to frequency. 
Locational information                        
(order book, bid re-
sources) 
Order books are organized based on LFC area need, but underlying resources 
are indicated in bids.  
Aggregation rules Aggregation allowed  
Link to primary ser-
vice(s) 
Balance mechanism. (FCR is for primary frequency control and FFR for pri-
mary frequency control in low inertia conditions). 
Link to secondary or 
other services 
- - - 
Market or other procure-
ment channel 
TSO (LFC block TSOs together) organized hourly reserve markets. Also, FCR 
yearly capacity markets are in place to ensure liquidity and adequate supply. 
Buyer(s) TSOs 
Seller(s) Reserve market participants 
Remuneration and com-
pliance monitoring 
Varies in Europe, e.g. remuneration with marginal pricing for availability and 
separate utilization compensation. Compliance monitored with measurements. 
Mostly capacity is remunerated. 
Sources (Fingrid 2019c)  (Modig et al. 2019) 
 
All electricity market participants and network operators use electricity market products very 
differently and value certain technical details from their own viewpoints. One of the most com-
plex parts of trading are overlapping trading periods. This is shown in Figure 12 which shows 
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different GOTs and GCTs regarding a hypothetical delivery period of 15 minutes in Finland 
after 2024. Asterix shows trading parameters where increased uncertainty about the future is 
involved.   
     
 
Figure 12: Scenario of market trading times related to a delivery period of 15-minutes. Adapted from: 
(Fingrid 2019c; ACER 2019; 2019; ENTSO-E 2018d; eSETT 2019). 
 
The product parameters and market processes described in Chapter 3 have simultaneously un-
necessary overlapping and missing details. Gaps of the current electricity market product struc-
ture in Tables 1-3 and other identified challenges in Chapter 3 are: 
• Markets, products and other instruments are both fragmented and overlapping 
• DSOs have no or limited access to current electricity or reserve markets.  
• There are conflicting zonal- and nodal-market characteristics in most products. 
• Many products result in binding obligations to deliver, which can reduce flexibility of 
the flexibility trading process. Cross-process linking of product offers is not difficult. 
• Product parameters, market rules and settlement differ regionally and within regions. 
• Role of SO actions in competitive and regulated markets differs: 
o Network tariff parameters are not harmonized, and these do not support the use 
of locational and system-level flexibility dynamically.  
o Balancing mechanism and reserve and balancing products are not harmonized. 
o SOs participation or other impacts to wholesale markets are not a harmonized. 
• Missing locational based investment and dispatch incentives within bidding zones. 
• Missing time-of-use and flexible capacity-based incentives. 
• There are very limited harmonized, transparent or competitive processes and products 
for congestion management, outage support and voltage support.  
• SOs do not always remunerate ancillary services. 
 
Gap-analysis shows that there are many possible parameters that a product reform could tackle, 
regardless that major reforms and harmonization are foreseen already. For example, the imple-
mentation of near-real time GCTs, harmonized balancing products and updated settlement rules 
in of many products is here assumed to solve many of the identified gaps. Still, some common 
missing details are seen to remain, such as: the lack of locational information in energy-based 
products, dismissal of reactive power and voltage control products, outage support products 
and missing time-of-use and availability-based incentives in most products.     
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4 Emerging flexibility products for electricity markets  
This chapter focuses on flexibility products traded on multilateral flexibility markets which 
either do not exist in current European electricity markets or of which the definitions are not 
fully established or harmonized. Although existing markets use flexibility, here the term flex-
ibility market refers to markets where flexibility product trading or other mechanism is ena-
bling services that existing products do not cover. The focus is on local flexibility services 
identified in Chapter 3.4. These include congestion management products, voltage and reactive 
power support products, dynamic network tariffs and flexible network service agreements. 
Practices and parameters used are those of emerging pioneer flexibility initiatives and thus the 
officiality of terminology and compatibility to the existing products described in the Chapter 3 
is not ensured (Schittekatte & Meeus 2019; Villar et al. 2018). Locational or system level self-
balancing concepts, rule-based control and network allocation reductions are not considered in 
this chapter, as these are not tradable products, although these can foster the use of flexibility. 
4.1 Flexibility products for congestion management 
This part examines how SOs can procure resources for congestion management from flexibility 
markets with three options: locational balancing products, locational intraday and competitive 
bilateral contracts. The offers for these products can be placed on the same balancing or intra-
day platforms or to a separate platform with specialized products. Out of many possibilities, 
these alternatives are selected for further investigation because these product types are used by 
many SOs and flexibility initiatives in Europe (Esmat 2019; Schittekatte & Meeus 2019). There 
are no harmonized congestion management mechanisms and products in Europe and this is 
concluded in the ASM-report: "TSOs and DSOs are convinced that flexibility product design 
is not only important for the implementation and the extension of markets for congestion man-
agement but could in some cases trigger the establishment of such markets." (CEDEC et al. 
2019). Following the recommendations of the ASM-report this thesis looks only into solutions 
that are compatible with EU level electricity markets and standardized regionally or at national 
level (CEDEC et al. 2019). Figure 13 shows the complex connections of existing and emerging 
markets and mechanism linked to congestion management in zonal electricity markets. 
 
 
Figure 13: Congestion management mechanisms in zonal electricity markets.  
 
4.1.1 Locational balancing products 
Using locational balancing products for congestion management means activation of balancing 
energy offers or selection of balancing capacity offers for local needs. Local flexibility 
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activations via balancing markets could be done also for other purposes, such as local voltage 
support in combination with ORPR, but here only active power congestion management is 
assessed. This process of congestion management with future European balancing platforms is 
like congestion management described in chapters 2 and 3.3.1, but only mFRRsa and mFRRda 
are considered out of the standard balancing energy products. Proposals presented here are not 
compatible with the foreseen common mFRR products and operational guidelines related to 
using these products, so therefore changes might have to be made. 
 
 
Figure 14: Interaction between trading for different balancing processes (ENTSO-E 2018d). 
 
The possibility of having a separate mFRR congestion management interface is here excluded 
due market fragmentation. Still, a separate locational balancing energy market with the same 
interface with differing congestion management energy gate closure times (CMGCT) and spe-
cial products could be organized. It is assumed that these complementary product offers should 
and could be linked to the balancing process by forwarding unused offers to the mFRR balanc-
ing market. In Figure 14 activations for mFRRsa take place 7.5 minutes before delivery and 
mFRRda can be ordered until 7.5 minutes after (H+) delivery. If there is a need for SOs to 
conduct congestion management with mFRR offers or similar offers how would this work: 
a) from the common balancing platform preventively before real-time? 
b) from the common balancing platform reactively in real-time? 
c) from the common balancing platform with an earlier gate closure time? 
  
In situation a, if a SO uses balancing offers for congestion management and predicts a conges-
tion well in advance, it is assumed that the SO would order sufficiently cheap locational bids 
to be preventively activated. If an offer is placed to be available for balancing, it is not possible 
to activate it before H-7.5 min. SO could make sure that it would have the bid available by 
marking it unavailable during LMOL formation and then activating it directly for delivery be-
fore real-time. These markings are done also for N-1 dimensioning, so there is a working prin-
ciple being studied: “to select most expensive bids” (ENTSO-E 2018d). It would be counter-
intuitive if an offer with a wanted location would be cheaper than the working principle re-
quires. To add, these marked bids would be available for the direct activation process only.  
 
As described in Chapter 3.2, preventive or long activations with mFRRsa or mFRRda with 
forward linking in time are not possible. A linked offer direct activated in a quarter hour (QH) 
can cause is issues, since for example a bid for QH-1 is not available in QH-0 for direct or 
scheduled activation. Thus, if there would be a need for a SO to use locational standard mFRR-
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bids preventively for congestion management it could do this securely for 15 minutes. If 
enough local supply is available, then a SO could order other bids with above described prin-
ciples. These conditions are highly dependent on whether the balancing area uses unit- or port-
folio-based bidding for balancing markets and how the linking is done. (ENTSO-E 2018d). 
 
Here it is assumed that BSPs looking for increased flexibility trading revenue are interested to 
mark bids suitable for purposes other than the standard balancing product. The reason for this 
is, that the BSPs don’t care about the underlying reason for activation. In addition to location, 
this marking could include the possibility to be activated for longer durations or with a faster 
ramp-rate. This means that a SO must identify suitable offers for congestion management and 
coordinate this with other SOs during the 13-minute time window for TSO processing time. In 
13 minutes, it is impossible to calculate multilateral financial convexities of offers and tech-
nical constraints of underlying resources and networks with full accuracy. Therefore, near de-
livery GCT means extensive automation and approximations, especially at lower voltage lev-
els. (ENTSO-E 2018d). 
 
The BSPs could be allowed to add additional conditions into bids. If for example the balancing 
bid is selected with long or fast activations the price could be different. Pricing is here assumed 
as pay-as-bid, but at least the balancing energy price of the given market time unit. The offers 
selected for purposes other than balancing, are marked unavailable during the formation of 
LMOL so that these are not activated in the balancing process. It remains open whether this 
time is sufficiently long for this and if the SOs can trust the process. Option a is here recom-
mended, since it assumes that BSPs are more likely to bid without locational premiums. 
 
Option b with reactive congestion management with balancing bids is similar to option a. Re-
active congestion management during operational market time unit with balancing offers can 
be done solely with the mFRRda product. Limitations of the common balancing energy plat-
form can cause difficulties if there are linked bids in place and a long need for congestion 
management occurs suddenly, as described above. Here this is considered less significant since 
the whole process of congestion management is assumed to be preferably based on preventive 
operational and investment actions of SOs. If a non-forecasted congestion occurs, the relevant 
SOs can first activate mFRRda as reactive congestion management and if the situation is still 
present, then continue the activation with other methods to alleviate overloading.  
 
Option c uses the same market interface as previous options but would have a congestion man-
agement gate closure time before the balancing energy gate closure time, which is at 25 minutes 
before delivery (H-). Since the BSPs would face two GCTs for similar mFRR-products it is 
argued here that they would be inclined to bid for the first market with a locational premium 
and then bid for the common balancing market without this margin. The assumption for this is 
that SOs value the risks and earning possibilities of location specific bids higher as these are 
earlier binding for physical delivery and that the geographically smaller market will be less 
liquid and competitive. This is not optimal as it incentivizes locational market power. However, 
SOs could be interested to apply for separated BEGCTs and CMGCTs if the congestion man-
agement coordination between SOs would require this. Possible separate CMGCT times are:  
• earlier than IDCZGCT (before H-60min),  
• IDCZGCT (at H-60 min) or IDCZGCT between Finland and Estonia (H-30 min), 
• time of delivery of production plans (currently at H-45min in Finland). 
 
If delivery is requested significantly earlier, the accuracy of congestion forecasts decreases and 
BSPs are less interested to trade or offer at higher prices. This is since risk margins due to 
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physical responsibility to deliver increase relative to the length of the preparation period. The 
motivation to include locational information depends on the BSP in question and the location 
of the underlying asset. If, for example, bids from an area are rarely used for congestion man-
agement, there might be less motivation to bid for a such CM market. As said in Chapter 3.3, 
many TSO balancing markets, and NODES-platform post such a possibility to combine con-
gestion management with mFRR balancing products (NODES 2019; ENTSO-E 2018c).  
 
4.1.2 Locational intraday market product 
This subchapter examines how SOs could procure resources for congestion management ser-
vices using flexibility products based on intraday products. The possibility to use locational 
intraday bids for continuous trading for congestion management is here defined as preventive 
dispatch control. In preventive dispatch control SOs want to influence what consumption and 
generation is dispatched based on the market clearing. In self-dispatching-based markets this 
means that SOs affect with payments how market trades are cleared, instead of dictating mul-
tiple markets concurrently like in central dispatching models. To enable intra-zonal dispatch 
control, IDM bids must contain locational information more specific than the bidding zone 
where the underlying units belong to. This implies unit-based bidding and imbalance settlement 
to certain accuracy, regardless whether unit- or portfolio-based bidding is being used. Here 
only bidirectional dispatch control is examined, which means congestion management where 
a controlled dispatch to the opposite direction of the initially controlled dispatch is activated 
together. This is done to preventively solve either one or two forecasted congestions and main-
tain balance of the LFC area. The use of preventive dispatch control in DAM or IDM auction 
algorithms is here not examined, even though this could be possible.  
 
Such dispatch control products linked to intraday market products are defined in development 
initiatives such as GOPACS and ENERA, which post similar products (BMWi 2018; GOPACS 
2019a). Here the definition of the IDCONS-product in the GOPACS-platform combined to 
ETPA power exchange is further examined. GOPACS is currently in operational use in Neth-
erlands by TSOs and DSOs. An IDCONS-product is a combination of two offers in opposite 
directions, an ask and a bid, with the same starting time and duration. Since these offers are 
available on the market, these must have non-matching offer prices, a bid-ask spread, meaning 
that the market has not cleared them already. This happens when the ask price is higher than 
bid price. For in order these bids to be cleared by the exchange the SO needing CM will select 
to pay the spread. GOPACS congestion management is shown in Figure 15. (GOPACS 2019a). 
 
Currently, GOPACS supports only limit orders. These offers must contain locations which 
when cleared would result in dispatches that completely solve or alleviate a congestion. Parties 
indicate in their IDCONS offers which of the predefined European Article Numbering (EAN) 
electricity supply points are part of the offer. Asset owner must himself or give permission to 
a market party to trade with a specific EANs. In 2019 autumn GOPACS- developers are also 
testing whether the use of more broadly defined areas with virtual EANs area can achieve de-
sired results in cross-zonal congestion situations. Offers with a locational information included 
can be activated also as a normal system level intraday trade. In case both locational up- and 
downregulation are needed in separate areas, an IDCONS-product can solve two congestions 
at once. (GOPACS 2019a). 
 
Firstly, congestion management with GOPACS can happen only if the parties have indicated 
the location and to allow orders to be used for an IDCONS-product. Secondly, SOs estimate 
whether an IDCONS combination will achieve the desired results cost-efficiently. SOs have an 
interest to find the cheapest possible combinations that can achieve congestion management, 
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while not causing other congestions, as they are paying for the spread. There is motivation for 
market parties to mark offers suitable for IDCONS and offer more aggressively. This is firstly 
because offers suitable for an IDCONS have higher risks due to physical delivery commitment. 
Secondly, offers are more likely to be activated in the case of congestions. Thirdly, the bid-ask 
spread is paid by a third party. This means that locational asks are submitted at higher price 
and bids at lower price, than for the system level IDM. Market parties can also submit two 
offers regarding an underlying asset, where one offer is marked for IDCONS and another more 
conservatively priced offer, for the system level intraday market. (GOPACS 2019a). 
 
 
Figure 15: IDCONS product on GOPACS platform (GOPACS 2019a). 
 
IDCONS-process can start by SOs first looking at locationally market bids and then selecting 
suitable ones. However, if there are no suitable bids available in the market, SOs submit noti-
fications to ask for more offers in certain areas for a specific duration and regulation direction 
(GOPACS 2019b). Thus, IDCONS-products are case-specific. In case of similar and continu-
ous needs there could be motivation for SOs to design standard IDCONS-product calls, for 
example announcements for weekday mornings from 6 till 9 in a city region. Still, if such 
activations are continuous, this indicates the existence of a structural congestion. The use of 
continuous IDCONS-activations must be compared against the cost of grid reinforcements or 
procurement of long-term bilateral contracts discussed in Chapter 4.1.3.  
 
If an order is cleared as a part of an IDCONS, the market parties must deliver at least the service 
indicated in their offer. This means that a FSP with an ask must upregulate equally or more in 
the predefined EAN and the FSP with a bid must downregulate equally or more in the other 
location. The validation of this flexibility delivery is defined relative to the planned network 
use at this location, which can in general be a: unit-based market position, schedule or a base-
line-defined from historical behavior. As shown in Figure 7, self-dispatch and portfolio bidding 
is in place in Netherlands and in other European countries. Since, there are no unit-based mar-
ket positions for IDCONS settlement, the delivery is compared to generation or load schedule 
of the connection. If a connection does not have a plan, the IDCONS party is responsible to 
deliver an alternative plan. Verification of the delivery is also monitored by grid operators from 
more detailed or real-time metering data, as examined in the Chapter 7.2.3. (GOPACS 2019a). 
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The locational intraday product is a hybrid of zonal and nodal market characteristics, as de-
scribed above. According to Hirth and Schlecht (2019), such hybrids are doomed to fail, and 
instead a regulated redispatch model should be adopted. Other option is to change from a zonal 
to a nodal market design, though this transformation will not be made without problems (Alay-
wan et al. 2004). In this thesis, a zonal market model combined with a market-based redispatch 
is examined as it is more compliant with the European target model. Once possible problems 
related to the model are solved, it can provide a solution to solve congestions in the operational 
timeframe and provide more value for flexibility. Main challenges related to market-based re-
dispatch and especially to locational intraday offers are: 
 
• Non-existing schedule. Most network connections do not have a schedule that the market 
party is delivering, or the accuracy of these is limited. This is especially true for small con-
nections with generation, consumption or both. SOs also forecast schedules, but these SO-
schedules are financially decoupled from the locational or system level market position of 
the market party. For example, in Finland load schedules (exceptions possible for major 
loads) and generation schedules of small generation units (units below 1 MW or co-opera-
tive power plants below 100 MW at unit level) are not delivered to SOs (eSett 2019). The 
challenge for unit-based bidding or schedules is the unit granularity required. Aggregated 
small resources, such as retail customers and distributed generation are difficult to define 
accurately at system level, yet alone for smaller areas. If a FSP would be responsible to 
forecast and trade at unit level for increasingly smaller units, this could result in increased 
cost margins due to the difficulty and risks involved. 
  
• Non-binding schedule. If a FSP in a market model with self-balancing, portfolio-based 
bidding and settlement in a single price and single position imbalance settlement model 
submits schedules for its network use at unit level, there is no responsibility for these sched-
ules. In other words, there is no financial motivation for the market party to monitor the 
schedule and the realized network use at unit level. Also, non-binding schedules leave room 
for speculation about the motivation of the market party to deliver the true private unit 
schedules. If the schedule is replaced with a baseline defined by a SO or other party the 
possibility of manipulation is reduced but substituted with inaccuracy related to the baseline 
definition. Chapter 7.3.2 examines these concepts further. 
 
• Undefinable connection. If a foreseen congestion is related to an unclearly defined area, 
such as a city with a complex internal network and multiple market parties, it’s difficult to 
accurately define what actions would cause or solve a congestion. For example, if a FSP has 
many consumers within area and a SO needs to solve a congestion at a sub-station level it 
can be difficult to aggregate resources with accuracy to solve the congestion.  
 
• Self-balancing and zonal market compliance. In zonal markets, use of optional locational 
unit-based offers creates the possibility of mixed incentives. Here it is assumed, that portfo-
lio-based self-balancing results in less-conservative actions and a higher share of available 
flexibility offered to the system-level markets than in unit-based self-balancing. This is since 
imbalances can be netted within the portfolio and multiple units can counterbalance. It is 
also assumed, that unit-based bidding and settlement results in more accurate schedules, due 
to the balance management philosophy of this market model. It can be counterintuitive to 
promote self-balancing at portfolio-level while support position compliance at unit-level 
with other instruments. To summarize, there is a tradeoff between accurate schedules, unit-
compliance and system level self-balancing. Also, when SOs actions affect the outcome of 
the competitive market domain, such as intraday markets, this results in distorted behavior.  
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Figure 16: A congestion announcement on 22.9.2019 from 7 pm to 12 am for Ketelmeer area. Adapted 
from (GOPACS 2019b; TenneT 2019). 
 
If an offer is matched as an IDCONS-trade, the market party must follow a schedule of a unit 
and physically deliver the service. Position freezing can limit the interest of market parties to 
bid into such markets and at least increases safety margins and bid prices due to obligatory 
physical delivery. Currently SOs place IDCONS announcements to call for more locational 
offers usually 2-12 hours before delivery and the situations are approximately 1-10 hours long. 
(GOPACS 2019b). In Figure 16 an example congestion announcement is presented together 
with a map illustration showing the impacted area between the two circles and regulation di-
rections regarding the congestion. Locational intraday bids are requested from the resources 
within the red circle and asks are needed from the blue circle. For example, the situation can 
be solved with the match of two locational five-hour long block offers. In the selection phase 
prices of offer combinations are compared but also the locations within the circles must be 
accounted for. For example, there is higher certainty that a power plant closely connected to 
the congested network element can solve the issue, compared to an aggregated offer from mul-
tiple locations and voltage levels far away from the overloaded component. 
 
4.1.3 Competitive bilateral flexibility contract for congestion management 
Competitive bilateral flexibility contract means a market-based contract which after an open 
auction to find the most suitable offers, results in bilateral service agreements between a net-
work or network operators and FSPs. This is like bilateral contracts for reinforcement deferral 
described in Chapter 3. The term competitive refers here to the situation where the auction is 
based on free-for-all entry, instead of private bilateral trading. The term is not established in 
the industry, regulation or legislation. Still, such market-based procurement of qualified re-
sources is supported in CEP (Nouicer & Meeus 2019). These contracts can be done for the 
procurement of market-based non-wire alternatives for congestion management during normal 
network use, during maintenance conditions and other purposes described in chapters 4.2-4.4. 
Similar to normal situations for an undefined period, in the case of temporary limits, such as 
maintenance works, the SOs might have to curtail part of network use from many customers 
for predefined period. For these periods, network operators could opt for locational auctions 
instead of equal curtailment or mobile back up supplies. If the experienced disadvantage differs 
among the customers, the customers could also be allowed to trade among themselves or via 
the corresponding SO these curtailment obligations (Kessels et al. 2019).  
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There are many possibilities to form and price competitive bilateral contracts, but similarly to 
reserve markets, a combination of availability and utilization costs is here assumed to be suit-
able. For example, UK Power Networks has estimated: “services with an approximate cost of 
£30,000/year can help us defer a reinforcement cost of £2m for 4 years” (UKPN 2019a). Such 
estimates are dependent on the location, forecasted reinforcement need, regulatory model and 
many other variables. UK Power Networks compares the submitted offers for reinforcement 
deferral with comparable rates in Equation 1 (UKPN 2019a).  
 
  Comparable Rate =
(estimated availability cost + estimated utilization cost)
(tendered service period hours∗maximum run time)
                 (1) 
where:  
• estimated availability cost = Availability Fee (£/MW/h) * service period hours   
• estimated utilization cost = Utilization Fee (£/MWh) * estimated utilization frequency 
* estimated utilization hours per utilization 
 
Offers are submitted for auctions and if the sum of costs from selected offers is cheaper than 
the reference cost for the length of the availability window, the SO can procure services instead 
of reinforcing. The procurement lead-time and contract term are case-specific, but there might 
be interest to standardize these to make the procurement process simpler for offerors. For ex-
ample, UK Power Networks has had lead-times of 6 and 18 months for 1–4-year contracts 
(UKPN 2019a).  
 
 
Figure 17: A flexibility competition for a location in a DSO network (Open utility 2019b). 
 
Figure 17 shows an example method to procure flexibility, with an open competition using the 
Piclo Flex-platform. The offers from prequalified assets are submitted per area. In Figure 17 
the assets located in the orange part map are entitled to participate. In Figure 17 the competition 
is about insufficient local network capacity during winter 2020. Similar competitions could be 
arranged for voltage support or post-fault outage mitigation, as discussed in following chapters.  
Assets that pass the testing and procurement processes can be activated by the corresponding 
SO. This activation can be done either via SMS, email or other electronic signal in the Piclo 
Flex competition areas (Open utility 2019a). Outside the contracted availability windows, the 
resource operator can offer the underlying asset to other markets or use the resource itself. To 
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add to the activation logic options above, here in advance defined self-dispatch activations are 
presented for situations where the activation is continuous or repeated. A preordered activation 
could be a preferred option for continuous needs, as this flexibility can then be accounted dur-
ing energy procurement from DAM and IDM.  
 
Areas that need completely new installations, such as electrical energy storages, generation 
units or demand-side-response equipment, might benefit from longer lead and contract times. 
This can foster locational liquidity and interest as transactional and risk-based financial costs 
are reduced. The possibility to allow free offers for utilization near delivery and to use separate 
availability fees simply to ensure capacity, like balancing capacity markets, would be a possible 
development step once experience with the described combined model is gathered. TSOs and 
DSOs are here considered as the sole buyer of these NWA services, even though in islanded or 
in micro grid segments similar peer-to-peer contracts could be issued behind a connection. As 
defined in Chapter 3.3.2, SOs can remunerate the delivered service differently, but here sepa-
rate payments from network tariffs are assumed to be easiest contractually.  
 
4.2 Flexibility products for voltage support  
Flexibility products for voltage and reactive power control mean enhanced reactive power re-
serve services and other trades which ensure the voltage quality in addition to obligatory volt-
age control of network users and SO resources. Flexibility products can be used for voltage 
compliance during normal conditions, maintenance works or pre-fault and post-fault outage 
management. As said in Chapter 3.3.2, the concept of voltage support products varies. Cur-
rently there are none or limited market-based ways for networks to procure voltage support. 
Existing voltage support methods can be complemented with a market for reactive power trad-
ing.  
 
A thesis written as a part of SysFlex-project concluded that the further development of a bilat-
eral model would be preferable over a marketplace for reactive power (Takala 2018). The rea-
sons for this are related to long procurement cycles, lack of supply, regulatory support for SO 
ownership instead of service procurement, location specificity and required strict technological 
compliance. This thesis follows this conclusion. Here it is assumed, that the competitive bilat-
eral flexibility contract product and procurement model, presented in Chapter 4.1.3 for conges-
tion management, are suitable for voltage support procurement. For example, there are such 
competitive reactive power competitions active in the Piclo Flex-platform (Open Utility 
2019b).  Also, ORPR requirements and grid tariffs must be kept updated according to voltage 
support needs. 
 
The activations due to a flexibility contract can be either continuous during contracted periods, 
based on SO activation signal or result of self-dispatch. SO signal is here assumed as a not 
cost-efficient or technically suitable way of delivering service due to the volatile nature of 
voltage support needs. Continuous fixed compensation or self-dispatch according to locational 
phase-angle measurement, like frequency dispatch of FCR, during contracted periods are both 
suitable ways. The result of the tenders are resources which are activated during contracted 
periods to compensate the reactive power demand according to the bilateral contract.  
 
The reference cost for ERPR procurement with competitive bilateral contracts, is the cost that 
the SO would pay for an alternative compensation resource itself. Due to the regulation model, 
land-use possibility at substations, SO expertise related to reactive power and voltage control 
and low credit risk rating of regulated monopolies, it is here assumed that SOs would be able 
45 
 
to procure a new dedicated resources below the cost of a market party (Takala 2018). A reactor 
or capacitor installation for an area is an example of this. Therefore, SOs could procure market-
based voltage support cheaper only if the resource would be used also for other purposes. An-
other reason for voltage support contracts would be if the resource, such as a power plant, was 
in some measure more capable of delivering reactive power control, than resources possible 
for network operators to own and operate. An example of a voltage support flexibility contract 
is a grid tied EES systems owned by an FSP, providing reactive power control to networks 
during high need and other times being used for other purposes.  
4.3 Dynamic network tariffs 
Here dynamic network tariffs refer to grid tariffs where the cost parameters are constantly up-
dated and shown for the network user before, or during delivery. This can lead to implicit 
behavior based on the locational or system-level network needs to incentive system supporting 
behavior. These conceptual tariffs could also vary within a network area of a single SO for 
similar grid services, although current regulation does not allow this. As identified in Chapter 
3.3.3, different kinds of cost parameters are included in tariffs but most of these parameters are 
not locationally and temporally dynamic, or the dynamicity is not in the level needed for active 
system management (CEDEC et al. 2019). Similar dynamicity was investigated also for elec-
tricity taxation in Finland, but this was identified not recommendable (Pahkala 2018). Four 
kinds of dynamic tariff cost parameters including locational and system level price signals can 
be identified (Similä et al 2011; Schittekatte et al. 2018; Schittekatte & Meeus 2018): 
1. dynamic tariffs linked to real-time energy price, 
2. dynamic tariffs linked to frequency, 
3. dynamic tariffs linked to local network congestions, 
4. dynamic tariffs linked to voltage control. 
 
It is difficult to find suitable pricing for dynamic tariff components to achieve the desired out-
come while respecting other market mechanisms. As network costs can be a large share of total 
electricity costs, tariffs should be compatible with other market mechanisms if price-respon-
siveness is pursued. As near-zero variable cost generation, such as nuclear and VRES, is added 
to power systems, the absolute costs or the proportional share of network related costs out of 
total energy costs can increase. Still, maintaining cost-reflectiveness of networks while calcu-
lating an optimal individual dynamic tariff for each network user is impossible if main princi-
ples presented in Chapter 3.3.3 are followed. Defining dynamic tariffs is computationally in-
tensive without major approximations. This could mean, that a customer would have a different 
tariff structure for each market time unit of the day due to system-level capacity adequacy. 
Also, local parameters, such as a congested or poor voltage quality areas, mean a different tariff 
structures for similar customers in different parts of the same network (Shen et al. 2019). 
 
Option 1 i.e. using dynamic tariffs linked to real-time energy price, is related to system-level 
capacity adequacy in wholesale and other energy-based markets. There is a significant chal-
lenge in defining an optimal reference for the system-level electricity price to calculate the 
tariff. For instance, linking a part of tariff costs to off-peak hours with, for example, night and 
day prices, or to day-ahead market results, would bind customers flexibility as these prices 
would be amplified. Using only parts of tariff structure as flexibility indicators, is here sup-
ported, as tariff revenue predictability is important for network operators who have mainly 
fixed costs related to the existing infrastructure. This would reduce the interest to participate to 
other markets, which could experience more flexibility scarcity at that time. Amid the energy 
transition, it is difficult to define what times, markets, and use-cases on average have flexibility 
scarcity and will this scarcity vary significantly. Option 2 i.e. using dynamic tariffs linked to 
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frequency, is here excluded since this is interpreted as equal to already functional FCR markets 
described in Chapter 3.3.1. (Burger et al. 2019; Schittekatte et al. 2018). 
 
Option 3 i.e. using dynamic tariffs linked to local network congestions, can be done with other 
ways than tariffs, such as SO dispatching or with options presented in Chapter 4.1. Here the 
introduction and increased share of updatable local power-based components in tariff structures 
is presented as a complementary option. Dynamic power tariffs are assumed to be impossible 
to be implemented in the current regulatory environment. Replacing volumetric network 
charges with net-metering and capacity-based charges, such as power limit tariffs or power 
tariffs, is an attractive alternative for SOs to recuperate sunk and foreseen network costs. This 
can be seen reasonable if customers use less energy and more power than before when they for 
example opt for demand-response or self-generation. (Schittekatte & Meeus 2018). 
 
Still, there are fairness issues between active and passive network users and cost-reflectiveness 
issues, if too static power tariffs are implemented. This means that if, for example, power-based 
costs are calculated per network user based on historical peak power utilization, the local con-
gestions or system-level power adequacy at the time of peak-utilization are not considered. 
Also, some customers with, for example, home automation systems or electrical storages, are 
more suited to optimize in relation to power-based tariffs. Rarely updated dynamic power tar-
iffs therefore limit peak-power utilization per connection, for example, during yearly or 
monthly intervals, but do not necessarily shift these reduced peak-loads to times most optimal 
for power balance or local network capacity. Also, dynamic tariff schemes can neglect the true 
costs of maintaining the possibility to use the maximum subscription capacity. Inaccurate en-
ergy-only-based tariff design results in non-cost-reflective tariffs, unfair cost allocation and 
especially not price responsive power-based behavior. This could be improved with the intro-
duction of tariffs structures where a share of costs could be based on some degree of spatially 
and temporally dynamic power-based components. This could, for example, avoid major power 
peaks and incentive customers to investigate the possibility of intelligent control and invest 
into capability to control network use. Dynamic power tariffs have a lot of promising attributes, 
but here no suitable ways to implement these in the existing regulatory environment are fore-
seeable. 
 
Option 4 is similar to ERPR concept, but as explained in Chapter 4.2, voltage control is best 
procured with bilateral contracts additional to modifications to existing reactive power network 
tariffs and to ORPR requirements. The dynamic network tariff options 1-4, are subjected to 
industry consultation in Chapter 5 to decide whether the solutions are preferable. 
4.4 Flexible network service agreement 
Flexible network service agreement or flexible grid connection means the procurement of 
NWAs during the network service agreement contract process of new connections or reinforce-
ment of existing connections (INTERRFACE 2019; Kessels et al. 2019). This can mean addi-
tional clauses in connection and network service agreements, separated service contracts, or 
both. The concept of competitive bilateral flexibility contract presented in Chapter 4.1.3 is as-
sumed to be applicable to these use cases as well. The situation is described from the viewpoint 
of a single or a group of users within a grid area, though NWAs can reduce costs for all users 
since unnecessary reinforcements are not socialized trough grid fees from all customers.  
 
When new or larger connections for network use are planned, the requested location might 
have insufficient existing transmission capacity. Therefore, it would be beneficial for SOs to 
have other options than to accept or deny a network connection application. The use of NWAs 
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in these locations could result in more cost-efficient grid service, if the alternative would mean 
a costly grid reinforcement for limited hours of only minor overcapacities, or the complete 
denial of the additional subscription capacity. The other option is that NWAs are procured as 
a temporary solution to enable network use while waiting for the grid reinforcements. An ex-
ample of such a situation is the connection of VRES generation or large consumption units to 
an existing network segment. This enables the connection, and in addition, the customer can 
be remunerated with a bilateral service contract or with reduced grid fees. Due to non-discrim-
inatory clauses related to connection fees, tariffs and other grid cost invoicing, it might be 
easier to apply for a separate case-specific service contract. Network users could allow the SO 
to curtail network use or the network user could self-dispatch under defined conditions.  
 
Reinforcing a network connection with back-up connections or for example weather-proofing 
grids to avoid disturbances is costly. Especially for non-critical network users, the use of flex-
ibility can result in cheaper costs. For instance, in rural areas the customers could opt for a 
different level of security of supply with cheaper network costs or separate remuneration. 
Muukkonen (2019) indicated the possibility to pay a 347 € to 651 € weather-proof readiness 
fee to Finnish customers for accepting longer interruption times rather than weather-proofing 
all existing grids. This option requires significant changes to regulation model, electricity mar-
ket laws and customer willingness from the entire group of customers connected to the specific 
radial feeder. The alternative for flexible network service agreements is reinforcing or the pro-
curement of NWAs from market parties, to deliver electricity to the customers in case of dis-
turbances or longer outages with the connection to the common electricity system. The moti-
vation for SOs in these contracts is to avoid mandatory costs related to customer interruption 
incentives. Also, the inclusion of contract costs in the calculation of allowed profit of regulated 
monopolies can be a motivation to apply for flexible network service agreements.  
4.5 Flexibility market development projects  
Chapters 4.1-4.4 focused on different emerging flexibility contracts, tradable flexibility prod-
ucts, and dynamic tariffs. Table 4 lists the current and foreseen design controversies linked to 
the different development initiatives mentioned and the use of mFRR balancing energy bids 
for purposes other than system level balancing. All the alternatives focus on the utilization of 
locational flexibility in areas smaller than an LFC area. Flexible service agreement, dynamic 
tariffs, and bilateral flexibility contracts were examined in previous chapters. These are not 
listed in the table as they are too use-case specific or in the case of dynamic tariffs, part of a 
regulated domain where no trading takes place. Unclarities are marked with a question mark.  
 
Table 4: Flexibility development initiatives (Schittekatte & Meeus 2019; USEF 2018a, b). 
Platform  GOPACS NODES 
 PICLO 
FLEX 
ENERA 
mFRR 
offers 
(MARI) 
Support for congestion manage-
ment 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes, pos-
sibly 
Support for balancing No Yes 
Yes, possi-
bly 
No Yes 
Support for reactive power and 
voltage control) 
No Yes? Yes No No 
Reservation payments (also de-
fined as long term products) 
Yes (future) 
Yes (fu-
ture) 
Yes  
Yes 
(future) 
Yes (ca-
pacity 
markets) 
Integration to EU electricity 
markets 
Yes Yes 
No, yes in 
the future? 
No 
Is an EU   
market 
Standardized product (s) Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
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Products “similar” to IDM with 
locational offers 
Yes 
(see 
above) 
No Yes No 
Products “similar” to mFRR 
with locational offers 
No 
(see 
above) 
Yes  No Yes 
Offer location (where are under-
lying resources indicated) 
Postal code 
Below a 
specific 
feeder 
SO defined 
area 
Resource 
specific 
LFC area 
or more 
specific 
Market operator Third party Third party Third party 
Third 
party 
TSOs  
Bid submission time Before IDGCT ? 
Long be-
fore deliv-
ery 
Before 
IDGCT 
Before or 
at 
BEGCT 
Clearing time 
Hours before 
delivery 
? 
Long be-
fore deliv-
ery 
Hours be-
fore deliv-
ery 
Before 
BEGCT 
or H-
12min 
Activation Self-dispatch 
SO / plat-
form oper-
ator? 
SO activa-
tion 
Self-dis-
patch? 
SO acti-
vation 
Settlement 
Related to unit 
schedule 
? Baseline  
Related to 
unit 
schedules 
Similar as 
mFRR 
Pricing Pay-as-bid 
Pay-as-
bid? 
Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid 
Pay-as-
bid 
Sources 
(GOPACS 
2019a) 
(NODES 
2019) 
(Open util-
ity 2019a) 
(BMWi 
2018) 
(ENTSO-
E 2018d) 
 
Table 4 shows, that although flexibility initiatives differ significantly, all focus on locational 
aspects of flexibility use, especially congestion management. Main differences between flexi-
bility product alternatives are related to where and when bids are submitted, how clearing is 
done, how activations take place, and how settlement and compliance monitoring is achieved. 
Figure 18 summarizes the different domains where tradable products are exchanged on markets 
or other regulated mechanisms are in place to deliver flexibility services. These are further 
divided into existing and emerging options. The division of products into regulated, semi-com-
petitive and competitive domain is not straight forward and many of the emerging flexibility 
products are in the grey area between domains as shown in Figure 18 
 
 
Figure 18: Existing and emerging products and mechanisms in European electricity markets. 
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5 Industry views on flexibility and flexibility products 
This chapter summarizes the results of the industry consultation regarding flexibility and flex-
ibility products. The consultation consisted of 26 industry experts whose interviews took place 
during autumn 2019. The experts are working with different perspectives related to the elec-
tricity domain such as generation and consumption, transmission and distribution system op-
eration, network planning and development, ancillary and reserve markets, wholesale and retail 
markets, aggregation or other energy services business and regulation. Interviewees repre-
sented Finnish organizations, which are active in countries of the Baltic Sea Area, but the re-
search focused on Finnish perspectives. The results are listed as a summary of all answers per 
theme where direct quotations and detailed information possibly linking to a specific company 
or interviewee is either anonymized or removed. Comments related to selling of flexibility are 
listed as a part of the role of FSPs and buying of flexibility as either the role of network oper-
ators or BRPs and other types of FSPs. This division is used to firstly maintain structure and 
secondly to secure the anonymity of interviewees. A list of interviewees is in appendix 3.  
 
The interviews were executed as half-structured expert interviews, which form the empirical 
part of this thesis. Theme interviews can provide comprehensive answers to complex topics 
with the help of clarifying questions and discussion (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2015). Due to time 
constraints the number of interviewees was limited. Also, the selection of interviewees was 
discretionary to get overall sampling and priori known expertise. This was necessary, as the 
research topic is relatively new in zonal electricity markets, there is a limited number of flexi-
bility initiatives in Europe, scarce literature regarding flexibility markets and the theme requires 
comprehensive expertise. As the topic is an industry cross-cutting theme, the consultation was 
done with a broad interviewee list, with limited overlapping of expertise. Thus, the results do 
not fully represent the industry views nor firm positions or decided actions of any individual 
interviewee, company or organization. Still, the results provide an indication of the future 
trends of electricity systems and markets as envisioned by the experts. 
 
The interview framework consisted of four themes. Firstly, a technical consultation was done 
to find out the current and foreseen flexibility needs of different types of electricity network 
users and operators. Secondly, the market architecture and coordination between different sub-
markets and mechanisms were examined. Thirdly, the product parameter definitions of existing 
and emerging options were evaluated. Lastly, the possible conflicts with emerging concepts 
and the possibility of testing were openly discussed. The interview framework, themes and 
questions are shown in detail in appendix 4. All the interviews followed this framework to an 
extent, while most interviewees focused more on specific questions related to their domain 
expertise. When needed, the interview questions were supported with background material 
from thesis chapters 1-4 during the interviews. Following chapters list consultation results di-
vided according to the four themes and the roles of flexibility seller and buyer as defined above. 
5.1 Flexibility in the electricity system: present and future needs  
During interviews the experts had difficulties in defining and quantifying their current local 
and system level flexibility needs. These estimates also varied significantly depending on the 
interviewee. For example, an interviewee argued that alongside system-level balancing there 
are significant local needs in European and Finnish TSO and DSO grids already today, but 
according to other interviewees not so much in transmission and distribution grids of Finland. 
This was identified to be dependent on the voltage level definitions between transmission and 
distribution and the status of existing energy related infrastructure. Still, according to most 
interviewees system-level markets linked to financial trading and balance management, such 
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as wholesale and TSO reserve markets were seen as the clear primary use case for flexibility. 
Local use was seen as an emerging market for additional utilization and revenue with potential 
for future growth. Financial optimization was the unifying factor in all use-cases. Other flexi-
bility needs, based on for example personal user preferences, were identified by few, but are 
not further elaborated here due to interviewee anonymity.  
 
Experts highlighted the difficulty of evaluating the flexibility needs of 2024 and onwards dur-
ing major changes of the energy transition and the foreseen market design changes. The com-
ments were split between the supply and demand of flexibility. Risks related to the long lifetime 
of the networks, costs of flexibility resources and the possible unavailability of flexibility were 
identified as potential hurdles for networks to trust flexibility as a network supporting element 
or as non-wire alternatives. Flexibility sellers were in most cases often not familiar or interested 
about voltage or congestion challenges, as they argued that these are the responsibility of net-
work operators. Still, many added that they would be interested in a clear opportunity to sell 
services for networks for a reasonable compensation. Not all network operators and market 
parties were seen capable of participating to fast and real-time flexibility markets. Also, not all 
parties plan to do around the clock operational monitoring. Outsourcing, utility mergers and 
automation were mentioned as key solutions to tackle these challenges. Some argued that real-
time trading should not be the goal of networks and that flexibility procurement for local net-
work services should be done well in advance, for example with longer service commitments. 
Comments related to flexibility selling were split here, while some highlighted long contracts 
as a realistic solution and some strongly opposed these due to market fragmentation and inef-
ficiency 
 
Experts identified and prioritized their local needs and from these answers it can be summa-
rized that currently Finnish grids need local resources for three use-cases. Flexibility is needed 
firstly for radial distribution grids for outage and maintenance support, secondly for voltage 
support and thirdly for congestion management. While outage management was mentioned 
often, it was seen problematic by most experts as the current security of supply is experienced 
sufficient by most customers and because of difficulty of the execution. It was argued that in 
the event of disturbances, flexibility would not help unless there is a back-up connection or 
back-up supply to all nodes. Fast reactive power and voltage control and congestion manage-
ment were mentioned mainly as existing TSO tasks, but many experts identified these phenom-
ena also as emerging challenges in distribution networks. These local services were seen highly 
overlapping and some argued that same resources could deliver all of these, sometimes even at 
the same time. Experts estimated, that only in few cases, flexibility capacity exists and is uti-
lized at local level, apart from night tariffs in electricity distribution and voltage support of 
power plants. Modest capacity and utilization are restricted by the lack of locational needs, 
which most experts accounted to reliable networks with high transmission capacity. This status 
was estimated to be caused by the regulation model and historically successful grid develop-
ment of network operators. Most of the local flexibility was seen capable of participating to 
system level markets, where it has already been used to a certain extent.  
 
Flexibility connected to the electricity network was seen as a scarcely divided pool of resources 
with many owners and operators. These operators optimize the resources for multiple markets 
and use-cases with competing buyers, such as network operators and other market parties. The 
sequencing of offers to different use cases on temporally overlapping markets is done accord-
ing to the availability and expected need of flexibility. Offers are placed and priced taking 
account to the expected risks and revenue of each trade being successful or not being realized. 
The experts argued, that increases in need for local or system level flexibility should be 
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indicated by market-based price signals and that system operators should focus on their role 
only as a market facilitator, not as a dispatcher. Interviewees mentioned existing and emerging 
use-cases for flexibility, which are here divided into:  
• financial, OTC and day-ahead market trading and dispatch planning of flexible capacity 
for long to medium term portfolio optimization, 
• intraday and OTC trading and dispatch schedule changes for short-term portfolio and 
forecasted imbalance management,  
• different long to medium term (capacity) TSO system-level reserve markets, 
• different short-term (energy) TSO system-level reserve markets, 
• and locational or other use-case specific bilateral contracts or markets. 
 
Multiple interviewees stated that most market parties optimize dispatchable units firstly per 
unit and then all together with the forecasted non-dispatchable units as a portfolio. Because of 
this underlying unit-based dispatch planning and private information, interviewees with the 
capability to sell flexibility, indicated that if there are incentives in place to do so, they have 
ability to trade flexibility with more specific locational parameters. Still, fully accurate or trust-
able unit-based schedules and bids cannot be provided economically for small or uncontrollable 
units, for example below 1 MW. For these dispatches, flexibility sellers must forecast network 
use after aggregation. Regardless of this private locational knowledge of the available flexibil-
ity resources, there is currently little reason for market parties to develop flexibility market 
models or offer detailed flexibility to markets due to limited financial incentives or rules in 
place. This is because there are limited financial incentives or rules in place to do so. Some 
answers questioned the capability of parties from the regulated domain to procure flexibility 
cost-efficiently from liberalized or bilateral markets and whether these actions would distort 
other market activities as well. Numerous interviews highlighted, that the capability of different 
technologies and units to provide flexibility differs significantly when power, reactive power, 
activation time, duration, energy and any other parameters are discussed. Comments related to 
network domain added, that needs for flexibility resources vary significantly according to pre-
vious parameters and the location.  
 
As an example of flexible resources, existing power plants combined with demand response of 
industrial consumption was mentioned most often. Second most often mentioned flexibility 
technology was emerging sector coupling to the heat, mobility and industrial sector via electri-
fication. Industry-scale batteries and other energy storages were mentioned often for local use-
cases. There was interest from the network domain to procure energy storages for network 
support from markets or with bilateral contracts, depending on how regulation interprets CEP. 
According to many flexibility buyers the fourth often mentioned technology for flexibility use 
was small-scale demand response. An interviewee highlighted, that different resources are not 
fully comparable. Many experts were concerned, that many network areas will have only de-
mand side response left for local services if industry and heating systems will be electrified and 
combined heat and power (CHP) cogeneration is stopped. Experts saw that local and global 
flexibility is being simultaneously added with sector coupling but also removed with CHP 
mothballing or decommissioning. According to experts, many network areas face significant 
uncertainties related to voltage support and congestion management. This results from simul-
taneous migration of people and industries as well as from a rapid deployment of different and 
new types of network resources such as heat pumps, underground cabling, electric vehicles and 
distributed wind and solar generation. In many cases this is happening more rapidly than net-
works, regulation and permissioning can keep up with. As a conclusion an interviewee added 
that whatever technology and resources flexibility sellers use, it should be a simple as possible 
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and most preferably wireless. Main reasons for this are the high unit-costs of flexibility control 
and measurement of distributed assets, as electricians are relatively expensive. 
 
According to the interviewees, currently in most flexibility selling use-cases for the foreseen 
operating hours, the price levels or price volatility of different markets should be higher to 
trigger new investments. Investments are needed to use existing flexibility potential that is cur-
rently unavailable or to connect completely new flexible resources to networks. It was high-
lighted by an interviewee, that in parallel to increasing market pull for flexibility, the existing 
network and market rules must be reformed to support this behavior. Flexibility buyers saw 
similar emerging issues related to insufficient local supply, but contradictory to sellers, many 
flexibility buyers saw high price levels as a challenge. Flexibility buyers stated, that a trend of 
high price levels on local or system-level markets is an indicator for network operators or other 
market parties to invest into network capacity or flexibility. According to an interviewee, these 
hypothetical local investments could then destroy a local market and therefore flexibility sellers 
can trust local markets for only additional revenue. Still, investors should be able to have a 
locational price signal or at least indication of not preferable zones. Also, some saw system 
level markets as subjects to certain degree of market cannibalism already. 
 
Flexibility for system-level markets, supported with revenue from voltage support and conges-
tion management was identified as the most realistic near-future use-case for local flexibility. 
Outage support would be additional benefit from such installations or vice versa. Reactive 
power and voltage control with different devices was summarized as a joint service for com-
mon benefit from a combination of assets of network operators and network users. Reactive 
power tariffs and network rules issued by TSO or DSOs were seen as a major motivation for 
customers to invest into resources capable of delivering reactive power compensation. The ex-
periences of experts related to voltage support were divided into two: slower and deterministic 
and faster and stochastic. Slower capability was needed to deliver scheduled reactive power 
compensation according to predefined schedules, mainly to limit reactive power tariff costs 
and minimize power losses. Voltage drops during high consumption have been known, but for 
example voltage rises during low network use are becoming an increasing challenge. 
 
Lack of faster support, such as voltage control of power plants or other flexible network con-
nected equipment, is a critical issue. According to the experts, there are large areas where volt-
age control during disturbances are becoming an increasing issue as existing flexible capacity 
like power plants are being removed and replaced with consumption and distributed generation. 
Experts added, that therefore network codes like DCC and RfG and new resources for those 
areas are needed to mitigate the emerging challenges. Identification of these areas includes high 
uncertainty. An interviewee argued that procuring voltage control and back-up supplies from 
markets creates a first interesting challenge and need for flexibility markets. The need was seen 
to exist even if there was no need for congestion management Still, if this additional voltage 
support is remunerated, it opens new questions about whether existing network users providing 
voltage support should be remunerated as well. Many experts argued, that both TSO and DSOs 
have now identified that they must start procuring flexibility for reactive power compensation 
at all voltage levels and congestion management in higher voltage levels. The reactive power 
tariffs from TSOs might have been a first push towards investments, but in addition to TSO 
tariff optimization, DSOs have also personal needs regarding fast voltage support. An expert 
concluded, that soon system-level balancing and straightforward thermal limit congestion man-
agement are not sufficient alone, as faster dynamics and instabilities are also increasing. All 
agreed that networks should improve their transparency and capability to signal market parties 
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to offer more flexibility for local needs, because in most cases the flexibility will be otherwise 
offered to system level markets. 
 
Many experts argued, that the need for flexibility is sometimes difficult to forecast or prepare 
for and the supply available might be insufficient to match the demand. Lack of visibility to 
the locations of flexible resources in networks and the overall status of the network itself was 
identified as an issue by many network operators. Real-time or short-term visibility was seen 
limited in own medium to low-voltage networks, but also in networks of other network opera-
tors. Some experts added, that this concept of shared visibility between TSOs and DSOs would 
be needed if the activation of flexibility were to effect on a broader area. Experts with tasks 
related to network operations and planning stated, that as the possible buyers of flexibility, they 
must have a comprehensible view of the available flexibility offers and the status of the network 
itself in order to procure locational flexibility. Contradictory to the previous, an interviewee 
stated that to increase their networks cost-efficiency, the company has optimized operations so, 
that below high to medium voltage transformers networks they have near zero real-time visi-
bility. Expert added that if this needs to change in the future, networks must invest a lot and 
increase shared transparency, but next generation smart meters can provide a partial solution 
to this. Due to the limited locational need and the lack of visibility, the interviewees could not 
concretely say whether there would be temporally and spatially matching flexibility available 
at a reasonable cost.  
 
Many network experts had done simulations to find possible emerging bottlenecks to proac-
tively plan reinforcements for those grid elements. Some saw little situations where maximum 
capacity used at low voltage levels caused congestions. Possible congestions where identified 
to happen at medium to high voltage networks and often at transformers. Queries of experts 
from other networks in Europe supported these results, as there first challenges have occurred 
most often at the medium to high networks, most probably at transformers or high-voltage 
lines. Still, experiences of experts from outside of Finland where such that voltage and capacity 
issues have emerged suddenly and extremely fast and that existing markets and coordination 
mechanisms are not keeping up with this pace. Regarding medium to high voltage networks 
the views of experts where split whether congestions or voltage support challenges would 
emerge first, but some had already experienced significant voltage challenges and expected 
these to worsen. In general voltage support was identified as a more urgent need than conges-
tion management, although the two challenges are interlinked. Many argued that they must 
prepare for both congestions and voltage support and any other yet unfamiliar challenges. As 
examples of such other phenomena harmonic resonances, dynamic instabilities and low inertia 
conditions where mentioned. Interestingly, some experts disagreed because they had identified 
low to medium voltage networks segments more prone to insufficient capacity and especially 
voltage challenges. Many interviewees argued, that all networks are unique in some way and 
there will not be one off-the shelf solution that would suit all network needs. Some experts 
speculated, that there is a high possibility that power systems will need all the possible grid 
reinforcements and the available flexibility they can get, if they plan to keep up with the energy 
transition.  
5.2 Architecture and coordination of a flexibility market 
Market architecture was a difficult theme for many experts as many interviewees considered 
themselves experts in only some of the submarkets. When dispatching of flexibility was dis-
cussed during interviews there was a fundamental difference between the financial and market-
oriented viewpoint of flexibility sellers and the technical viewpoint of flexibility buyers. An 
interviewee pointed out that many flexibility market concepts are in the grey-area between 
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these viewpoints and between regulated and competitive domains. Many comments expressed 
concerns about the other party being unsuitable of operating outside its domain and whether 
this kind of cross-domain conduct should be allowed.  
 
Interviewee comments expressed that market parties demand transparent reasons for limited 
network capacity allocation, bidding zone definitions, redispatching, bid filtering, other special 
regulation and bilateral contracts. Many identified risks, if regulated parties would be active in 
competitive markets after network capacity allocation and no clear rules or monitoring are in 
place. On the other hand, experts raised concerns about the locational market power and other 
“gaming” possibilities in ancillary and flexibility markets. Some added that since gaming is 
happening on system-level markets already, local markets are posing a risk for making the 
situation worse. Other experts argued in favor of strong regulation regarding gaming, while 
others argued that only true market-based competition can limit gaming. An interviewee ar-
gued, that many places in need of flexibility, have in insufficient local competition and capacity 
for creating a technically or economically viable markets. There can be feeders with tens of 
kilometers long to only a dozen of small users. Full transparency and lack of market-based 
competition was seen already as an issue in system-level markets. Also, few experts argued 
that market parties could see the limited competition and transparency as issues, since full dis-
closure would reduce activity on such markets. No clear results can be concluded regarding 
gaming, although almost all saw it as a major issue.  
 
Regardless of domain, experts supported a customer centric market architecture. According to 
answers, an asset owner should be able to use flexibility itself or sell the flexible capacity if 
markets provide a better price. One answer pointed out that a flexibility seller does not care if 
the buyer is a network, another market party or both parties together. Still, coordination pro-
cesses between different network operators, market operators and market parties should be 
transparent, market-based, avoid fragmented market situations and unnecessary mandatory re-
quirements for the flexible resources. For a future architecture vision, it was presented that 
FSPs, BRPs or retailers should be the currently missing link between customers and networks. 
This must be done via open markets as this should be the primary or only way of doing things. 
If networks need to procure flexibility, for example when night-tariffs are phased-out, they can 
get contracts from service providers which can pass on the revenue to their customers. Multiple 
experts stated that in order to operators and traders to focus on balancing and trading, conges-
tion management and other flexibility trading should be done preferably well before the bal-
ancing window. Still, many argued that in cases of disturbances, congestion management and 
voltage support must be done reactively during the balance period and therefore not everything 
can be solved with preventive actions before the operational time unit. Also, availability for 
these moments must be ensured somehow. Experts also argued, that even though accuracy of 
forecasting is increasing and changes in wholesale trading, balancing markets and imbalance 
settlement might reduce the bindingness of production schedules there is still a need for sched-
ules, since transmission management and capacity procurement planning is dependent on those. 
Proactive procurement of balancing, voltage support and congestion management, general 
forecasting and mFRRsa were seen dependent on good quality schedules. No interviewee had 
answers what is the TSOs, DSOs and network user’s motivation to share good data in the fu-
ture, if this is needed for multilateral transmission management. 
 
Interestingly, the current status of network operation unbundling was seen to have positive and 
negative sides when flexibility markets were discussed. For example, when utility unbundling 
is done at accounting level and there are similar owners in the both networks and users, there 
is a possibility that the incentivizes of the parties are aligned. Network users know that even 
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though they might not preach their individual limits, the possibility of reducing the costs of the 
network operator might be directly beneficial to their shared owners or partially to them via 
reduced tariffs, if the network operator does not have to pay for subscription level violations 
or invest for rare peak-load situations. Still, limited unbundling, customer lock-in and loca-
tional monopolies were seen as a major issue for flexibility markets. Interviewees argued that 
DSOs who still have competitive business operations in their concern should always separate 
decision making and pricing. This should be done so that they do not discriminate other market 
parties or undervalue their own network assets. Aligning of benefits and costs of consumers 
and networks was mentioned multiple times as a prerequisite to flexibility markets, but with 
few solution suggestions. Current situation of tariffs was identified as a major hurdle since the 
share of energy-based generation and consumption costs were seen decreasing and the share of 
fixed capacity or power-based network costs as an increasing part of total costs.  
 
Interviewees from both the market and regulated domain were unanimous that the only goal of 
networks should be the minimization of total lifetime cost of network service while keeping 
sufficient security of supply in mind. Questions were raised on estimates on the cost of devel-
oping and operating flexibility markets and if there are any realistic alternatives. Many argued, 
that TSOs and DSOs should use locational flexibility only if it provides a cheaper option than 
networks assets in the long run. Therefore, network operators should avoid underinvesting, 
particularly when medium to high-voltage networks and cross-zonal interconnectors are 
planned. These network elements were seen as the most inclined to experience the majority 
and the first incidences of foreseen congestions and voltage challenges. Some added, that low-
voltage network voltage challenges are their first priority. According to an expert these con-
nections also have the biggest impact on wholesale market price formation as they are needed 
to transfer most of the power even in decentralized generation systems. Differing opinions were 
presented about whether the low voltage networks are the first foreseen challenge. Still, many 
experts stated that DSOs must invest into lower voltage networks anyway, due to the current 
regulation model, and some feared that higher voltage level network planning might be ne-
glected as a consequence of this.  
 
An interviewee stated that all historical sizing principles and planning in general are challenged 
since existing usage is replaced with new types of consumption and generation. Typically, this 
new usage has varying power factors and higher peak powers and volatility. Therefore, the 
power and voltage support needs are increasingly spatial and temporal and happen on multiple 
voltage levels. For example, a specific area might have large network use only during cold 
days, another one on weekdays and a third one only on summer weekends. Regardless of this, 
it was identified that even when designing grids for the peak utilization, some locational flexi-
bility must be available. Another expert proposed a design strategy which focused on the costs 
of flexibility. Where there is foreseen low-cost flexibility available for future use the networks 
can be sized for the average power consumption situation. If there is foreseen to be a limited 
amount of locational flexibility or the lifetime cost of utilizing it is estimated to be higher than 
network reinforcement cost, the reinforcements should be chosen. Many interviewees high-
lighted that the marginal cost of additional network capacity during reinforcements is ex-
tremely low in relation to the cost of flexibility currently and foreseen to be available. One 
interviewee concluded that grid design should not leave bottlenecks into grids below high-
voltage levels. According to interviewees grid segments in many places, must now be rebuild 
anyway due to their age. This is because of the current reinforcement debt, resulting in conges-
tions, disturbances and poor voltages. When renewing networks, many argued that it would 
make little sense to undersize networks, since higher capacity removes uncertainties related to 
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voltage and capacity control of future’s highly distributed and automated electricity networks 
and markets, where totally new kinds phenomena and behavior are taking place.  
 
According to experts there are many parties interested to control flexibility: resource owner 
and operator, other FSPs, DSOs and TSOs. Also, power exchanges or other market operators 
were seen to have an increasing role in dispatching. The use cases for balancing, wholesale and 
flexibility markets were seen also interlinked. Questions arose in interviews regarding who will 
do the actual control of resources physically, financially and contractually. This could not be 
answered during interviews. Also, locational trading on wholesale or balancing markets with 
some degree of SO interference raised many comments, where many opinions were not unan-
imous. No single interviewee had a fully complete set of ideas on how this cross-process and 
multilateral coordination should ideally take place and many suggestions where contradictory. 
For example, some argued that DSOs should be given priority to choose flexibility first, but 
when TSOs and DSOs would have conflicting interests, the TSO need should be prioritized.  
 
Some experts agreed that to enable flexibility markets we must have good prequalification 
process and bids with locations. For example, DSO topologies can sometimes last only some 
minutes and flexibility use must adapt to this in some way. Modelling of the entire network 
with all nodes in the model will take multiple hours. Prequalification and dynamic prequalifi-
cation will need some abstracting and flexibility must be procured in advance according to the 
joint TSO-DSO need forecasted. Bid filtering and unavailability marking for congestion man-
agement in balancing markets spurred many questions about fair treatment of BSPs that could 
not be discussed in full detail during interviews. Many argued that if DSOs have very limited 
needs, they would almost always take very little part in the coordination, except for large TSO 
activations related to DSO connected resources. Also, many saw the possibility of a DSO re-
questing or blocking manual balancing activations of mFRR offers for congestion management 
or voltage support purposes both as a challenge and as an opportunity. Also, joint TSO-DSO 
impact on wholesale, FCR or aFRR resources was discussed, but some argued that these mar-
kets should be outside DSO jurisdiction. One comment stated that in many situations the local 
flexibility need for an area is in the same direction for both TSOs and DSOs but added that 
opposite direction system-level balancing needs might worsen the situation if activated. Ques-
tions were asked about TSO-DSO coordination and how the linking of this data exchange to 
market offers and market clearing could be done best, but this was left open. An expert con-
cluded that some abstraction of the topologies must be done so that TSO-DSO coordination 
can with the network model help flexibility markets to operate.  
 
Many interviewees argued that flexibility markets are now discussed at a difficult time since 
the role of balancing and wholesale markets is being currently extensively revamped. Many 
saw self-balancing via dispatch planning and near real-time wholesale trading changing future 
imbalances and imbalance costs of some parties significantly. Some argued that the need for 
proactive balancing will change so much that balancing and redispatching with mFRR will be 
increasingly less desirable. This can lead to situations where mFRR balancing or congestion 
management with mFRR offers will be impossible. Some experts speculated that real-time 
knowledge of balancing price or quantity and direction is a must if TSOs want to enable self-
balancing, and if this were coupled with locational needs, could self-balancing be locationally 
specific. Compatibility of self-balancing and single price and single position imbalance settle-
ment model in relation to flexibility markets was a concern raised by almost all interviewees.  
 
Some mentioned independent aggregation as a prerequisite for flexibility markets in this con-
text but had limited ideas what would be an optimal way to proceed. Some added that 
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independent aggregators should be held accountable for the imbalances and any other costs 
they might cause other parties. An interviewee speculated, that independent aggregation can 
possibly offer flexibility for balances of multiple retailers or BRPs and networks at the same 
time and these can change per ISP. Thus, multi-user value-stacking is enabled, meaning higher 
prices for a flexibility sellers and lower prices for flexibility buyers. In such cases, processes 
flexibility markets must be highly automated. Many argued that all existing and new market 
participants must have equal rights and obligations in the market, so therefore closed bilateral 
products should not be allowed and fair settlement is needed also for independent aggregators. 
According to experts if these issues are solved, then existing market parties do not have issues 
with the new forms of competition on markets.  
 
Conflicting market time units, imbalance settlement periods and overlapping bidding periods 
of many markets make trading and dispatch planning increasingly difficult and increase risks-
premiums in prices. Most often the simplification and possible reduction of the number of sys-
tem operator operated single-buyer markets was mentioned. Many could not say which markets 
should be eliminated first, but some were in favor of reducing mFRR markets first, while others 
argued against this. Still, most experts argued that regardless of the difficulty, the tasks of bid-
ding and market selection should be completely left for market parties and their service pro-
viders.  
 
Many interviewee comments related to buying of locational flexibility stated that flexibility 
markets should preferably close well in advance of real-time. Reason for this was the complex-
ity of the TSO-DSO coordination, capacity securing and the physical importance of this mar-
ket. Counterarguments raised the question about how early the flexibility sellers would be will-
ing to trade system level or locational flexibility if this would then freeze that resource to an 
unit-based position. Also, some argued that we cannot have two different ways of trading on a 
specific market, since if unit-based trading is in place alongside portfolio trading, there is a 
possibility for double-spending the same capacity. Most concerns were raised against unit-
based bidding in wholesale markets, but some interviewees argued this as the best option.  Rea-
sons for selecting locational wholesale trading as a mean to alleviate intra-zonal congestion 
were related to liquidity and competitive environment of wholesale markets. Opposing argu-
ments were raised that this would distort the zonal market model and semi-competitive single-
buyer markets of both TSOs and DSOs should be preferred. Still, for some, neither locational 
intraday or balancing are suitable for their needs and bilateral contracts are needed. 
 
Contradictorily interview results indicate, that according to some expert’s, market development 
should lead towards cascading or sequenced markets, while other interviewees stated we should 
have only overlapping and near or at real time closing markets. When sequenced markets are 
used, traders should be able to know the results of the previous market clearing before the next, 
to increase competition and avoid double activations. An expert highlighted that in the current 
situation capacity is reserved for a single purpose during a market period so it cannot participate 
to many markets. Therefore value-stacking is possible for many users, but still via only one 
market. On the other hand, if only overlapping markets are in place, markets should have offers 
that can be cross-process linked. Then an activation on a flexibility market means, that the 
resource is not suitable for trading on the intraday or balancing market and vice versa. Auto-
mation of market and offer integration was identified as the solution to many issues in both 
scenarios. Interviewees favored to establish market-based tools for testing flexibility trading, 
where key needed features are the aggregation, activation and settlement processes.  
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Few experts indicated that TSOs should more clearly define the roles of FCR, aFRR, mFRR 
markets. Also, clearer definitions and more flexibility in the way SOs procure mandatory and 
additional voltage support from network users with the possibility of remuneration was men-
tioned as a request by some. Part of the interviewees argued, that a full separation of balancing 
and flexibility markets should be avoided since fragmentation and centered domestic or inter-
national competition is an issue already on the FRR markets. Most interviewees agreed that at 
minimum a reform to the voltage support and current redispatch mechanisms is needed, at least 
in terms of transparency and market accesses. Opinions related to coordination of local sellers 
and buyers can be divided into long needs with availability payments and shorter demands with 
locational energy trading. Some argued, that local markets in general will lead to nodal markets 
and should be avoided at all possible ways. Still, a vast majority favored market-based redis-
patch and voltage support procurement over regulated or central-dispatch models as they saw 
market-based model as fair, cost-efficient and in accordance with CEP and other regulation. 
 
Interviewees agreed, that DSOs must be joined to TSOs flexibility markets or otherwise no 
flexibility sellers will join such local market. A possible flexibility capacity market linked to 
balancing capacity markets or as a separate TSO-DSO flexibility capacity market was seen 
reasonable by many interviewees even with possible network capacity allocation reductions, if 
the justification, results and costs would be presented openly. Lead-times and contract periods 
of this hypothetical TSO-DSO flexibility capacity market were under strong debate. Some ar-
gued, that many will not sell or buy flexibility if it must be done for short periods, while others 
stated that they will not buy or sell local flexibility if the resource must be reserved in advance 
to a market for long periods. Network related comments stated, that they would be interested 
to pay some compensation and selling related comments stated, that they would sell if the price 
was high enough. Regardless of differing opinions, many experts agreed that if there is almost 
any kind of market for local flexibility, market participants will offer. 
 
After short-term discussions, interviewees often asked on how would the longer-term availa-
bility or capacity market results for congestion management or other flexibility use-cases be 
realized and activated. Most argued that it does not make sense to create a separate congestion 
market for TSO-DSO congestion management, as it would not attract liquidity. Many saw self-
dispatch during congestion with no energy trading as most the most reasonable and as the eas-
iest option to implement. An expert added, that distributed flexibility can be controlled in many 
ways: manual SO control, self-dispatch according trades with FSPs or other machine-readable 
price or other indicator provided in a SO website. This also raised many concerns to market 
fragmentation, limited open access in real-time, verification and settlement, unclear remuner-
ation and balance deviation created. Majority saw allowing this as a possibility in special or 
demonstration cases, but some were worried if such method would then become business-as-
usual for networks. Also, when the possibility of combining congestion management either 
with balancing energy or wholesale markets were discussed and the opinions of experts where 
split. Some argued in favor of combined balancing and congestion management similar to the 
current situation in Finland, while others argued that locational wholesale markets should be 
preferred. Little justifications for these opinions were given. Most interviewees highlighted 
that it must be jointly discussed within industry whether locational parameter should be in-
cluded in flexibility offers, regardless of the market, and should these locational parameters be 
mandatory or optional. An expert added, that a TSO-DSO coordination mechanism to must be 
formed when two non-optimal bids are compared to choose. Also, it must be monitored how 
much flexibility can be delivered. Questions were asked if mandatory or even optional unit-
based bidding incrementally introduce nodal markets with non-market based central dispatch 
by TSOs. Production schedules were considered as a similar binding and restricting element, 
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which should be completely removed or changed to better support portfolio-based self-balanc-
ing. Experienced issues concerning production schedules were related to the early submission 
and unit-based compliance because of the existing imbalance settlement model. Introduction 
of mandatory or optional consumption schedule submitting was not supported. Some saw the 
timing of flexibility markets as the most important point to define first. Some saw that these 
should be done well in advance while others supported models where flexibility should be 
procured together with balancing, after liberalized markets would be closed.  
 
Experts commented also about the actual market interfaces used for flexibility trading and trad-
ing in general. For example, reducing the number of interfaces that traders and operators must 
maintain, would benefit all. One solution this was the possibility of detailed wholesale bids 
being suitable also for TSO-DSO flexibility or balancing markets. This was suggested because 
interfaces to exchanges is something that most market participants, BSPs or FSPs have at min-
imum. One interviewee added that currently traders see more than 20 different products on 
markets. This is was experienced too divided already, and therefore the need to link products 
and offers is a evident. To summarize the conflicting views and confusion of experts related to 
flexibility and future market architecture in general is that many do not know which will be the 
market for trading local flexibility and how important flexibility markets will be in relation to 
system level trading which is also in the midst of major changes. To this an interviewee asked: 
“In retrospect the Nordic market model has seemed historically successful. Now almost every 
European country, grid planner, system or market operator seems to go in different directions. 
Towards what architecture vision should the Finnish design develop to?” 
5.3 Flexibility products and other steering mechanisms 
Expert comments about product parameters were divided into updates to existing products and 
completely new products. Some of the comments related to market architecture in Chapter 5.2, 
answered to product questions and are not mentioned here again. This was partly caused by the 
question layouts, but still underlines that even industry experts talk overlappingly about com-
petitive and regulated domains and sometimes mix markets, products and services under one 
definition. All interviewees highlighted that we need all available flexibility to the markets. 
Therefore at least nationally harmonized tradable products are needed. They should work for: 
o large and small flexibility assets, 
o during short and long durations,  
o flexibility needs of DSOs, TSOs, market parties and other FSPs, 
o where the activations can be fast or slower. 
 
Firstly, experts were asked about their experiences with the current electricity market products. 
An expert pointed, out that gate closures, market time units, bidding sizes and activation and 
settlement rules are the most important product parameters and market design parameters that 
need to be redesigned first. Constantly updated rules and products on wholesale and ancillary 
markets were often mentioned by interviewees as an example of the uncertainty that market 
parties and service providers are facing. Especially capital-intensive investments see this un-
certainty as the biggest challenge. For example, many saw that moving towards 15-minute 
market time units in wholesale and balancing markets means, that some flexibility which is 
currently not used can be offered to markets, but some existing flexibility can be lost if longer 
products or block bidding is not allowed. Some also added, that prequalification tests, real-time 
telemetry requirements and control signals for any product should be thought carefully and 
designed with universal usability in mind so we do not exclude any possible flexible assets 
when designing technical rules.  
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Many saw that wholesale market products have well-defined parameters and that this is the 
primary market of their operation, although there where exceptions. Few argued that balancing 
energy markets are not either suitable or profitable and instead many flexibility resources look 
firstly into FCR. Bids with underlying assets not suitable or not selected for FCR are then 
offered then mFRR or aFRR markets or to intraday markets if a good match was found. In 
future, self-balancing and imbalance settlement as a market mechanism was seen to have a 
growing role. Market time unit definitions for flexibility products resulted in many opposing 
opinions and the mix seemed confusing for many interviewees. For example, an interviewee 
pointed out that future FCR-markets work with a 60-minute MTUs, assets are measured and 
settled either with a 15-minute or 60-minute resolution, balancing markets have overlapping 
15-minute MTUs, wholesale market trading is done in 15-minute and 60-minute resolution and 
flexibility markets can have varying products. Many hoped for a clear answer to what would 
be an ideal market time unit for flexibility markets. Questions related to wholesale, balancing 
and flexibility market bidding periods were a topic that spurred arguments. For example, mul-
tiple requests for European IDCZGCT and IDGCT harmonization were given by many experts. 
Majority found overlapping bidding and activation periods of continuous intraday, aFRR, 
mFRR and flexibility products too difficult for flexibility sellers and flexibility buyers. 
 
Experts were presented with three flexibility product options: locational intraday products, lo-
cational balancing products, including both mFRR balancing energy and capacity products, 
and competitive bilateral contracts. Experts could not present any other alternatives, but some 
mentioned the utilization of dynamic tariffs jointly with these products as an option. An expert 
started a discussion about longer competitive bilateral capacity contracts mimicking the current 
status of many bilateral flexibility use-cases and therefore market development should firstly 
enable those. Later this can be gradually changed towards shorter auction periods with reduced 
shares of availability and increased shares of delivery remuneration. Some argued that since 
the network needs flexibility only occasionally and suddenly, long term and availability prod-
ucts are the only realistic option. Many disagreed with bilateral contract auctions and stated 
that these should not be used, or if needed, only as a premarket for open flexibility energy 
markets. Some experts supported locational intraday products, while many argued against these 
and supported of using only balancing energy products for flexibility activations. In both cases, 
interviewees argued that SOs should signal via market interfaces to flexibility sellers to what 
market, where and when they would like have offers placed for local flexibility. 
 
Many experts mentioned that control rooms of DSOs and TSOs should not be limited in any 
way. Especially in emergency situations they should be able to utilize whatever flexibility via 
any market or mechanism, as long as they bear the costs. Many experts saw no obvious prob-
lems with any of the presented product alternatives but felt uncertain about saying anything 
concrete straight away. Majority of experts stated that they would first need to see clear exam-
ples on how these flexibility services would be procured contractually and how the physical 
activation would be done. After this they would estimate the financial profitability and offer or 
procure services from markets if it would make sense for them. 
 
Marginal pricing for both capacity and energy flexibility products was requested, while many 
argued that in some cases the results would lead anyway to pay-as-bid pricing. Many wished 
for flexibility capacity and energy markets to be developed with smaller than 0.1 MW mini-
mum bid sizes. For example, a bid size of 1 MW or 0.1 MW of locational balancing or intraday 
markets can be too large for DSO needs, and thus bilateral flexibility contracts are needed. 
Also, these markets are not fully compatible to purposes not related to active power control, 
such as voltage support. Bidding period for long term flexibility capacity was imagined 
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happening well in advance, for example, months or years ahead if new investments must be 
done. In the case of flexibility capacity markets being used without flexibility energy markets 
as after-markets, some experts argued in favor of self-dispatch while others for SO dispatch.  
 
Shorter period flexibility capacity market was discussed to happen together with mFRR capac-
ity markets or as a separate market. Some comments highlighted that maybe a separate flexi-
bility capacity market should be established to ensure the mFRR capacity market does not get 
too complex and because there might be a TSO-DSO flexibility market interface anyway. Some 
disagreed and supported to use the mFRR capacity market as an interface for local flexibility 
procurement, even though the possible D-2 GCT was found problematically early for some 
resources. An alternative suitable bidding period for shorter term flexibility capacity market 
would be before day ahead trading or after day ahead results. Some comments favored the 
latter, since this data would provide more accurate results for TSO-DSO flexibility need fore-
casting and offer matching. 
 
Many experts argued in favor of flexible network connections and competitive bilateral con-
tracts, while others were against these. According to some interviews, there are very little net-
work users, apart from summer cottages, that currently truly want to opt for reduced security 
of supply, regardless of the possible cost reductions. On the contrary, many large consumers 
already pay for increased security of supply with back-up connections and reserve generators. 
Still, there are some customer types that induce large socialized costs to other users, while some 
customers would like to opt for microgrids. An expert argued that these talks related to grid 
balkanization affects everyone negatively, and such talks should be abandoned now, if the mi-
crogrid or individual users plans to use the existing system even occasionally. Many argued 
that SOs must anyway reinforce the lines because most flexibility cannot save networks during 
storms. Only in cases where a reinforcement is coming anyway and there is a faster connection 
to a weak segment for a limited period or conditional connections for some network users this 
is reasonable. In these cases, networks can connect users earlier or more resources to a segment 
without reinforcement for very limited use. An expert argued that in order to simplify things, 
flexible connections should be done with a two-contract model, where the secondary contract 
adds on top of the original contract and possibly remunerates the network user separately.  
 
Most argued that while the status quo with high and increasing share of fixed costs in tariffs 
might be cost-reflective to networks, it is not supportive for flexibility. Many agreed, that well-
defined static power-based tariffs are suitable to act as a framework for network users. Still, 
some argued that dynamic tariffs are not cost-reflective and do not solve the true underlying 
issue related to dynamic network control, linked to both balancing and transmission manage-
ment. An expert suggested that moving towards a retailer centric model would reduce issues 
related to the some of these issues, since the retail customers could opt for paying a grid service 
fee. An expert stated that if no other ways to control networks will emerge, TSOs and DSOs 
will have to introduce hard power-based tariffs. Regardless of complexity of regulation related 
to this topic, most argued that different kinds of updatable dynamic tariffs and other fees would 
be a desired way to incentive network supporting behavior.  
 
Dynamics tariffs in combination with other types of flexibility contracts seemed reasonable 
according to other experts. Linking dynamic tariffs to real-time energy prices was seen prob-
lematic, since for example, day-ahead results following tariffs would distort zonal market be-
havior and following old day-ahead results would be not beneficial in cases where intraday 
trading has altered dispatching significantly already. Dynamic tariff parameter components 
linked to frequency were seen as a poor alternative to FCR-market, which should not be 
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developed. Parameters linked to congestion management, for example, time varying tariffs for 
an area or parameter components linked to voltage control were seen problematic by experts 
in many cases, because of regulation and the difficulty of updating correct tariffs for each area 
continuously. As stated in expert comments in chapters 5.1-5.3, a preferred option would be to 
procure these as services from markets, while keeping more static power-based tariffs as a 
framework for flexibility markets. FSP would be able to transfer part of remuneration that they 
would get from the network operator or market parties for the services provided. For example, 
a grid user could get remuneration from the FSP if they opted for a flexibility contract.  
 
Related to flexibility product alternatives, the biggest open question left was settlement and 
verification of flexibility delivery. Flexibility buyers and sellers both stated, that if a product is 
traded, they must know what is being paid for. Options for using unit-based market position 
and production and consumption schedules as a reference for flexibility settlement where ex-
cluded by most experts, since they were not seen compliant to self-balancing. Baseline-meth-
ods with statistical ex-post analysis and fine-resolution metering verification were mentioned 
as solutions by few. An expert asked who would be the right person to do such a baseline or 
schedule definition: flexibility seller or flexibility buyer? Both were seen as biased parties and 
a third-party settler was seen needed. Also, for some types of resources the possibility of gran-
ular sub-meter monitoring was discussed. Interviewees did not have answer for what should be 
the preferred way of proceeding, since the behavior of each unit will differ significantly, and 
the theme was seen too difficult. For example, a baseline-definition and schedules or fine-res-
olution metering, for production, consumption or storage devices will differ significantly and 
therefore one model will not suit all cases. Still, such processes must be reasonably simple and 
automatable. An expert concluded: “Current market products, verification and settlement are 
far from perfect, why should flexibility products and processes be any different?”  
5.4 General comments, development ideas and other feedback 
Contrary to the division of flexibility sellers and flexibility buyers, during interviews many 
experts interestingly commented on the rules and mechanisms related to flexibility use outside 
the responsibilities of their current organization. This was a clear indication that utilization of 
flexibility is an evocative and constantly developing concept with limited harmonization. The 
overall themes in the questions were familiar to the interviewees, but details divided the ex-
perts. Only a part of interviewees was able to say anything concrete about some of the ques-
tions. Emerging concepts and topics were the most difficult questions, for example, flexibility 
initiatives, like GOPACS, PICLO FLEX, NODES and ENERA, were new to most. Some had 
done, were doing or were about start on-going flexibility development and piloting in other 
research and development projects. Also, there was no full understanding of current status of 
flexibility markets. Flexibility activations via bilateral and balancing energy markets like re-
dispatching and countertrades and voltage support procurement raised mostly confusion. Many 
saw, that they can talk only about their own situation and that flexibility needs of different 
parties are unclear to them. In general, interviewees were interested in the topic and supported 
the thesis and further open and industry wide research into the topic. Many highlighted that the 
topic seemed novel and futuristic, and questioned the industry’s capability to develop such 
flexibility markets. Experts had significant disagreements regarding the flexibility needs, the 
suitable technologies and other technical details which are not shared more due to privacy. 
Many questions in the interview material raised a lot of counter-questions, that could not be 
answered during the interviews. For example, interviewees asked questions, like:  
• How much system-level and local flexibility do we need in the future?  
• What will be the cost of this local flexibility and the operational costs of these markets? 
• When do we exactly need to have these flexibility markets operational?  
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• How will the regulation model support the use of flexibility? 
• What is an ideal ownership structure of flexibility markets and coordination platforms? 
 
Many added that while they fully support this discussion and launch of a new development 
project, they are at the same time worried about the capability of the industry, particularly of 
TSOs, to complete existing projects they have started. Also, many saw that for example, BRPs, 
electricity retailers and DSOs are in the same difficult situation with the market and regulation 
changes. There is insufficient internal knowledge in many organizations and many of the few 
service companies are fully booked already for the 15–minute ISP and Datahub-projects. De-
veloping flexibility markets were seen as a secondary priority in many organizations. A non-
exhaustive list of these above-mentioned projects: 
• European or Nordic balancing capacity and energy markets, 
• independent aggregation pilots, 
• shorter ISPs and MTUs on different markets, 
• single price and single position imbalance settlement model, 
• Datahub, 
• bidding zone reconfigurations, 
• intraday auctions and harmonization of market GOTs and GCTs in general,  
• retail, wholesale and financial market development, 
• tariff component harmonization,   
• multi-NEMO arrangements,  
• market integration or offer linking in multiple markets, 
• flow-based capacity allocation, allocation reductions and Nordic RSC company.  
 
Majority argued that flexibility markets will not be a major priority for trading, as system-level 
balancing is more urgently developed. Experts saw that during next years the trading volumes 
will increase in the intra-day, balancing, reserve and possibly in the flexibility markets and in 
general during shorter timeframes. Many interviewees saw that intraday markets and self-bal-
ancing start to replace proactive mFRR and day-ahead markets. Some argued that reserves 
should be procured with shorter rolling auctions near real-time. To enable self-balancing also 
in possible two-price situations an interviewee argued for an aftermarket for imbalances. 
Linked markets, meaning that unused bids in one market, should be transferrable to other mar-
kets, were mentioned as a target to enable easier flexibility market development. Also, linked 
offers meaning that an offer being realized can lead to another bid being submitted or removed 
in the same or other markets, were mentioned by many. Cross-border flexibility market har-
monization was argued by experts to be the next step after development of national flexibility 
markets.  
 
In the interview background material, it was mentioned, that flexibility markets might need a 
datahub linked flexibility register to possibly monitor, verify, settle and possibly activate flex-
ibility delivery automatically. The possible introduction of a flexibility register raised a lot of 
questions. Some experts questioned the need and occurred costs of a such flexibility register. 
Still, many interviewees supported such a functionality, since the introduction of thousands of 
small-scale flexible resources to markets, fair independent aggregation and future settlement 
in general requires this. This topic was left open and further researches should analyze if flex-
ibility markets can work without such a register. The concrete functionalities of a TSO-DSO 
coordination platform were also left open and it raised interviewee speculation. Reliability of 
IT-based systems and cybersecurity raised a lot of concerns when flexibility platforms and 
markets were discussed, although all agreed that automated systems are a must. 
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Many experts argued that the current regulatory model should be updated to match the current 
situation as for example, currently flexibility and service procurement is undervalued. Allow-
ing total expenditure framework (TOTEX) in some regulatory cases, could support the use of 
flexibility by aligning network and network user incentives better. This means allowing service 
procurement as a part of the expenditure allowances of SOs. Examples of possible modifica-
tions varied regarding dynamic tariffs, bilateral contracts, unit prices of network components, 
electrical storages as part of networks and are not discussed here further. As a key next step 
many mentioned that regulators should define harmonized product parameters for distribution 
and transmission products and especially tell how power-based issues should be tackled. In 
general, the capability and resources of market surveillance and regulation were questioned, 
especially now when flexibility markets are introduced. Extension of Regulation on Wholesale 
Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) or similar monitoring to flexibility mar-
kets was discussed as a possible solution. Many added that market-based investments are chal-
lenged if rules on different markets are constantly changing. An expert added that in near future 
we will need tens or hundreds of terawatt hours of clean electricity to clean the electricity sector 
and other electrifying sectors. Flexibility markets and other rules should be in place before this 
to reduce the risks related to these changes, not to increase them. Some experts added, that it 
is interesting to have industry-wide discussions on whether reactive power, inertia and black 
start capability should be more compensated. Others argued that it would reduce cost-efficiency 
of all parties, since networks are already maintained with shared resources of SOs and network 
users. Remuneration of additional or enhanced support above minimum levels was mentioned 
as a good place to start tests regarding these ancillary service markets.  
 
To alleviate complexity concerns related to existing markets and possibly emerging flexibility 
marketplaces, interviewees highlighted that allowing close to real time trading on all energy, 
capacity and flexibility markets as a preferred option to reduce risks. Also, possible network 
capacity allocation reductions done by SOs should be justified based on demonstrable socio-
economical welfare benefit of all affected parties in Europe. When flexibility markets are pi-
loted stakeholders should be provided with an easily accessible interface to test and investigate 
emerging markets. Experts added that it will be hard to offer flexibility without knowing how 
much will be procured and therefore flexibility needs, location and revenue forecasts should 
be provided. In these pilots, end-to-end testing of trading with aggregated bids must be tested, 
not just conceptualized. Experts argued that since markets and bidding is already automated, 
next steps should focus on market integration. Market or bid coupling is difficult because most 
of markets are binding.  
 
Many argued strongly, that further development should separate more clearly the regulated and 
market-based roles. An expert added that when conducting pilots, demonstrators should not 
plan market calls, otherwise no natural market behavior will happen. Many added that further 
development should continue with open debate and incremental experimentation and when do-
ing so data formats, interfaces and processes should be harmonized and open to make joining 
easier. A domain cross-cutting consensus highlighted that especially now when there are lim-
ited local challenges in Finland, network companies should both invest into grids and test flex-
ibility markets, while they can. News of emerging network challenges around Europe were 
seen as a major concern and many interviewees agreed that these should be avoided in Finland 
with preventive actions. Most of interviewees provided conditional preliminary interest to test 
flexibility markets.  
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5.5 Summary of industry consultation results 
Many interviewees had not yet experienced serious local flexibility issues in Finland but were 
familiar with issues in other countries around the world. System-level flexibility use-cases were 
given priority over local-level flexibility by many experts. Experts argued, that there has been 
and will also be in the future more technical needs and market-pull for system-level markets. 
Many argued that in Finland, local flexibility needs have been minor due to development of 
strong high-capacity transmission and distribution networks. Some added that this method has 
been often the only possible technical or economically cost-efficient solution, and this has re-
sulted in higher cost-efficiency than co-utilization of flexibility and networks. Many saw elec-
trification and electrical networks as the platform of many future business and added that as 
old infrastructure in European electrical networks must be renovated anyway there is little point 
not to reinforce grids while doing so.  
 
Regardless of this, majority of interviewees saw flexibility worth considering for some fore-
seen local applications if this could be done cost-efficiently. Outage management and voltage 
support with flexibility were identified as the most urgent local needs and congestion manage-
ment was seen less important. Many argued that technical and financial problems in local net-
works and markets seen in different countries around the world will emerge in Finland soon. 
Many interviewees found the proposed flexibility product alternatives challenging to asses and 
had little or no new ideas to add. No clear favorite product alternative emerged, but many 
opinions of experts were contradictory. Still, preference to go forward with development was 
mostly divided between three product option categories: locational intraday products, loca-
tional balancing products and different kinds of competitive bilateral flexibility contracts. Also, 
dynamic network tariffs were supported widely, but the correct method to include system-level 
or local price signals into tariffs could not be answered during interviews. 
 
Flexibility sellers were more optimistic about their capability to sell on flexibility markets, than 
flexibility buyers were about their capability to buy on flexibility markets. To continue with 
development of flexibility products, many interviewees wished for interoperability of market 
interfaces, harmonized data exchange standards and processes, simpler rules and mechanisms 
on different markets and a clear division of roles between regulated and liberalized domains. 
Majority were interested in some way planning to continue flexibility development. 
 
 
Figure 19: Development drivers for flexibility in 2018 as seen by UK utilities (CGI 2019). 
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To accurately compare results in chapters 5.1-5.4 to other industry consultations is difficult. 
Still, Figure 19 shows similar results, which were obtained from a UK utility consultation, 
where many indicated that flexibility is having a major system-level role. Latest around the 
year 2023 the local need to have flexibility is increased up to a level where flexibility markets 
are needed according to a majority. Interestingly reinforcement deferral was seen by two thirds 
as an opportunity already today. Differences of these to results in chapters 5.1-5.4, are here 
assumed to be related to the regulatory model and status of energy infrastructure. The results 
presented in previous chapters, showcasing industry confusion and contradictions related to a 
complex and non-mature smart grid environment, are aligned with a similar Finnish industry 
consultation during 2012, regardless of the changes happened since (Aaltomaa 2012).  
 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the survey according to main conditions, while details are 
shown in chapters 5.1-5.4. There are major changes expected to the physical needs and sources 
of flexibility in a short period. Also, the ownership and dispatching of flexible assets were seen 
subject to be modified. Flexibility trading platforms and related mechanisms were seen to be 
developing fast during the following years, although majority saw that these will not be ready 
in 2024. Points with limited significance or uncertainty are in parentheses. It can be seen from 
Table 5 that major uncertainties are linked to year 2024 and flexibility markets. 
 
Table 5: Development trends of flexibility during 2019-2024 as seen by interviewees. 
Condition 2019 2024 
Flexibility supplied from Hydro, interconnectors, CHP, 
fossil fuel power plants, de-
mand response 
Hydro, interconnectors, reduced CHP and 
fossil fuel power plants, demand response, 
(EES) 
Flexibility supply loca-
tion 
Mainly centralized medium to 
large units 
(Increasingly centralized in terms of energy 
but decentralized in terms of power) 
Flexibility needed for System level: wholesale, bal-
ance mechanism. Local: volt-
age support, occasionally CM 
during faults or maintenance 
System level: wholesale, balance mechanism 
(including self-balancing). Local: voltage 
support, outage management, CM  
Flexibility need location Local needs are limited, (north-
to-south transmission) 
(Hard to forecast. Increasingly dispersed 
problems) 
Flexibility buyer TSO, (DSO) TSO, DSO, (FSP energy communities) 
Local flexibility pro-
curement method 
Limited. Private bilateral trad-
ing or using balancing markets 
Privat bilateral contracts, competitive bilat-
eral contracts, (flexibility markets) 
Flexibility products used Locational balancing energy 
products, private bilateral 
trades 
(Locational balancing energy products, loca-
tional wholesale products, competitive bilat-
eral flexibility contracts, dynamic tariffs) 
Local flexibility pricing Case-specific (Increasingly market-based/competitive) 
Flexibility settlement No settlement or case-specific (Increasingly standardized) 
Flexibility dispatch Mostly TSO or DSO dispatch Increasingly self-dispatch from to market sig-
nals or (multilateral TSO-DSO dispatch) 
Harmonization No harmonization (European guidelines with national or re-
gional implementation) 
Resource ownership Competitive parties, SOs Competitive parties, (SOs) 
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6 Flexibility products for multilateral power system man-
agement 
This chapter proposes the most promising flexibility products for future development. The pro-
posals are based on literature review in chapters 1-4 and the industry consultation in Chapter 
5. Flexibility products are traded multilaterally with many network operators and market par-
ties. Market interface of these markets can be separated or integrated with the existing system-
level markets, but in both cases separated pricing, trading and cost-allocation rules are in place. 
Here flexibility products are in place for the purposes of networks, meaning that different net-
work operators are the buyers of flexibility and different kinds of FSPs as sellers of flexibility. 
FSP to FSP and other liberalized flexibility trading are assumed to be done on system-level 
markets. Also, FSPs can optimize their own resources for their own locational needs in the 
future, as they can today. In cases where many FSPs need to trade locationally and these needs 
differ from network needs, the trading can be done with bilateral trading. Established system-
level products on wholesale, FCR, FFR and FRR markets, are not examined here. 
 
Flexibility products in this chapter are not totally new products to be traded on separate flexi-
bility markets, but rather modifications of existing products. This is done to foster liquidity, 
increase competition and to make the products reasonably simple to use, while robust enough 
to deliver many types of services securely. For locational intraday and balancing products, the 
modification is locational information to existing offers. These offers are multiples of standard 
products described in Chapter 4. The modification can be the marking of the underlying regu-
lating object (RO) in question or using EANs. In competitive bilateral flexibility offers, the 
modification is holding open auctions instead of private bilateral trading. 
6.1 Technical details of flexibility products 
Flexibility products here are like those presented in Chapter 4, but with modifications based on 
industry views from Chapter 5. For example, in Chapter 4, dynamic tariffs and flexible service 
agreements were identified as a potential flexibility product, but due to industry consultation 
results in Chapter 5 and other studies, these are excluded here (Gaia Consulting 2018; Koski 
2017). Instead, it is here assumed, that similar results can be achieved with market-based com-
petitive bilateral flexibility contracts. These can be used for similar services as dynamic tariffs 
and flexible network service agreements, when these contracts are linked to locational or sys-
tem-level price-signals. In Figure 20 flexibility products are divided into two: flexibility ca-
pacity market products and flexibility energy market products.  
 
 
Figure 20: Flexibility capacity and flexibility energy products relationship and utilization. 
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Flexibility capacity products are here defined as:  
• pre-market product for locational flexibility energy markets, which can be: 
o balancing capacity market products with locational information, 
o separate locational flexibility capacity market products, 
• or competitive bilateral flexibility contracts, without a mandatory flexibility energy 
trading, for: 
o congestion management contracts, 
o voltage support contracts, 
o outage support contracts. 
 
Flexibility energy products and mechanisms are here defined as: 
• locational intraday product, 
• locational balancing energy product (mFRR), 
• other bilateral flexibility energy trades. 
 
Flexibility capacity markets are based on competitive auctions, where pre-qualified assets of 
the flexibility area can offer their capacity. Flexibility capacity markets can be realized together 
with flexibility energy markets, meaning that the successful trades of flexibility capacity mar-
kets obligate the selected FSP to bid to the corresponding flexibility energy market. If a FSP 
does not bid to the corresponding flexibility energy market, this is penalized according to terms 
and conditions. Flexibility capacity markets are in place to secure locational flexibility capac-
ity, similarly as balancing capacity markets secure system-level balancing capacity. Flexibility 
capacity markets can be part of existing balancing capacity markets if balancing capacity offers 
include locational signals, or a separate flexibility capacity market.   
 
An alternative result of a flexibility capacity market is a competitive bilateral flexibility con-
tract, which does not include mandatory flexibility energy trading. Optionally either the FSP 
itself or the SO can settle possible imbalances of activations on wholesale markets or with 
bilateral trades. In the case of using competitive bilateral flexibility contracts, the product re-
muneration can be based on availability and/or utilization costs, depending on the use-case. 
Bilateral flexibility contract could exist between many kinds of parties, although according to 
industry feedback, contracts directly between network operators and an end-user, should not 
be preferred over networks procuring flexibility via markets from FSPs. A bilateral flexibility 
contract is, for example, a separate contract between a FSP having network connected flexibil-
ity asset and a network operator, where the asset provides voltage support, congestion manage-
ment or uninterrupted power supply. FSP controls assets according to its own, networks or 
according to other FSP needs through trading. The activation can base on in advance defined 
self-dispatch or SO activation decision. As these contracts are the result of locational and indi-
vidual use-case specific auctions, the product parameters details are also use-case specific. Still, 
a framework and product parameter definitions can be harmonized. For example, UK Power 
networks and National Grid Electricity System Operator have held such auctions for reactive 
power support and congestion management (NGESO 2019; UKPN 2018). A DSO product 
structure based on bilateral contracts is shown in Appendix 6.  
 
Flexibility energy products are activated according to locational and use-case specific needs. 
These are suited for congestion management services. These markets should be used when a 
flexibility activation results in a significant energy activation which is not netted during an 
imbalance settlement period. This can be accomplished with locational bilateral flexibility 
trades, intraday markets or balancing energy markets. Here it is assumed, that bilateral and 
69 
 
locational intraday trades are executed with self-dispatch, while locational balancing energy 
product is activated by the corresponding TSO or DSO. 
 
The possibility of joining flexibility products and existing products together and creating one 
super-platform or single market as described by Ofgem (2019) is here neglected. This is due to 
the limited industry support in Chapter 5 for such a market design. The creation of such a 
mechanism is extremely complex and it would reduce the possibility of market-based trading. 
Here it is assumed, that market-based competition will create better results than centralized 
concepts. Table 6 summarizes the flexibility product concepts based on template in appendix 
5. As in Chapter 3.4, only the standard flexibility products for year 2024 are described. Pro-
posed flexibility products are regionally specific for Finland, but most likely applicable to other 
European electricity markets. Longer, faster or complex services can be procured with blocks 
and offer linking of standard flexibility products or using special products defined later.  
 
Table 6: Flexibility products. 
Parameter 
Locational balancing 
offers 
Locational intraday prod-
uct 
Competitive bilateral 
flexibility contract 
Short description 
Utilization of mFRR (or 
similar) offers for con-
gestion management ei-
ther preventively or dur-
ing occurring conges-
tions. 
Utilization of locational in-
traday offers where SO 
pays a congestion spread 
between offers to manipu-
late zonal market dispatch 
to preventively alleviate 
congestions. 
SOs arranging auc-
tions to competitively 
procure contracts for 
congestion manage-
ment, voltage support 
or outage support. 
Market time unit /valid-
ity period 
15 min. (Same as bal-
ancing offers or longer 
if special products 
used.)  
15 min. (Same as intraday 
MTU or longer if blocks 
are used.) 
Contract specific. 
(Typically, months to 
years. Within the va-
lidity there can be pe-
riods where contract 
doesn’t oblige deliv-
ery. 
Market opening 
D-1 12:00 (same as bal-
ancing market)  
D-1 15.15. (similar as con-
tinuous trading on intraday 
markets) 
Contract specific 
(Months or years 
ahead of validity pe-
riod. Depends whether 
the procurement is 
done from existing or 
new resources.) 
Market closure 
~H-25 min. (Same as 
balancing markets or be-
fore if special products 
are needed.) 
~IZ H-0 min. (Same as 
IDM, but most likely trad-
ing hours before delivery.) 
Minimum lead time 
~17.5 min. (Same as 
balancing market or 
longer if special prod-
ucts used.) 
~0 min. (Same as intraday 
market, but most likely 
hours before delivery.) 
Contract specific (e.g.  
months or years.) 
Full activation time 
~12.5 min. (Same as 
balancing markets or 
different if special prod-
ucts.) 
Not applicable/0min. (Re-
sults are known in ad-
vance.) 
Contract specific de-
pending on the mode 
of activation (e.g. con-
tinuous, procurement 
to deliver in advance 
or from SO signal.) 
Duration of delivery pe-
riod (minimum-maxi-
mum) 
~5 min. (Can be same as 
balancing markets, but 
most likely hours) 
~15 min. (Can be same as 
intraday markets, but most 
likely hours.) 
Contract specific. (e.g.  
hours or continuous). 
Minimum bid size 
[granularity] 
1 MW [0.1 MW]. (Same 
as balancing market.) 
0.1 MW [0.1 MW]. (Same 
as intraday markets.)  
Contract specific. (e.g. 
0.05 MW [0.05 MW]) 
Divisibility Yes (indivisible offers can also be allowed). 
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Symmetric/asymmetric 
product 
Asymmetric 
Asymmetric/symmet-
ric (contract specific) 
Mode of activation SO manual dispatch Self-dispatch 
Contract specific (e.g. 
procurement in ad-
vance to deliver, SO 
activation signal or 
self-dispatch). 
Locational information                        
(order book, bid re-
sources) 
Underlying resource(s) 
are indicated in the of-
fer. 
Underlying resource(s)/ 
(and postal code) are indi-
cated in the offer. 
Contract specific, but 
in most cases resource 
or at least location 
specific. 
Aggregation rules Can be allowed. 
Link to primary ser-
vice(s) 
Congestion management 
Many: Congestion 
management, reactive 
power and voltage 
control, uninterrupted 
power supply (and 
other services). 
Link to secondary or 
other services 
Same offers can be used 
for balance mechanism. 
Possible link to loca-
tional balancing/flexibil-
ity capacity markets. 
Same offers can be used for 
intraday trading. 
Outside the availabil-
ity window the re-
source can be offered 
to other markets or 
purposes. 
Market or other pro-
curement channel 
Balancing energy mar-
ket 
Power exchange (and a co-
ordination mechanism) 
Separate auctions 
Buyer(s) TSOs (DSOs) TSOs and DSOs TSOs and DSOs 
Seller(s) BSPs (FSPs) BRPs/BSPs, (FSPs) FSPs 
Remuneration and com-
pliance monitoring 
Pay-as-bid energy remu-
neration for utilization. 
Compliance is moni-
tored with measure-
ments. 
Pay-as-bid energy remu-
neration for utilization. 
Compliance is monitored 
with measurements in rela-
tion to (unit-based market 
position), delivery schedule 
or a baseline. 
Contract-specific. Re-
muneration for utiliza-
tion (energy) and/or 
availability (capacity). 
Pricing can be mar-
ginal, pay-as-bid or a 
regulated price. Com-
pliance is monitored 
with measurements in 
relation to unit-based 
baseline or other. 
Existing examples 
European TSOs with 
mFRR (or RR) offers, 
NODES. 
GOPACS, ENERA 
TSO and DSO con-
tracts, PICLO-FLEX 
Source 
(NODES 2019; EN-
TSO-E 2019d) 
(GOPACS 2019a) 
(Open utility 2019a;  
NGESO 2019; UKPN 
2019) 
 
These three proposed emerging flexibility products are needed in addition to existing products 
described in Chapter 3, because there are specific needs to procure more flexibility services 
from markets and the existing products do not adequately enable this. In the cases of congestion 
management products, the need is the inadequacy of the transfer capacity of networks or the 
management of its congestions. There are significant similarities between locational balancing 
product and a locational intraday product as both have a role in the balancing mechanism and 
can be used for congestion management. In the case of products for voltage support, the back-
ground is related to insufficient capability or increased costs of network operators maintaining 
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voltage quality during all situations. In cases of other flexibility needs, such as uninterrupted 
power supply, the need is use-case specific and therefore the product definition must be flexi-
ble.  
6.2 Utilization of flexibility products 
The bidding period, market clearing time and activation point in time of the flexibility products 
described in Chapter 6.1, have many alternatives. One option is to do all flexibility product 
trading at the same time as the corresponding system-level market products. Other option is to 
do flexibility trading after or before system-level products are cleared. As system-level prod-
ucts are traded close to delivery, earlier trading is the more likely option. The difficulty related 
to this timing is shown in Figure 21, where hypothetical flexibility procurement from flexibility 
markets is indicated by the three bidirectional arrows representing trading.  
 
Figure 21: Scenario of parallel energy, capacity and flexibility trading. 
 
As said in previous chapters, there might not be a separate market interface for such trades. 
Instead, system-level market offers with more detailed bids can operate like a market within a 
market. During this process many overlapping and simultaneous mechanisms, rules and mar-
kets need to be accounted for. The main difficulty is related to times where different offers 
linked to an underlying resource could be unfeasibly realized multiple times. Such times are: 
• after BEGCT, at H-25 min, where system-level or locational mFRR, normal aFRR and 
normal or locational intraday-offers could be double or triple activated, 
• at FCR-market clearing, at D-1 21:00, where FCR offers, normal or locational intraday-
offers could be double, or triple activated, 
• at flexibility market (undefined) clearing and all other market offers, 
• at any time with continuous bilateral trades and all other market offers. 
These issues can be solved either with flexibility seller doing sequential bidding one product 
at a time or intelligent market integration where bids are cross process linked. The latter option 
is here preferred and is further examined in Chapter 7. 
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According to industry feedback in Chapter 5, bilateral energy trades and competitive bilateral 
flexibility contracts are assumed to be completed well in advance, and most likely with longer 
contract periods. These are not assessed here further as these are case-specific and the FSP 
assumedly knows these commitments when submitting other offers. If short-term flexibility 
capacity market auctions are needed, these could be separated or integrated in balancing ca-
pacity markets as locational offers. If flexibility capacity markets would operate as a separate 
market, suitable times to hold auctions could be either before or after day-ahead auction. A 
possible time to hold flexibility capacity auctions is after first intraday auction results, most 
preferably during traditional office hours to minimize interfering with zonal market price dis-
covery. If further studies find challenges related to this, a time before day-ahead auctions can 
be considered as an alternative.  
Activation of offers on flexibility energy markets is assumed to happen well in advance of 
delivery. This is because near the delivery, only balancing can be concentrated on. If continu-
ous intraday with locational parameters is used, the flexibility market could operate after intra-
day auction results (D-1 15.15 CET). Still, as majority of intraday trading volumes occur near 
delivery, the liquidity of early trading can become an issue (Schraff et al. 2016). Other bilateral 
flexibility trades shown in Figure 20, are here assumed to be like locational intraday products 
and are not further examined. The unclarities for locational balancing energy flexibility offers 
are further assessed in chapter 4.1.1. These unclarities include questions like can and should 
flexibility market clearing be synchronized with system-level balancing energy offers or not, 
and should special products be allowed. 
Based on this thesis, it is difficult to say what product and product utilization agreements would 
be optimal different network operators. There is a possibility that all three product options 
could be used together. This was also the result of the industry consultation. This could happen 
in a scenario scheme where different needs are fulfilled during all times with a procurement 
strategy for: 
• Long-term: TSO and DSO flexibility capacity markets are used: 
o to secure short-term congestion management capacity for locational balancing 
energy markets (either separated or combined with balancing capacity markets), 
o to secure long-term local capacity with bilateral flexibility contracts for: 
▪ congestion management, in cases where flexibility energy markets are 
proven not sufficient or efficient, 
▪ security of supply during disturbances, 
▪ fast and slow voltage support (additional to ORPR and SO resources). 
• Medium to short-term: flexibility energy markets prioritize the use of locational con-
tinuous intraday trading if preventive congestion management activations are needed. 
• Real-time: in case of reactive congestion management or other unforeseen situations 
locational balancing energy products are used by TSOs, DSOs or by TSOs under DSO 
request.  
 
There are many alternatives how the products described above could be used together and no, 
or limited experience with these concepts. Reasons why the flexibility products could not co-
exist at the same time were not identified. Still, different procurement strategies and operational 
guidelines should be tested. 
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6.3 Evaluation of flexibility products 
This subchapter evaluates the viability of the product options presented in part 6.1. Figure 22 
shows an assessment, using traffic light-concept as diagnostic tool to present the strengths and 
weaknesses of the three preferred flexibility products (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2015). Assessment 
is based on literature study in chapters 1-4 and industry consultation results from Chapter 5. 
Red light indicates that the product does not fulfill evaluation criteria, yellow light means par-
tial compliance and green light implies compatibility. Multiple lights mean that the product 
option is in between light criterions, or it is not feasible to say whether the product complies or 
not.  
 
 
Figure 22: Evaluation of three product options to be included in the flexibility market design. 
 
From Figure 22, it can be interpreted that all product options have weaknesses and strengths in 
different ways. For purposes other than congestion management the use of competitive bilateral 
flexibility contracts is here the only option. It is also the most realistic alternative in low voltage 
radial networks or in locations of insufficient local capacity and in need of investments. In 
cases of congestion management in higher voltage networks with meshed grid topologies and 
enough supply, TSOs and DSO can use locational flexibility energy products alongside com-
petitive bilateral flexibility contracts.  
 
From the viewpoint of network operators, the use of competitive bilateral flexibility contracts 
is simple and robust as auctions can be customized to be case-specific. Still, it has a major 
disadvantage as markets are increasingly fragmented. Locational intraday offers can be used 
within the day to solve congestions, but not for longer durations nor during delivery. Balancing 
energy offers with locations can be used for reactive congestion management near or during 
delivery, but smaller resources can have difficulties in participation to the market. With modi-
fications, all options are seen compatible with future European electricity markets.  
 
As indicated by most stakeholders in Chapter 5, there is a possibility that network operators 
need to reinforce networks as fast as possible and use all available flexibility, to keep up with 
the energy transition. To enable this, the three presented emerging flexibility product options 
and possibly the preceding flexibility capacity markets could all be used simultaneously. Test-
ing and case-specific analysis must be done to find out which of these products would be 
74 
 
preferred in each case. Therefore, evaluation in this chapter and scenario in Chapter 6.2 is pre-
sented as an initial suggestion and as a benchmark.  
 
When designing flexibility products and their utilization, it is important to remember the con-
text. This includes the probable updated versions of existing products from Chapter 3 and pos-
sible emerging products from chapters 4 and 6. Below is a possible product structure for future 
electricity markets in Finland and Europe: 
• Financial market: 
o Financial products 
• Wholesale market: 
o Day-ahead products 
o Intraday products 
• Network service products and rules 
o Network tariffs 
o Network service agreements  
o Other rules 
• Frequency-based reserve products 
o FCR-N hourly product 
o FCR-N yearly product 
o FCR-D hourly product 
o FCR-D yearly product 
o FFR hourly product 
• Balancing products 
o aFRR balancing capacity product 
o aFRR balancing energy product 
o mFRR balancing capacity product 
o mFRR balancing energy product 
o (self-balancing in relation to the expected imbalance price) 
• Flexibility products: 
o Flexibility capacity products: 
▪ balancing capacity market with locational information  
▪ separate flexibility capacity market 
▪ competitive bilateral flexibility contracts 
o Flexibility energy products: 
▪ locational flexibility intraday product, 
▪ locational flexibility balancing energy product (or similar), 
▪ other bilateral flexibility trade. 
 
There are many variations on how to define and utilize flexibility products and the product 
structure presented above is not the only option. Along with the possible implementation of 
discussed flexibility products, the existing products on different markets will be revamped. 
Existing and emerging products will be traded in parallel and there will be price-competition 
between different markets, products and different users for the same resources.  
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7 Discussion 
This chapter discusses relevant themes related to the definitions of flexibility products. The 
motivation for flexibility product development derives from the quintessential need to give the 
right value for flexibility to foster fair network and system friendly behavior. As stated above, 
this need can be seen increasing due to technical development, market liberalization, environ-
mental protection goals and other global phenomena related to on-going energy transition. The 
premise for this goal can be found in numerous global agreements and European legal docu-
ments. For example, the 2030-vision for the Nordic electricity market is: “In 2030, the Nordics 
should have the world’s most competitive, innovative and consumer-oriented electricity mar-
ket, that contributes to reaching the Nordic climate goals” (Nordic council of Ministers, 2019). 
To enable this vision the visibility, transparency and automation of existing markets needs to 
increase. In this thesis this is argued to be achieved with the combination of market pull and 
technology push, where multilateral and integrated market environment enforces market-based 
competition to use flexible assets when and where most needed. Flexibility market data must 
also be accessible by regulators, so that fair competition can be ensured.  
 
Firstly, national and regional rules, products and markets for flexibility are needed. Later a 
common European model should be developed with the harmonization of best practices. Prod-
uct reforms or implementation of totally new flexibility products can increase interoperability 
and efficiency of market mechanisms controlling electrical systems. To enable the use of flex-
ibility with flexibility products, there are significant challenges that need to solved, such as: 
compatibility of flexibility products with the existing zonal market models, difficulty of cross-
process offer linking or market integration, settlement and verification of flexibility delivery, 
market fragmentation due to flexibility products and whether participation to flexibility mar-
kets is optional or mandatory. The following chapters will discuss these themes.  
7.1 Market architecture and product reform 
Limited or non-existing possibility of network operators to procure flexibility from markets 
must be solved with simultaneous development of flexibility products and installation of flex-
ible assets. The needed market architecture and product reform include product definitions and 
modified operational guidelines for trading the market-based flexibility products. In general, 
SOs procuring flexibilities for local purposes are a must in some situations and could be a good 
alternative to grid expansion, if enough flexible capacity exists to enable a cost-efficient flexi-
bility market. As industry consultation in Chapter 5 indicates, a local flexibility market alone 
is very seldomly preferable. Therefore, combability of local flexibility markets with existing 
system-level market must be ensured. In this thesis, competitive flexibility contracts and inte-
gration of flexibility markets into system-level intraday or balancing markets, with more de-
tailed offers, are assumed to be able to tackle this issue.  
 
Competitive bilateral contracts should be preferred if a very specific service is be procured, 
short-term liquidity is missing, or if longer-term contracts can create savings as flexibility 
seller’s transactional costs are divided over a longer contract period. It must be ensured, that 
the resource can be used elsewhere outside of the service window if competitive bilateral flex-
ibility contracts for a single purpose are used. Market integration and removal of separate and 
unnecessary markets is here assumed as a competitive way to facilitate the use of flexibility as 
resources are not locked to a specific use-case. This means, that the existing market products 
and bids must include more locational and resource specific information and that market coor-
dination needs to improve. This thesis does not have a preferred answer if this detailed offer 
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information should be optional or mandatory, but for portfolio trading this can create gaming 
opportunities as discussed in Chapter 7.3. 
 
Figure 23 illustrates a possible single flexibility market environment where multilateral trading 
on overlapping markets and products can create increased value for flexibility. Market parties 
selecting markets and products in the foreseen multilateral and multi-market environment and 
pricing the same resource differently for overlapping use-cases is and should remain as com-
petitive business. Selecting bids from semi-competitive SO single-buyer markets, such as bal-
ancing and flexibility markets, is regulated business.  
 
 
Figure 23: Flexibility services architecture. Adapted from: (Fingrid 2019d). 
 
In Chapter 5 most industry experts indicated that they are interested in flexibility markets and 
support all three proposed flexibility products, with the precondition that market interfaces, 
data-exchange formats and that market participation is made easier than it currently is. Here it 
is proposed, that market interfaces and data-formats are harmonized, but the actual markets 
will remain separated. Detailed bid linking within a single market and cross-process linking is 
proposed to tackle the issues that flexibility sellers and flexibility buyers are experiencing al-
ready. This means that offers being activated on one market can result in linked bids being 
instantaneously removed or added to the same and other markets (Boomsma et al. 2014). For 
example, intraday offers could be forwarded to balancing markets. Also, intraday and balanc-
ing market offers could be made usable for congestion management. CEDEC et al. (2019) ar-
gues that in order to have functional flexibility markets, the reformed market environment will 
need new functionalities, such as a flexibility register and datahub, as shown in Figure 23. 
These market services are not discussed further here.   
7.2 Operational changes  
The use of flexibility will result in short-term operational activations and changes to the oper-
ational planning processes. This subchapter addresses four themes in relation to this operational 
window. Also processes related to long-term operational or network planning, such as grid 
reinforcements, must be updated when flexibility products are being used in larger extent, alt-
hough these are excluded here. 
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7.2.1 TSO-DSO coordination 
Short-term or operational TSO-DSO coordination means multilateral processes that ensure se-
cure and cost-efficient utilization of infrastructure of many network operators and flexibility of 
the network connected resources (CIGRE 2018). This is a market service. Therefore TSO-DSO 
coordination should enable following functionalities: 
• TSO-DSO need coordination (for example congestion zone definition), 
• additional request of flexibility offers, 
• offer filtering (physically unfeasible offer), 
• selection of feasible flexibility bids according to technical effectivity and cost-effi-
ciency, which can result to: 
o in-advance defined self-dispatch of the FSP, 
o dispatch by the TSO, 
o dispatch by the DSO (directly or request from TSO). 
 
Figure 24 illustrates a possible timeline related to TSO-DSO coordination, where the concept 
of a TSO-DSO-coordination-platform (TDCP) is introduced. The product sequence in Figure 
24 follows the procurement scheme presented in Chapter 6.  
 
 
Figure 24: TSO-DSO coordination and multilateral markets - scenario of parallel energy, capacity and 
flexibility trading and delivery. 
 
To avoid complexity, Figure 24 does not show other parallel markets, such as FCR markets. 
Also, possible interactions between the illustrated markets are not shown. Previous is regard-
less of the fact, that these interactions exist, as same resources are traded for many products on 
many markets. As discussed in Chapter 7.1, there should be a possibility to cross-process link 
offers between markets, so that risks and complexity FSPs face regarding flexibility product 
trading is reduced. Also, as indicated by experts in Chapter 5, energy-activations related to 
competitive bilateral flexibility contracts and other bilateral trades should be preferably known 
before day-ahead trading. Still, near real-time bilateral trades must be allowed in case of emer-
gencies. Figure 24 assumes, that balancing and locational balancing energy bids are part of the 
same market and that intraday markets will have separate merit order lists for locational and 
zonal offers. In Figure 24, the SO grid calculations are done by each SO individually, and then 
combined in the shared operator interface. TDCP has the TSO-DSO functionalities listed 
above. One main goal is to calculate an effectivity matrix of different order combination alter-
natives in reference to the network needs. This is to select the most efficient offers to be acti-
vated. 
78 
 
 
7.2.2 Operational chain of flexibility  
Once multilateral planning of SOs results into a need to activate flexibility, there must be op-
erational processes in place. These ensure, that the entire operational chain of flexibility acti-
vation works as desired. This includes contractual, financial and physical interactions. Figure 
25 visualizes one possibility of different interactions and operational value chains of market-
based flexibility trading from the FSPs, resource owners and network operators’ point of view. 
Relationships of other parties are not shown to make the figure more readable. Non-market-
based flexibility procurement, like curtailment, directly between a network operator and a net-
work user, which is not a FSP, is not considered. The arrows in Figure 25 indicate the assumed 
direction or bidirectional relationship of the financial transactions, activation signals, and con-
tractual relationships between the parties. 
 
Figure 25: Value chains of market-based flexibility from viewpoints of FSP, flexibility resource owner 
and network operator. 
 
According to Figure 25, if a network operator needs to procure additional flexibility to support 
its own resources, it should do this via markets. Network operator will have contracts in place 
with market operators, FSPs and flexibility owners. The activation signal from the network 
operator to the flexible asset can go through the FSP or directly to the asset owner, but the 
contractual relationship and financial transactions will go only to the FSPs. Also, FSP can self-
dispatch flexible assets according to market price-signals and to their own preference without 
an activation signal from network operators. The possibility of a flexibility market operator 
sending activation signals, is not examined here, since either FSP self-dispatch or SO dispatch 
is preferred. Still, market operators can enforce self-dispatch by matching trades, supportive 
price-signals, or obligating penalties and other rule-based control. FSP has a contractual rela-
tionship and financial transactions with all parties.  
The financial compensation for delivered flexibility is here transferred from networks to FSPs 
via markets. In turn, FSPs remunerate resource owners for the utilization of their assets while 
making profit on operational margins. The FSPs can sell flexibility from the controllable assets 
to other market parties, networks or use the flexibility for private purposes. Also, the possibility 
of doing private bilateral trades with other parties is shown in Figure 25, but not further 
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examined here as it is not preferred. FSPs also compensate the possible imbalances and other 
costs that retailers and BRPs might experience from the flexibility delivery in the flexibility 
scenario presented in Figure 25. BRPs and retailers can have uni- or bidirectional financial and 
contractual relationships with different parties. If the retailer is also a BRP and a FSP or the 
owner of the flexible resource, the figure will have less roles and interactions. 
7.2.3 Flexibility delivery verification and settlement  
Settlement and verification of flexibility delivery are important functionalities of the end-to-
end chain of flexibility and needed for securing fair financial transactions. Flexibility delivery 
verification and settlement processes must be in place so that network operators can fairly and 
confidently procure flexibility with flexibility products. Also, flexibility sellers will need this 
functionality to trust flexibility markets. Flexibility delivery verification can happen during 
real-time or after delivery. Flexibility delivery settlement after physical delivery can happen 
separately or jointly with imbalance settlement processes. In the foreseen market environment, 
flexibility settlement and verification are difficult regardless of what kind of flexibility prod-
ucts are being used. Settlement is an inseparable part of product definitions and markets. 
 
Here it is proposed, that flexibility verification and settlement should be done for different 
kinds of production and energy storage units with the combination of a schedule and fine-
resolution monitoring, as their network varies significantly depending on dispatcher decisions. 
For some forms of consumption also statistical baselines based on historical consumption can 
be used as schedules (Elering et al. 2017). Therefore, one key element of functional flexibility 
markets, is an accurate baseline-definition or good quality schedules. These are needed when 
the amount of flexibility activated must be identified and settled. Firstly, a baseline or a sched-
ule is needed if there are no unit-based market positions or trustable schedules available. The 
possibility of mandatory unit-based trading is excluded, as the shift towards unit-based bidding 
in European wholesale trading is seen unlikely. Possible other ways to settle flexibility could 
not be answered in this thesis. For example, if a SO activates virtual power plant consisting of 
distributed resources, there must be a way to know what the true private plan of a FSP was 
before the activation took place. This is needed because the buyer and seller must be able to 
compare measurements in relation to something in real-time or ex-post. This is needed to settle 
and remunerate the delivered service. Secondly, if aggregation is done from resources meas-
ured under different BRP balances, there must be a mechanism to settle and handle these acti-
vations fairly among all affected parties. This can be done either with a separate financial pay-
ment and/or the imbalance deviation should be transferrable during imbalance settlement. Also, 
good quality baseline-definition or schedules are needed for verification, when using flexibility 
products where the balance energy might not be a major motivation to deliver flexibility, such 
as congestion management or frequency containment reserve products.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it should be decided, who sets the schedules or baselines. Before a 
seller of flexibility has made a sell offer, it has analyzed the flexible asset in order to determine, 
how much it can flex. This analysis results in schedules and trading. Accurate forecasting re-
quires knowledge about whether the resource has been flexing in the past. The seller has this 
historical information and the flexibility buyer doesn’t. There is a risk, that the seller or buyer 
manipulates the baseline or schedule and a risk-free solution would require impartial third-
party.  
 
Figure 26 presents a scenario to clarify the proposed flexibility verification and settlement 
method. In both scenarios A and B, there is a dispatcher with three power plants, privately 
planned to produce 60 MWh, 40 MWh and 20 MWh. This is based on a 120 MWh portfolio 
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offer on day-ahead market and a production portfolio with a 10 MWh offer. Both portfolios are 
realized in market clearing. Fixed and variable costs, for example fuel costs, related to produc-
tion or consumption are here assumed to be zero and all profit margins are assumed to be in-
cluded in the prices. Local flexibility market clearing price is assumed as given, although it can 
be foreseen that the dispatcher could impact the market price. Hypothetical prices used:  
• Wholesale system-level, day-ahead price = 45 €/MWh 
• Wholesale system-level, intraday price = 65 €/MWh 
• Local flexibility market price = 150 €/MWh 
• Imbalance price = 75 €/MWh (downward regulating ISP assumed) 
 
 
Figure 26: Arbitrage of private and public schedules during verification of flexibility delivery. 
 
In both scenarios there is a need to order upregulation for an area where the powerplant 1 is 
located. This amount will differ depending on the need of the SO, but it is here assumed that 
the SO trusts the schedules given by the dispatcher and procures all locational flexibility. It is 
also assumed, that if the powerplant 1 produces 70 MWh or more the congestion is solved. In 
scenario B the dispatcher manipulates the public schedules of power plants so that firstly the 
need to order locational upregulation seems to increase and secondly the dispatcher can sell 
more of the production of powerplant 1 with the higher local flexibility market price. It is here 
assumed that when the dispatcher is doing this manipulation, he has full insight of the foreseen 
revenues, costs and regulation direction. This example is not realistic and competition in the 
area could limit the chances of gaming. In scenario A the dispatcher informs the private sched-
ules, but in scenario B it informs that powerplant 1 will produce only 10 MWh of the 120 MWh 
and powerplants 2 and 3 will produce the rest. After this, the dispatcher has three options: 
• Option 1: Take full cost of imbalance 
• Option 2: Self-balance (assuming zero costs) 
• Option 3: Balance the portfolio with a trade system-level intraday  
 
If the dispatcher uses true private schedules, it can generate more and gain extra revenue with 
the localized flexibility trade in scenario A. In scenario B this local premium is increased with 
generation schedule manipulation. Possibility of flexible consumption or consumption sched-
ule manipulation is here excluded. Additional revenue from flexibility trades: 
• Scenario A:  
o 10 MWh*150 €/MWh = 1500 €, where the calculation is flexibility amount 
times the flexibility price. 
• Scenario B 
o Option 1: 60 MWh*150 €/MWh – 50 MWh*75 €/MWh = 5250 €, where the 
calculation is flexibility amount times the flexibility price minus the imbalance 
costs.   
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o Option 2: 60 MWh*150 €/MWh = 9000 €, where the calculation is flexibility 
amount times the flexibility price minus the imbalance costs.   
 
o Option 3: 60 MWh*150 €/MWh – 50 MWh*65 €/MWh = 5750 €, where the 
calculation is flexibility amount times the flexibility price minus the intraday 
trade costs. 
 
o Interestingly if in option 1, the ISP would have been an upward regulating one 
with same price, the dispatcher would have gained through local flexibility and 
self-balancing: 60 MWh*150 €/MWh + 50 MWh*75 €/MWh = 12750 €. This 
is because the activation would have helped the local area congestion and the 
system-level area frequency at the same time.  
 
In all five cases, the dispatcher gains additional and relatively more revenue from the local 
trade than from the system-level markets. Also, the dispatcher has the possibility to further 
increase revenue with schedule manipulation. As stated in Chapter 5, the best way to address 
gaming is to increase local competition. Also, regulation, monitoring and fine-resolution meas-
urements can help where there are many options to limit gaming, such as: 
• in case of a flexibility trade, trading on that regulating object (RO) or on the entire 
portfolio is frozen until delivery, 
• in case of a flexibility trade, self-balancing is disallowed, by doing unit-based settle-
ment, 
• in case of a flexibility trade, market behavior and other activity is monitored, 
• introduction of regulated prices, price-caps or other rules on flexibility trades. 
 
In future, overlapping flexibility, balancing and wholesale markets provide situations for near-
real time trading. It must be ensured that these processes and settlement are compatible, to 
avoid situations where same capacity and energy would be sold multiple times. It is here as-
sumed, that if flexibility activations via balancing or locational intraday markets are done near 
delivery, the possibility of gaming is reduced. This results from the limited time to re-trade the 
flexibility or to do self-balancing. Also, competitive bilateral contracts can limit gaming as 
there is less urgency to select bids. Assumptions above, are highly dependent on the GCTs and 
transparency of balancing, intraday and flexibility market results. Still, it is likely that SOs 
would prefer to procure locational flexibility well in-advance, since TSO-DSO coordination 
can take time and the activity of SOs must focus more on system-level balancing near delivery.  
 
According to Pakalén (2019) TSOs should implement operational processes and practices that 
are in line with a reactive balancing philosophy to support efficient system-level balancing. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there is industry support for the transition towards a more reactive 
balancing model of TSOs. There are market changes foreseen despite and due to a reactive 
balancing philosophy. Examples of these are: single price and single position imbalance settle-
ment model, near real-time trading on wholesale markets and limited preventive activations 
from balancing energy markets. These can decrease frequency deviations and increase cost-
efficiency of balance mechanism. A reactive balancing model is here assumed to be the future 
of the balancing mechanism, even though it can limit the operational environment of flexibility 
markets. This limitation is because of the near delivery trading and because balancing offers 
cannot be used for redispatching as extensively as before. Therefore, the situation is a tradeoff 
between the two options. If financial bindingness of production schedules is reduced and reac-
tive FRR balancing energy activations are increased, there will be increased challenges with 
all presented flexibility product options. Still, according to findings in this thesis, some 
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locational flexibility must be procured from markets and therefore there must be mechanisms 
to monitor and settle deliveries. Reconciliation of flexibility markets and a reactive balancing 
philosophy with other foreseen changes must be continued in future development. 
 
7.2.4 Transparency 
As said in previous chapters, there are foreseeable changes ahead, where a transparent and fair 
market environment must be ensured. Firstly, there must be visibility to the supply and demand 
of different amounts and types of flexibility to be able to use flexibility markets. As mentioned 
in Chapter 5, flexibility sellers have good understanding of the geographical and time-varying 
characteristics of their resources. Flexibility buyers indicated that currently SOs have limited 
short-term visibility to the areas for which they might need flexibility and that they do not know 
if there is matching supply. Also, information sharing between different network operators 
should increase, as described in chapters 5 and 7.2.1.  
 
This thesis does not examine transparency of existing markets. Still, during interviews, experts 
were worried about possible abuses of market power in system-level markets. Some argued, 
that the situation would worsen especially in cases where market transparency would increase, 
or locational flexibility would be more valued. For example, limited market access and low 
data transparency of redispatching, network allocation reductions and other capacity mecha-
nisms in Europe were mentioned during interviews. SOs varyingly indicate what ancillary ser-
vice costs and congestion management expenses they have had (ENTSO-E 2019a). There is 
room for improvement in the transparency of European TSOs and DSOs. 
  
Table 7 lists the redispatching and countertrade costs and special regulation activations done 
by Fingrid during 2015-2018. Activations for special regulation, such as redispatching, are 
currently done from balancing energy market or with bilateral trades. The average price on the 
last row of the Table 7 is an indicator that does not consider other power-based regulation, 
which are included in the total costs, but not in the special regulation quantities. Considering 
this would lower the average prices below 100 €/MWh in all years, according to an interviewee 
from Appendix 4. Still, this is a good indicator of the locational value of flexibility, as these 
locational mFRR prices are higher than the normal balancing energy market. Based on the data, 
it can be argued that there haven’t been significant structural congestions in Fingrid’s network. 
The occurred congestions, within the Finnish LFC area or between bidding zone borders have 
been mainly due to disturbances and occasional maintenance needs.  
 
Table 7: Special regulation done by Fingrid during 2015-2018. Data: (Fingrid 2019a, e). 
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total RD and CT cost [M€] 3.8 3.9 1.8 4.1 
Special up-regulation [MWh] 25054 22992 8842 38521 
Special up-regulation hours [number of 
hours] 
216 239 125 383 
Special up-regulation average activation 
[MWh,h] 
116 96 71 101 
Special down-regulation regulation [MWh] 8771 6584 2591 7040 
Special down-regulation hours [number of 
hours] 
112 130 67 139 
Special down-regulation average activation 
[MWh,h] 
78 51 39 51 
Average price [€/MWh] * 112 132 157 90 
*This is a price-indicator, not an exact price as explained above.  
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It is important to compare flexibility mechanisms. For example, the same numbers as in Table 
7 for 2017 for the German part of TenneT-network are: 57.9 €/MWh for the average redispatch, 
26 101 GWh of redispatching and total cost of 1,511.5 million euros (TenneT 2018). This is 
significantly higher compared to Fingrid, but an average price is lower. Also, TenneT’s costs 
are larger than the total European costs according to ENTSO-E (2019a), but this contradiction 
is not further examined. Fingrid’s special regulation is, in terms of energy, roughly one tenth 
of the of the balancing energy market. From these comparisons it can be concluded that existing 
network, consumption and generation infrastructure together with market design impact sig-
nificantly what kind of total service costs network users will face. Increased transparency in 
the rules, market access and market data together with fair settlement and easy interfaces are 
key to spur interest of market participants to sell their flexibility both locally and at system-
level. As an example of this, Fortum (2019) argues for the benefits from harmonization of 
redispatch, congestion income and network planning processes of TSOs. 
7.3 Locational market power 
Market power in markets is a situation, where an induvial supplier can have pivotal effects on 
the markets clearing prices with their trading decisions. Due to marginal pricing and many 
other phenomena of electricity markets, defining an exact threshold where a supplier becomes 
dominant is hard to determine. Still, a market share of greater than 40% is assumed to be an 
indicator of existing market power. REMIT-regulation is in place to monitor market abuse on 
different energy markets in Europe. During interviews, the market power of some large Euro-
pean market parties in the system-level markets was experienced challenging. Broadening both 
long-term and continuous market regulation and monitoring to flexibility markets was men-
tioned by interviewees as a prerequisite for having fair competition in emerging flexibility 
markets. (Hirth & Schlecht 2019). 
 
 
Figure 27: Spot market equilibrium with anticipation of redispatch (Hirth & Schlecht 2019). 
 
Alongside regulation many argued in favor of ensuring true market-based competition to solve 
gaming issues. Hirth and Schlecht (2019) argue that locational market power in redispatch or 
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other locational markets is not avoidable with sufficient competition, as gaming results from 
inconsistent power market design. Gaming can be present even with many equally sized com-
petitive bidders. Hirth and Schlecht (2019) argue, that since congestions can be predictable, 
flexibility mechanisms of zonal electricity markets should opt for regulated prices instead of 
market-based mechanisms or switch to nodal pricing. In Figure 27 a hypothetical gaming situ-
ation in the German power system is shown, where anticipation of a congestion leads to gamed 
behavior on zonal wholesale markets and later the employment of the redispatch mechanisms 
with higher prices. The severity of the problem is clear. Similar forecastable north-south trans-
mission trends, major VRES generation capacity concentrations or major load centers strug-
gling with insufficient local flexibility supply and network capacity are seen in many European 
networks. Other type of gaming was presented in Chapter 7.1, where non-physical gaming with 
unit-based schedule manipulation can result in windfall profits even in cases, where no physical 
network limits were threatened. These scenarios are not further assessed in this thesis, as there 
are little reports of such behavior in Finland. Still, if significant gaming behavior is noticed 
using regulated prices, price caps or other types of remuneration in flexibility markets, should 
considered as a secondary option instead of flexibility products presented above.  
 
Table 8: Post tender results (UK Power Networks 2019b). 
Total offered capacity (MW) 66.5 
Accepted capacity (MW) 43.1 
Rejected capacity (MW) 23.4 
Total overall capacity share of accepted bids of the largest bidder (%) 85.9 % 
Total capacity share of accepted bids of largest bidders in each competition (%) 99.8 % 
 
Locational gaming can occur also outside flexibility energy markets. There is little coherent 
data available for assessing issues with locational market power while using competitive bilat-
eral flexibility contracts. All European countries and different networks have their own nu-
ances. Still, an indication of the situation can be seen from recent UK Power Network’s auction 
data. Table 8 shows some key indicators of the DSO held auction. Share of realized bids indi-
cates that in general, there is one large company selling flexibility in many areas. When exam-
ining each area individually, it is evident that only one incumbent bidder is often available. 
Holding auctions to procure capacity from existing resources of a network area can result in a 
situation, where a bilateral contract would have resulted in less transactional costs. Still, in 
cases where an auction results to new installations, it is preferable to have more than supplier. 
Regardless of the possibility of sellers having monopolies in flexibility markets, open market 
access should be provided according to transparency principles described in Chapter 7.2.4. 
7.4 Regulatory and industry chances  
To have flexibility supportive markets in place, the rules of different mechanisms and incen-
tives of different parties must be aligned to ensure this. Regulation model of networks and 
market monitoring has a significant role regarding this. Unbundling, principles of calculating 
allowed profit, cost remuneration principles, tariff parameter harmonization, abuse of market 
power and many more themes were discussed in earlier chapters. This thesis does not go into 
detail regarding the historical or future regulatory models in Finland, as according to 
Kuosmanen (2018), the historical model has worked well. Still, during interviews regarding 
Chapter 5, stakeholders presented three development ideas for regulators: 
1. Harmonization of network tariff components and retail market rules nationally and 
later market harmonization in regional or European context 
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2. Increased market monitoring of system-level and local markets. 
3. Discuss or trial total expenditure framework (TOTEX) in some cases or otherwise al-
low some service procurement as a part of the expenditure allowances of SOs. 
 
Development ideas one and two were examined in chapters 4.3 and 7.3. Regarding idea 3, 
networks and regulation should approach flexibility with the comparison of lifetime costs. Dis-
counted availability and utilization costs of flexibility combined with flexibility optimized net-
work costs should be compared against the network costs without the use of flexibility over the 
lifecycle. This does not consider the current regulation model, other markets, price and interest 
rate development of different cost parameters and assumes that network and flexibility utiliza-
tion forecasting have perfect foresight. The actual lifetime calculation of flexibility and net-
work costs is a multi-variable non-convex optimization problem with many possible solutions 
(Esmat 2019).  
 
The procurer of flexibility, in this case a network operator, can use the above described method 
to compare the possible lifetime savings from flexibility use in relation to the financial and 
technical risks related to the use of flexibility. Still, this oversimplifies the case, as in some 
cases it is almost impossible to use flexibility and, in some cases, it is almost impossible not to 
use flexibility. For example, in cases where system-level security is threatened, the risks out-
weigh almost any costs. In cases where network reinforcements should be done to secure a 
back-up supply for an islanded area being utilized very rarely, the cost of flexibility is minor. 
On the other hand, in cases where there is a structural bottleneck, the alternative costs can 
approach infinite, as the costs of flexibility are much higher than the cost of network reinforce-
ments.  
 
According to Muukkonen (2019) the utilization of flexibility in networks can create significant 
societal cost reductions, and regulation model of networks should adapt to this as quickly as 
possible. According to industry experts in Chapter 5 the regulation model should not lapse and 
lead into a situation where networks over procure flexibility or reinforce networks for locations 
that do not create societal net benefits, discriminate users or that networks undervalue long-
term total network service costs over short-term savings. Still, as said in Chapter 2, according 
to CEP, flexibility comparisons against network assets should be done by many European net-
work operators. Regulators and flexibility traders have a significant role to define fair market 
rules and suitable reference costs for infrastructure, non-wire alternatives and the cost of mar-
ket-based flexibility procurement, which all have major uncertainties. As said in the chapters 
6 and 7.3 the use of competitive bilateral flexibility contracts seems in most cases the realistic 
approach for radial distribution network segments with limited competition while higher volt-
age meshed networks could use flexibility energy products in addition.  
 
According to Saulny (2017) and Manner (2019) flexibility procurement for networks is hap-
pening in Finland already. Technical feasibility and financial profitability can be achieved in 
the current regulation model in Finnish distribution networks, if flexibility can create value 
from multiple sources. It must be highlighted that these results are often case-specific, and the 
true total costs of flexibility are changing rapidly. For example, traditional power plants using 
fossil fuels are increasingly expensive to run while demand response and electrical energy stor-
ages are more economical than before. In these bilateral cases regulation should ensure that the 
procurement process is open for all flexibility sellers and separate and allocate the regulated 
and competitive costs fairly.  
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Technical profitability estimates for flexibility utilization from uncertain and non-existing flex-
ibility energy markets are more difficult than competitive bilateral flexibility contracts. Firstly, 
market and technical data needed for quantitative empirical analysis is not yet existing, avail-
able or isn’t coherently comparable among different systems and countries. As shown in a 
study by Korhonen (2018), analyses using realized balancing energy prices as a proxy for re-
alized flexibility prices work in cases considering large areas. A similar analysis also using 
balancing energy prices for a small area showcased results, where flexibility markets work 
better in load-dominated urban areas, but in rural generation-dominated areas network rein-
forcements and bilateral contracts work better (Mennel et al. 2015).  
 
Flexibility cost-benefit analyses are needed for regulators to compare different alternatives. As 
said in Chapter 1.3, the method deployed in the analyses above was considered also for this 
thesis, but not selected as the research method. This was identified not to be realistic as different 
areas do not have the same resources always available and costs of flexibility are rapidly chang-
ing due to energy transition. For example, using LFC-area-level balancing energy prices as 
reference cost for congestion management or voltage support costs of a large power plants, 
does not work everywhere. In many cases the true cost of utilizing flexibility in an area can be 
significantly more expensive than system level balance pricing would imply or approaching 
infinite, as there is not enough capacity available when needed. Bilateral contracts are better 
suited to situations where there is need to procure entirely new capacity or limited local flexi-
bility supply and only occasional needs. Therefore, only in cases of meshed networks with 
reasonable certainty of competitive alternatives from different sellers, flexibility energy prod-
ucts should be allowed by regulation. Only real-life testing can provide results on the applica-
bility of flexibility markets.  
 
To achieve functional flexibility markets, major industry and regulation changes must be 
achieved. Appendix 7 has a list of industry and regulatory guidelines for flexibility market 
implementation and flexibility product development. To facilitate market-based procurement 
of flexibility, multilateral flexibility markets and tradable flexibility products must be defined. 
Also, clear market rules, TSO-DSO flexibility coordination, and flexibility delivery verifica-
tion and settlement principles based on open architecture between all parties must be deployed. 
When using such flexibility markets SOs must increase the level of transparency regarding 
flexibility activations and design market rules and operation based on open access. To ensure 
the completion of such a complex vision and such ambitious goals, incremental development 
and testing together with the industry should take place. Two possible goals for next steps are 
presented in Appendix 8. 
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8 Conclusions 
This thesis studies the definitions of flexibility products for electricity markets by evaluating 
parameters of existing and emerging product alternatives and identifying gaps in services that 
existing products are not able to adequately fulfill. Due to the impact of the ongoing energy 
transition to electrical systems and expected changes in electricity markets, the need for net-
work operators and market participants to procure flexibility for both system and local-level 
services is expected to increase during the following years. Parameters of tradable products on 
existing electricity markets must be updated to utilize market-based flexibility in multilateral 
electricity markets Also, completely new flexibility products could be developed. 
 
The scope of this thesis is European electricity market development, particularly the electrical 
system and markets of the Baltic sea area and Finland for the next five years. To complement 
academic literature and industry data, an empirical industry consultation was done with half-
structed theme interviews. This included expert views on various aspects of flexibility utiliza-
tion, flexibility markets and flexibility products. Moreover, the flexibility market environment 
was studied to understand the context and to propose the optimal flexibility product structure 
and practices, to be tested in physical demonstrations in real-market conditions. Thus, this the-
sis answers to the question: What kind of electricity market product structure would match the 
needs of the flexibility buyers and capabilities of the flexibility seller’s best, while ensuring 
cost-efficient and secure delivery of electricity? 
 
In addition to possible parameter modifications of the existing products and mechanisms, dif-
ferent kinds of emerging flexibility product and mechanism alternatives are identified, such as: 
flexible network service agreements, dynamic network tariffs, locational balancing energy 
products, locational balancing capacity products, locational intraday offers, competitive bilat-
eral flexibility contracts, nodal products and other mechanisms like forced curtailment. These 
product alternatives were subjected to further analysis and industry consultation. From the ex-
pert interviewees, it can be recognized that the research topic and different flexibility products 
are novel to many of the industry professionals. Discussions during industry consultations fo-
cused more on Finnish and regional aspects of electricity systems and markets and therefore 
European context was given less attention by many experts. Due to this the results of the con-
sultation may be partially applicable for electricity systems and markets in general, but it is 
important to note the differences between environments.  
 
According to the industry consultation there are limited local flexibility issues in Finnish elec-
tricity networks, but this is expected to change in the foreseen years. According to interviewees, 
the primary local needs for flexibility are related to voltage support and network outages, while 
congestions are less of an issue. System level use cases provide the primary market for flexible 
assets, but local needs can provide additional value. The views of experts where split between 
different products and many favored the development of products incompatible with other sug-
gestions. Many interviewees argued in favor of reducing complexity of the foreseen flexibility 
markets and products, as they are already struggling with the on-going market design chances, 
regulatory changes and energy transition in general. Majority agreed, that the coordination be-
tween different parties and interoperability between existing and emerging markets should be 
a primary target for improvement. This would foster the use of flexibility where it is most 
valued. 
 
According to the findings in this thesis, the most suitable products for development are modi-
fications of the existing products. Additional locational information and open competition are 
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best suited for the foreseen challenges. Next, the network operators and market parties should 
test the suitability of the three preferred flexibility product categories: 
• locational intraday products,  
• locational balancing products, 
• competitive bilateral flexibility contracts.  
 
These tests should be done with physical demonstrations in real-market conditions. The devel-
opment of different market services, such as: TSO-DSO coordination, market coordination and 
offer-integration and flexibility verification and settlement, should be started with tests in par-
allel. In addition to the above-mentioned testing and development of flexibility products and 
markets, this thesis identifies themes for further studies. These themes are related to flexibility 
products, such as: dynamic tariffs, independent aggregation and settlement models, flexibility 
register, supportive regulatory model regarding procurement of flexibility services, compati-
bility of reactive balancing with flexibility markets, and flexibility needed for harmonic reso-
nances and dynamic instabilities. Flexibility settlement and the reconciliation of flexibility 
markets with a reactive balancing model are identified as the two most urgent topics for further 
investigation. 
 
Since energy transition is developing at an increasing pace, it is evident that existing infrastruc-
ture, but also tradable products, price- and rule-based mechanisms and zonal-market models, 
are not suitable to handle the change. Emerging electrical network challenges, such as conges-
tions, frequency deviations, outages and voltage instabilities, are major problems that should 
be avoided whenever possible with preventive actions. To solve these challenges, holistic de-
velopment of market models must address long-term investment signals while developing 
short-term balancing, congestion management and other ancillary service markets. These are 
needed to solve network challenges while minimizing the total cost of network service. This 
work should consider both the physical infrastructure and the rules, products and mechanisms 
on markets. Development with incremental experimentation should start immediately and go 
forward with cooperation of all network users and operators. The market-based short-term trad-
ing of system-level flexibility with updated existing products and local level flexibility trading 
with flexibility products is expected to increase in the future. According to the findings in this 
thesis, it is seen that flexibility products will have an increasingly important role in intelligent 
electricity markets to ensure high security of supply and cost-efficient delivery of electricity.  
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Appendix 3. List of the interviewees in industry consultation 
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• Härmä, Onni. Expert. Fingrid Oyj. Interview in Helsinki 27.9.2019.  
• Jouni Pylvänäinen. Chief executive officer. Kymenlaakson Sähköverkko Oy. Interview 
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• Jäppinen Jonne. Manager, System operation digitalization. Fingrid Oyj. Interview in Hel-
sinki 26.9.2019.  
• Kaukonen, Timo. Manager, operational planning. Fingrid Oyj. Steering group interview 
in Helsinki 20.9.2019. 
• Konttinen, Lasse. Business Analysis Manager. Caruna Oy. Interview in Helsinki 
20.8.2019. 
• Karlsson, David. Chief executive officer. Ålands Elandelslag. Interview via phone 
24.9.2019.  
• Kuusi, Risto. Expert. Fingrid Oyj. Interview in Helsinki 27.9.2019.  
• Laakkonen, Mika. Head of physical trading. Power-Deriva Oy. Interview in Helsinki 
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• Latsa, Antti. Service manager. Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy. Interview via phone 4.10.2019 
• Lehtinen, Suvi. Chief specialist, Networks, Technical Regulation. Energy Authority. 
Steering group interviews in Helsinki 17.6.2019 and 20.9.2019. 
• Lindroos, Risto. Corporate adviser. Fingrid Oyj. Steering group interviews in Helsinki 
17.6.2019 and 20.9.2019. 
• Lundberg, Anders. Special Adviser, Regulating services. Fingrid Oyj. Interview in Hel-
sinki 26.9.2019.  
• Mutanen, Antti. Project Manager. Elenia Oy. Steering group interviews in Helsinki 
17.6.2019 and 20.9.2019 and interview in Tampere 23.9.2019.  
• Nyrhinen, Jarkko. Internal accounts manager. UPM Energy Oy. Interview in Helsinki 
22.8.2019. 
• Rantakokko, Jukka-Pekka. Manager, Energy policies and regulation. UPM Energy Oy. 
Interview in Helsinki 22.8.2019.  
• Rantamäki, Heikki. Business Director. Pohjois-Karjalan Sähkö Oy. Interview in Helsinki 
17.9.2019.  
• Saajo, Veli-Pekka. Deputy Director General, Networks. Energy Authority. Steering group 
interviews in Helsinki 17.6.2019 and 20.9.2019. 
• Schöpper, Carina. Student assistant. e2m-Voimakauppa Oy. Interview in Helsinki 
23.8.2019.  
• Segerstam, Jan. Development director. Empower IM Oy. Steering group interview in Hel-
sinki 17.6.2019. 
• Toivanen, Aki. Executive consultant. Korkia Consulting Oy. Interview in Helsinki 
24.9.2019.  
• Uimonen, Heidi. Electricity market specialist. Fingrid Oyj. Steering group interviews in 
Helsinki 17.6.2019 and 20.9.2019.  
• Uusitalo, Jyrki. Development manager. Fingrid Oyj. Steering group interview in Helsinki 
20.9.2019.  
• Väre, Ville. Senior manager, Energy. Virta Ltd. Interview in Helsinki 16.9.2019. 
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Appendix 4. Interview framework  
Introduction: 
• Background and context 
o INTERRFACE-project 
o Current congestion management process of Fingrid Oyj 
o Foreseen electricity market updates (that are linked to flexibility products): 
▪ European balancing energy markets (Nordic Balancing Model) 
▪ Pilots and other emerging concepts 
• Scope of thesis: 
o Real-time and local electricity market products for:  
▪ Market-based congestion management? 
▪ Enhanced voltage and reactive power control? 
▪ Other flexibility needs indicated by the interviewees? 
o From the year 2024 onwards 
o Focus on themes linked to the role of the organization of the interviewee 
• Utilization of interview results 
o Anonymity of interviewees in the thesis 
o Recording of the interview 
 
Theme 1: Flexibility in the electricity system: present and future needs  
1.1. What flexibility needs do you have now? What flexibility needs do you foresee from 
the year 2024 onwards? How locational is this flexibility need?  
 
1.2. During what kind of situations, you will need flexibility: 
a) now?  
b) from 2024 onwards? 
 
1.3. What flexibility supply do you have now? What flexibility supply do you foresee from 
the year 2024 onwards? How locational is this flexibility supply?  
 
1.4. Does the supply and demand of flexibility match:  
a) temporally?  
b) spatially? 
 
1.5. What experiences do you have about utilization of flexibility: 
a) at system level? 
b) locally?  
 
1.6.  What kind of capability do you have to asses locational needs and select specific assets 
to provide locational services: 
a) in general? 
b) in real-time? 
c) in relation to unit’s schedule or your balance position (if a market party)? 
 
Theme 2: Architecture and coordination of a flexibility market  
2.1. How network utilization should be decided at unit level (alternatives: with central dis-
patch, with portfolio-based self-dispatch, with unit-based self-dispatch?) in: 
a) wholesale markets?  
b) ancillary services markets (e.g. balancing energy markets)?  
c) flexibility markets?
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2.2. Who should have a priority control in ancillary services (e.g. balancing) and flexibility 
markets?  
a) Transmission system operator  
b) Distribution system operator if the resource is connected to the distribution net-
work 
c) Owner or operator of the resource 
 
2.3. What kind of network coordination is needed? What information needs to be shared 
and what decisions must be multilateral in: 
a) TSO-TSO coordination? 
b) TSO-DSO coordination?  
c) DSO-DSO coordination? 
 
2.4. What existing practices, parameters and rules should be changed to spur the utilization 
of all flexibility in:  
a) system level markets?  
b) locational markets?  
 
2.5. What is the optimal relation of wholesale, balance and congestion management mar-
kets/mechanisms: 
a) Option 1: separate TSO and DSO congestion management, but combine TSO 
balancing and congestion management? How DSO congestion management is 
achieved? 
b) Option 2: Combine TSO and DSO congestion management, but separate TSO 
balancing: 
Option 2.1. Utilize a separate congestion management market?  
Option 2.2. Utilize intraday markets for congestion management? 
c) Option 3: Combine TSO and DSO congestion management and TSO balancing? 
 
2.6. Do small bidding zones in flexibility market create the possibility of “gaming” due to 
locational market power? How should market design and regulation limit this? 
 
2.7. How do you think that market design should coordinate existing markets and mecha-
nisms and emerging flexibility markets together? Should some markets be integrated, 
or should some markets be used for purposes other than the current one? 
 
2.8. How should the contract relation and remuneration between the network, flexibility 
resource owner and energy retailer or trader be formed when flexibility is traded? What 
if there is an independent aggregator in place?   
 
2.9. How should network reinforcement planning and network capacity allocation take the 
utilization of flexibility into account? 
 
Appendix 4 (3/3) 
 
Theme 3: Flexibility products and other steering mechanisms 
3.1. Should mFRR or RR balancing energy offers used also for purposes other than balanc-
ing (e.g. congestion management or voltage support)? If yes, when should the flexibility 
market compliant balancing energy bids be submitted and activated?  
a) “Flexibility bid” submission at balancing energy gate closure (at H-25)? 
b) “Flexibility bid” submission before balancing energy gate closure (before H-
25)? When? 
 
3.2. Should flexibility market compliant balancing energy bids be activable also by DSOs 
and should DSOs or TSOs be able to activate these for longer durations than the stand-
ard balancing energy product (>15min)? 
 
3.3. Should mFRR or RR balancing capacity offers used also for purposes other than the 
reservation of balancing capacity (e.g. locational congestion management or voltage 
support)?  
 
3.4. Should intraday market offers used for other purposes than the zonal wholesale market 
trading? Are networks capable and willing to choose and remunerate trades based on 
delivery from locational intraday offers? Are market parties willing to trade with loca-
tional intraday offers?  
 
3.5. Should there be locationally specific auctions for the procurement of competitive bilat-
eral contracts? How should these bilateral contracts be realized: 
a) in advance defined delivery with self-dispatch? 
b) in advance defined availability times with SO activation? 
c) as a capacity mechanism with an obligation to offer to balancing energy mar-
kets? 
d) as a capacity mechanism with an obligation to offer to intraday markets? 
 
3.6. How should grid tariffs, network connection contracts, network service contracts and 
other mechanisms in place support the utilization of locational flexibility? Should net-
works be able to opt for bilateral contracts or limit delivery?  
 
3.7. How should flexibility offers be priced, settled and monitored and how should the re-
lated costs be allocated? Verification in relation to: 
a) unit-based market position or schedule? 
b) baseline method? 
c) fine granularity monitoring with sub-metering or high-resolution metering?  
 
Theme 4: General comments, development ideas and other feedback 
4.1. Are you aware of any existing flexibility market solutions or initiatives? 
4.2. Where any flexibility products or mechanisms missing from the background material? 
4.3. How do see flexibility products and markets in general? 
4.4. How should network operators enable flexibility markets?  
4.5. How should the regulatory model take the utilization of locational flexibility into ac-
count?  
4.6. Do you wish to test flexibility markets as a part of the INTERRFACE-project or with 
Fingrid Oyj in general? 
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Appendix 5. Definition of product parameters 
Adapted from: (CEDEC et al. 2019; Nolan et al. 2019; Kessels et al. 2019.)  
Parameter Definition 
Short description Short description of the product 
Market time unit /valid-
ity period 
The period when a bid offered to a market can be activated or is procured 
in advance to deliver for that market time unit.  
Market opening The point in time when bids can be submitted to the market. Time in CET. 
Market closure The point in time when bids must be submitted to the market. Time in CET. 
Minimum lead time The minimum period between the market closure and the start of the valid-
ity period. After closure there can also be market clearing which indicates 
whether the bid is valid for the market time unit. D symbolizes days and H 
symbolizes delivery hour. For example, H-25 min is 25 min before delivery. 
Full activation time The period between the activation and the full delivery of the product. This 
consists of a preparation and a ramping period. 
Duration of delivery pe-
riod (minimum-maxi-
mum) 
The minimum and maximum length of the delivery period which can 
shorter, equal or longer than the corresponding validity period. Delivery pe-
riod can also exceed the end of the validity period, if conditions allow this.  
Minimum bid size 
[granularity] 
Minimum bid size is the minimum amount of power for one bid. Granularity 
is the smallest additional increment in volume of a bid. 
Divisibility Possibility for a buyer to use only part of the bids. 
Symmetric/asymmetric 
product 
Symmetricity determines whether only symmetric products or also asym-
metric products are allowed. 
Mode of activation  Mode of activation refers what is the activation logic (manual or automatic) 
and who is responsible for the dispatch (e.g. SO or resource owner). 
Locational information                        
(order book, bid re-
sources) 
Locational information refers to at what spatial accuracy bids are given (e.g. 
for a bidding zone) and at what underlying resources must be indicated in 
the bid (e.g. a specific resource will deliver x share of an offer). 
Aggregation rules Description on the possibility to aggregate resources in bids. 
Link to primary ser-
vice(s) 
Description of the situation for what primary reason(s) this product is traded 
i.e. what system service does it manage. 
Link to secondary or 
other services 
Description of whether a product is currently used or could be used in the 
future for additional services. 
Market or other pro-
curement channel 
Description of what is the main market for trading and are there significant 
additional procurement mechanisms. 
Buyer(s) Description of what parties are most likely to actively procure services with 
this product. 
Seller(s) Description of what parties are most likely actively selling services with this 
product. 
Remuneration and 
compliance monitoring 
Description of how product delivery is monitored and what is remunerated 
in settlement.  
Sources Source(s) of information 
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Appendix 6. UK Power Networks flexibility needs and prod-
ucts summary 
Source: (UK Power Networks, 2019a) 
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Appendix 7. Industry guidelines for flexibility markets 
Adapted from: (Energiföretagen Sverige 2019).   
• Promote the use of flexibility in multiple ways and with many communication channels 
• Identify parties responsible for the situation and trough settlement ensure fair flexibility 
cost allocation to the responsible parties 
• Develop a discussion culture and increase transparency among different network oper-
ators and market parties to anticipate network reinforcement and operational needs in a 
timely manner 
• In case of allocation reductions release transmission capacity on the market after reas-
sessing the capacity requirements of different network operators 
• Explore and promote the possibility of introducing locationally and temporally dynamic 
power tariffs or other bilateral contracts via FSPs for the pricing of network service 
• Ensure compatibility of flexibility markets and other markets and rules in general with 
national, regional and European development 
• Ensure long-term commitment to the necessary network reinforcements and flexibility 
resource installations 
• Develop market mechanisms in place to promote the provision of the services needed 
by the network and identify and remove obstacles that reduce flexibility and price re-
sponsiveness 
• Streamline permit processes related to networks and network users 
• Ensure consistency of legislation, regulation and policy objectives 
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Appendix 8. Next steps for flexibility markets  
 
I. Test the suitability of different flexibility product options with physical demonstra-
tions in real-market conditions. Possible sub-tests: 
• Use of locational mFRR balancing products: 
o Activation of a locational mFRR balancing energy offer. 
o Activation of a locational mFRR balancing energy offer with a counter-activa-
tion in another location. 
o DSO activation of a locational mFRR balancing energy offer. 
• Locational intraday product: 
o Activation of a locational intraday offer. 
o Activation of a locational intraday offer with a counter-activation.  
• Activation of a locational flexibility energy offer, either IDM or mFRR, which is 
linked to a locational mFRR balancing capacity offer or other flexibility capacity 
market offer. 
• Competitive bilateral flexibility contracts: 
o Hold an auction for the procurement of locational flexibility from: 
▪ new installations,  
▪ from existing resources. 
o Hold an auction for the procurement of locational flexibility for: 
▪ reactive power control, 
▪ for congestion management with: 
• self-activation (according to the predefined contract), 
• system operator activation (e.g. electrical signal). 
▪ uninterrupted power supply or other post-fault support. 
II. Develop and test market services needed for the physical demonstrations (I). Possible 
sub-tests: 
• TSO-DSO coordination: 
o TSO-DSO need coordination (for example flexibility zone definition), 
o additional request of locational offers, 
o selection of feasible flexibility offers according to technical effectivity and 
cost-cost-efficiency which results to: 
▪ in-advance defined self-dispatch of the FSP, 
▪ dispatch by the TSO, 
▪ dispatch by the DSO (directly or with request from TSO). 
• Market coordination and offer-integration: 
o Regulated domain:  
▪ Offer filtering (unfeasible bids and bid selection) 
o Market operator domain:  
▪ Cross-process linking offers (wholesale, balancing and flexibility) 
o Competitive domain  
▪ Offering and market selection 
▪ Offer sequencing 
• Flexibility verification and settlement: 
o Fine resolution monitoring 
▪ ex-post and/or in real-time 
o Baseline-definition and settlement 
o Unit-based schedule and settlement 
o Imbalance adjustments and other financial compensation 
